William G. Dilley v. National Transportation Safety Board and Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
Docket: 93-9570
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; March 6, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
William G. Dilley appeals the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) suspension of his commercial pilot certificate, claiming the FAA lacks authority based on an unpublished interpretation of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, specifically Section 609, which he argues violates the Administrative Procedure Act's publication requirement. Dilley’s attorney, Lawrence B. Smith, contends that the court should vacate the suspension order due to this alleged failure. The Tenth Circuit Court, however, affirms the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) order, citing the FAA's broad authority under 49 U.S.C. app. Sec. 1429(a) to suspend pilot certificates when public safety is at risk. The court emphasizes that Congress intended for stringent regulations to ensure safety in air commerce and that the FAA's disciplinary powers have been upheld in previous cases, allowing suspensions as a sanction for misconduct, irrespective of a pilot’s qualifications. The court agrees with the NTSB that suspensions can serve both punitive and deterrent purposes.
The petitioner argued that suspensions under Sec. 1429 could only occur if there was evidence of a lack of technical qualification, suggesting that without such a finding, the Board could only impose monetary penalties under Section 901. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed these arguments, referencing a longstanding administrative practice of over 4,000 suspensions under the Act and affirming the Board's broad discretionary authority. The court emphasized the importance of air safety as a public interest justifying suspensions as a deterrent measure.
In the case of Hill v. National Transportation Safety Board, the court rejected Hill's claim that the FAA lacked authority to suspend his pilot certificate for regulatory violations, noting that Sec. 1429 is not limited to pilot qualifications. The Act grants the FAA the discretion to suspend certificates based on re-examinations or other investigations deemed necessary for public safety. The court reiterated that the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to modify, suspend, or revoke airman certificates for disciplinary reasons.
Additionally, the court stated that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not require the FAA to publish rules or policies regarding its authority to suspend pilot certificates for disciplinary purposes, a position upheld across several circuits, including Rochna v. National Transportation Safety Board.
The document affirms the decision of lower courts regarding the authority of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to suspend pilot certificates without requiring the promulgation or publication of rules under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The courts, including the First, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits, concluded that the statutory authority granted to the FAA is sufficient, rendering additional publication unnecessary. Mr. Smith, who represented the petitioners in multiple cases challenging FAA's authority, has consistently lost these cases, except potentially for one involving a damages claim against FAA officials. The court admonishes Mr. Smith for persisting with arguments previously rejected by multiple circuits, warning that further litigation on similar theories may lead to sanctions. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, with the FAA Administrator being the real party in interest in the suspension enforcement. The document also notes the historical transfer of aviation safety functions to the FAA and NTSB and highlights Mr. Smith's personal involvement in these cases. Finally, it underscores that any changes to the statute must come from Congress, as the courts' interpretations stand.
Mr. Smith asserted during oral arguments that no court has previously addressed the issue at hand. It has been established that courts require agencies to publish rules and policy statements only if they represent a change from existing law, policy, or practice, as noted in Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center. In the case of Mace, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of a Bivens-type action involving officials from the FAA, NTSB, and Department of Transportation regarding the suspension of an aircraft mechanic's certificate. The district court had claimed a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. However, the Ninth Circuit clarified that their ruling did not preclude the possibility of the complaint being dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or subjected to summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) after further record development. The Ninth Circuit also acknowledged that the Defendants had presented three alternative dismissal grounds: the FAA's comprehensive remedial scheme as a special factor against establishing a Bivens-type remedy, the failure of the complaint to state a constitutional claim, and the Defendants' potential immunity. Since the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice without addressing these arguments, the Ninth Circuit opted not to consider the merits of the Defendants' positions.
