Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; February 22, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
John Doe, a 17-year-old at the time of arraignment, appeals a decision from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York allowing the government to prosecute him as an adult under the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA). The JDA defines juveniles as those under 18 and restricts federal court prosecution unless the Attorney General certifies it serves the interest of justice. The Act provides certain rights to juveniles, including protections against confinement with adults, speedy trial requirements, and sealing of records.
Doe's appeal centers on two main issues: whether the district court correctly determined that proceeding as an adult was in the interest of justice, and whether his rights to a speedy trial were violated. The court found no errors in the district court's rulings and upheld the decision.
The case began in September 1991 with an indictment against Doe and ten others for robbery and extortion linked to the Born To Kill (BTK) gang, involved in serious crimes including robbery and murder. Doe was specifically implicated in a jewelry store robbery and an extortion case. At the time of his arraignment on October 18, 1991, Doe was already in custody for other armed robbery charges. During pretrial interviews, Doe provided a false name and claimed a birth date that indicated he was underage, despite inconsistencies suggesting he was actually over 18 at the time of the offenses.
Doe requested the pretrial services officer to contact his attorney regarding a pending case in Utica. The attorney confirmed that a xerox of an alien registration card indicated Doe’s date of birth as February 12, 1974, while law enforcement believed he was born in 1970. A government informant estimated Doe's age at 20 or 21. Doe had previously given different birth dates during two arrests in New York City, which indicated he was over 18 at the time of the alleged offenses.
At his arraignment on October 18, 1991, Doe was represented by Larry J. Silverman, who consented to delaying the trial, set for January 6, 1992, citing the complexity of the case. Silverman did not raise the issue of Doe's potential juvenile status. Following the arraignment, the government sent a discovery letter mentioning Doe had claimed to be born on February 12, 1974. During a subsequent hearing on pretrial detention, Doe again did not contest his juvenile status.
On October 31, Silverman sought an extension for filing motions but did not mention Doe's juvenile status. On December 10, 1991, Silverman moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that Doe was a juvenile at the time of the alleged offenses. After the government obtained additional documentation proving Doe's age, it conceded he was a juvenile and filed juvenile information on December 24, 1991, mirroring the original charges. The government sought to transfer Doe to adult status, supported by a certification from the U.S. Attorney asserting that the offenses were violent crimes with substantial federal interest.
At a January 2, 1992 hearing, the court dismissed the indictment due to the government’s concession regarding Doe's age. Doe argued against the juvenile information, claiming the transfer motion lacked proper support since he was not alleged to have committed crimes of violence in the Eastern District. The court aimed to resolve the motions quickly to begin trial around the January 6 date. However, Silverman expressed his intention to use procedural means to prevent Doe from being tried with co-defendants and stated he would appeal any decision to transfer Doe to adult status, requesting a 30-day preparation period for trial if the transfer occurred.
Silverman requested an adjournment related to the government's motion to transfer Doe, citing that Doe waived his right to a 30-day trial following the juvenile information filing. On January 3, Doe filed a motion to dismiss the juvenile information, claiming a violation of his right to a speedy trial under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5036 due to the delay from his October 18 arraignment to the December 24 filing. A hearing, referred to as the JDA hearing, commenced on January 9, 1992, but was delayed until June 1992 due to various adjournments linked to plea negotiations. Meanwhile, eight of Doe's codefendants were tried and convicted on most counts, with their convictions largely upheld on appeal.
During the JDA hearing, Detective William Oldham testified about the efforts to verify Doe's date of birth, expressing skepticism about a copy of Doe's alien registration card due to the potential for alterations and prior instances where defendants provided false birth dates to secure juvenile status. Oldham noted conflicting information, including statements from an informant and Doe’s previous arrests indicating he was older than 18. The government acknowledged challenges in confirming Doe's age, as he had provided multiple aliases and inaccurate personal details during prior arrests. Investigative attempts involving the INS and other agencies were stymied by the false information provided by Doe.
The district court, in a June 29, 1992 order, denied Doe's motion to dismiss and approved the government's transfer request, referencing prior sealed records. The court also addressed the authority of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District regarding the certification required under the Act, underlining that a crime of violence, as per 18 U.S.C. Sec. 16, involves a substantial risk of physical force being used.
Doe and other members of the BTK group were charged with a RICO conspiracy involving violent predicate acts such as robbery, assault, murder, and extortion. The court established jurisdiction in the Eastern District of New York, allowing the local U.S. Attorney to certify the case under the RICO Act. Doe claimed a violation of his right to a speedy trial under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5036, arguing for dismissal with prejudice. The court denied this motion, citing Doe and his counsel's implied consent to delays, as they had not raised Doe's juvenile status promptly, despite being aware of it. The court noted that the delay had aligned with the counsel's strategy to sever Doe's trial from that of his codefendants.
The court also found that the government had a reasonable belief that Doe was an adult, partly due to misleading information provided by Doe himself, which hindered efforts to verify his age. The court pointed out that had Doe been truthful, the delays would have been avoided, contrasting his situation with that of a juvenile co-defendant who provided accurate information. Additionally, the court determined that Doe would not suffer prejudice from the delay, as both parties had agreed on the complexity of the case, and the juvenile charge would not have been less complex. Ultimately, the court ruled that dismissing the case due to delay would contradict the interests of justice and supported transferring Doe to adult status.
On June 29, the court reopened the hearing to allow the government to call BATF agent Kumor as a witness regarding Doe's claim of being 12 or 13 years old at the time he left Vietnam. Kumor testified that Doe made this statement on October 18. During the hearing, Silverman acknowledged he was aware of Doe's juvenile status claim at the October 28 detention hearing but had not been authorized by Doe to raise it at that time. Silverman indicated he preferred to wait for further documentation. The government suggested that Silverman intentionally delayed raising the issue to obtain a severance, a claim he partially confirmed by stating that he believed he could achieve a severance indirectly.
The district court maintained its decisions to transfer Doe to adult status and not dismiss the case based on speedy trial rights. Doe subsequently appealed, arguing that the court erred in its findings regarding his speedy trial rights, the authorization of the United States Attorney to certify his case, and the justification for the transfer being in the interest of justice. The appeal is based on the collateral order doctrine, which allows for immediate appeal of certain orders that conclusively determine a disputed question, resolve an important issue separate from the case's merits, and are effectively unreviewable after a final judgment. The transfer order here meets all three criteria, as it definitively determines whether Doe will be tried as an adult or a juvenile, a determination distinct from his guilt or innocence. The benefits of juvenile status, such as different pretrial detention conditions and confidentiality of records, would be lost if the appeal were delayed until after trial.
An order that transfers a juvenile to adult status for criminal proceedings is classified as a final collateral order, making it immediately appealable. This is supported by various case precedents. Under 18 U.S.C. § 5036, a detained juvenile must be tried within thirty days unless delays are caused by the juvenile or their counsel, consented to by them, or deemed in the interest of justice. The district court's factual findings about consent are upheld unless clearly erroneous, while the determination of whether a delay serves the interest of justice is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The district court correctly found that the delay from October 28 to December 10, 1991, was consented to by the juvenile and his counsel. Evidence supporting this includes communications indicating awareness of the juvenile's status and the juvenile's misrepresentation of his age. The court also justified the delay due to defense counsel's tactical decisions and the juvenile's misrepresentations. Additionally, the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA) mandates that a juvenile cannot be prosecuted unless the Attorney General certifies the offense as a crime of violence, with this certification authority delegated to the U.S. Attorney in the relevant district. Proper certification is essential for federal jurisdiction over juvenile cases.
Doe challenged the district court's certification on the grounds that it was improperly issued by the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, despite the crimes of violence he is charged with occurring in the Southern District of New York and Northern District of Georgia. While the substantive RICO, robbery, and extortion offenses occurred in these districts, Doe is also implicated in a RICO conspiracy based in the Eastern District, which the court classified as a crime of violence. Doe contended that a conspiracy cannot qualify as a crime of violence since physical force is not an essential element of conspiracy. However, the court maintained that the specific conspiracy in question was correctly categorized as a crime of violence, referencing the general definition of "crime of violence" in the Criminal Code (18 U.S.C. Sec. 16), which includes offenses involving the use or threat of physical force or those that present a substantial risk of such force. The nature of the conspiracy’s goals can indicate the risk of violence, and conspiracies aimed at violent crimes, like murder or armed robbery, have been deemed crimes of violence in previous cases. The court concluded that the conspiracy to commit robbery and extortion fell within this definition, thus validating the United States Attorney's certification.
Additionally, the JDA stipulates that a juvenile may be transferred to adult status only if the district court finds it in the interest of justice, considering six specific factors: the juvenile's age and social background, the nature of the alleged offense, prior delinquency record, current intellectual and psychological maturity, response to past treatment efforts, and the availability of relevant treatment programs.
The court's decision to transfer a juvenile defendant to adult status is subject to review only for abuse of discretion if all relevant factors have been considered. In this case, the district court determined that most statutory factors favored transferring Doe to adult status. Doe was approximately 16 ½ years old during a jewelry store robbery and 17 during extortions, with continued criminal activity up to nearly his eighteenth birthday, indicating his conduct was not isolated or youthful indiscretions.
The court assessed Doe's social background, noting his estrangement from his father and preference for the violent BTK gang over his family, suggesting a negative influence on his upbringing. The nature of Doe's offenses was significant, as the judge, who presided over his codefendants' trial, had firsthand knowledge of the BTK gang's operations and Doe's active role in planning and executing the robbery. The court found Doe's assertion of a minimal role unpersuasive and concluded that the severity of the crimes warranted adult treatment.
Regarding Doe's prior delinquency, the court found his lack of juvenile convictions inconclusive but noted past arrests related to BTK activities. An evaluation by a court-appointed psychologist indicated that while Doe was above average in intelligence, he displayed impulsivity and immaturity. Despite functioning within the gang, the court concluded that Doe's repeated criminal behavior and intelligence suggested he was unlikely to rehabilitate. It also noted the absence of suitable treatment facilities for Doe and expressed skepticism about his willingness to accept behavioral changes imposed by the court.
The court determined that transferring Doe to adult status was warranted due to the severity of his crimes, his intelligence, and his affiliation with a dangerous gang. The court acknowledged the rehabilitative ideal but concluded that the threat he posed to society outweighed the potential for rehabilitation. Doe challenged the ruling on two grounds: first, that the government should have been required to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence rather than a preponderance of the evidence; and second, that the court disregarded psychological evaluations indicating his immaturity and the significance of his mother's arrival in the U.S., as well as his lack of prior juvenile offenses. The court rejected both challenges, affirming that the preponderance standard was appropriate for the transfer hearing, which is distinct from criminal proceedings regarding guilt or innocence. Furthermore, the court thoroughly examined all statutory factors and found no abuse of discretion in how it weighed the evidence. Consequently, Doe's appeal was denied, and the district court's order was affirmed.
