United States v. Steven Robertson, Also Known as Steven Davis, Also Known as Whitey, Also Known as Johnny Lee, Also Known as Mohammed
Docket: 93-1292
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; March 6, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
In the case of United States v. Steven Robertson, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered Robertson's petition for rehearing, which was denied by the panel. Senior Circuit Judge Lay dissented, advocating for a rehearing due to the unique nature of the case. Robertson received a life sentence, raising significant questions about the interpretation of the sentencing Guidelines, particularly in light of amendments to U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.4, which was deleted and consolidated with U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1. Judge Lay expressed concern over the method used to calculate Robertson's sentence, which involved converting seized cocaine quantities into equivalent amounts of cocaine base. The district court had combined 871 grams of powder cocaine (converted to 683 grams of cocaine base) with 69.75 grams of cocaine base to reach a total of 940.75 grams, resulting in an offense level of thirty-six and a life sentence after enhancements. Lay highlighted that Robertson was charged with two counts involving different drugs but was ultimately convicted under Count 3 for powder cocaine, raising questions about the appropriate application of the drug equivalency tables in sentencing. Although there was no issue of double counting, Lay noted the implications of Robertson's special assessment fee related to his conviction under Count 3.
Robertson's case raises concerns regarding the application of drug equivalency tables in sentencing, particularly given his unique charges compared to co-conspirators. The trial court's method of conversion is questioned, especially since Robertson was charged with both conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and possession with intent to distribute cocaine powder, without utilizing the Guidelines' equivalency tables. Two potential reasons for this omission are suggested: either the court viewed both drugs as equivalent and grouped the counts under sections 3D1.2(a), (b), or (c), or it ruled that, due to the conspiracy nature of Count 1, the equivalency tables were not relevant. However, the dissent argues that if the counts were grouped under 3D1.2, it was erroneous, as differing drugs in a conspiracy should be grouped under section 3D1.2(d). The Application Notes to section 2D1.1 indicate that drug equivalency tables should be used to aggregate quantities of different drugs for determining offense levels. The dissent emphasizes that the argument against using these tables in conspiracy cases lacks legal support. The specifics of the charges indicate that Robertson faced a conspiracy charge related to cocaine base and a separate possession charge for cocaine powder, with no clear rationale for the differing treatment. The conversion ratios outlined show that the total marijuana equivalent for the drugs involved leads to an offense level of 32, contrasting with the district court's finding of 36 due to not applying the equivalency tables.
