B.H., C.H., J.E. v. Jess McDonald Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, Appeal of Patrick T. Murphy, Both as an Individual Citizen and as the Cook County Public Guardian, Marlin R., Lamore W., Minors, by Their Next Friend, Patrick T. Murphy, Proposed Intervenors

Citation: 49 F.3d 294Docket: 94-2307

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; April 7, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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Patrick Murphy appeals the denial of his motion to intervene in the case involving the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), where he also challenges the district court's decision to conduct non-public in-chambers conferences regarding the implementation of a consent decree. The background involves a lawsuit filed by the ACLU in 1988 on behalf of approximately 25,000 children, alleging inadequate care by the DCFS. After extensive discovery, a consent decree was approved in December 1991, mandating reforms by July 1994, with a court-appointed monitor overseeing compliance. However, three years later, it was acknowledged that the DCFS had failed to meet its obligations, missing deadlines and lacking effective plans for reform. In late 1993, the parties agreed to hold private hearings to facilitate more candid discussions about DCFS compliance, as previous open court sessions had been characterized by adversarial interactions and media scrutiny, hindering productive negotiations.

Patrick Murphy's strong opposition to the decision to hold in-chambers conferences stems from his belief that the public has a right to all proceedings in open court, particularly regarding the significant taxpayer funding and the welfare of 39,000 state custody children. As Cook County Public Guardian, Murphy represents thousands of children and has previously attempted to intervene in the case. He has filed motions to conduct all future proceedings in open court, but the district court denied both his intervention motion and his challenge to the hearings, stating that the proposed intervenors did not meet the criteria for intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. The court concluded that a public right of access does not extend to in-chambers conferences. The appellate court affirmed this decision, noting that while Murphy's motion was timely and he has a general interest in the case, he failed to demonstrate how the denial of intervention would impair that interest. The court emphasized that the proposed intervenors can seek to make the proceedings public without formally intervening, thus failing to show a right to intervene.

Murphy, et al. have not demonstrated inadequate representation, as the ACLU's decision not to pursue open court hearings reflects its judgment regarding the benefits of in-chambers conferences rather than a failure to represent the plaintiff class adequately. The intervention sought by Murphy, et al. was correctly denied. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(b) grants district judges the authority to hold proceedings in chambers, provided that trials on the merits are conducted in open court. The applicability of this rule to in-chambers conferences regarding the consent decree is nuanced; public access is presumed for court business unless clearly distinct from trial proceedings.

The proposed intervenors seek to extend public access into judges' chambers, traditionally private, to monitor the actions of the DCFS Director and the handling of public funds. However, curiosity does not equate to a constitutional right to be present in another party's litigation. Rule 77(b) acknowledges a judge's authority to conduct private discussions with parties, distinct from trial proceedings. The Supreme Court has affirmed the discretion of judges to hold private conferences, even in the context of ensuring public access to criminal trials. Lower courts have upheld this discretion, indicating that the public's right to access does not extend to uninvited participation in in-chambers discussions or bench conferences.

Conflict exists between the court’s traditional authority to hold closed conferences and the public's expectation for transparency in government operations. Citizens often react negatively when they perceive that government actions, especially those involving significant public policy, are conducted without adequate public discourse. While courts are generally open and accountable, the complexities of consent decrees and institutional reform litigation challenge this openness. These cases often involve nuanced policy decisions that do not yield straightforward yes-or-no answers, unlike traditional trials focused on clear outcomes.

In instances where a court finds a state institution in violation of the Federal Constitution, the court typically issues remedies that are more comprehensive than simply ordering cessation of illegal conduct. Courts are obligated to provide effective remedies and possess broad equitable authority to do so.

Proceedings in this case will remain open to the public, with any enforcement or adjudication occurring in open court. Preliminary discussions aimed at negotiation will not be secretive; rather, any agreements reached will be made public, including the rationale behind them and the court's approval or rejection of such agreements. If the parties cannot reach a settlement, disputes will continue to be addressed through public hearings and filings.

Public and media access to in-chambers hearings regarding the implementation of a consent decree is affirmed, with provisions for public attendance at status hearings and access to related records. Written submissions and discussions occurring in chambers will be part of the public record, ensuring transparency in the court's decision-making process. The court, under Rule 77(b), has the discretion to hold in-chambers conferences for this purpose.

The proposed intervenors assert a public right to access such hearings based on the precedent set in Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court of California, which requires that the type of proceeding historically be public and that public access is vital for its function. While no cases have permitted public access to consent decree implementation conferences, the plaintiff class argues these are similar to historically closed pre-settlement conferences. The intervenors refute this, highlighting the distinct nature of consent decrees, which are court-ordered and enforceable, unlike private settlements. 

Consent decrees, established as judgments with the court's enforcement powers, differ significantly from settlements that require a lawsuit for enforcement. The court's ability to modify and enforce consent decrees reinforces their public nature. Comparatively, the case Newman v. Graddick is cited as supporting public access to proceedings following a consent decree, as it involved significant public interest in the release of prisoners under court orders, emphasizing the need for transparency in civil proceedings that affect earlier trial outcomes.

Murphy argues that the case Bank of American Nat. Trust v. Hotel Rittenhouse establishes a public right of access to court-filed settlement agreements and motions for enforcement, indicating that once parties engage the judicial system for interpretation and enforcement, they lose the confidentiality usually granted to such agreements. In contrast, the circumstances in this case differ from those in Rittenhouse and Newman, as the court is not exercising adjudicatory power in the in-chambers conferences, which, per Rule 77(b), do not adjudicate rights or enforce the consent decree.

Murphy also claims that the significant public interest in the consent decree necessitates public access to the in-chambers conferences. However, this assertion misrepresents the inquiry's nature, which, according to the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise, should focus on whether public access positively impacts the specific process. Public access is recognized for enhancing accountability and minimizing judicial errors in trials, thus benefiting all parties involved and fostering respect for the judicial system.

Conversely, allowing public scrutiny of in-chambers conferences could hinder their intended function, as these sessions rely on negotiation and compromise rather than adversarial positions. Such conferences require candid discussions about subjective social policies, and unrestricted public access could disrupt the atmosphere necessary for effective problem-solving and collaboration among the parties involved.

The court affirms that the public does not have the right to attend in-chambers hearings related to the implementation of a consent decree, although it maintains access to other relevant information and hearings. The public has been informed about the consent decree, with notifications sent to affected parties, and has access to monitor reports and court hearings, subject to seating availability. The court emphasizes that allowing public access to in-chambers conferences would obstruct the judicial process, hence non-parties cannot observe these sessions. The determination of whether proposed intervenors have a right to participate and whether the judge acted within discretion remains the focus of the case, with the conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion by the judge.

Additionally, Circuit Judge Easterbrook expresses concerns about the implications of the consent decree on legislative authority, noting that the reallocation of responsibilities from the Illinois legislature to the judiciary was not sanctioned by the legislature and raises questions about the appropriate role of the judicial system in political matters.

The decree places the court in control of a public agency without addressing a specific legal violation, as no concrete wrong has been identified. The court has not determined that the decree's provisions represent the minimal federal intervention necessary. There is uncertainty in society regarding how to effectively support children from dysfunctional families, with various proposed solutions such as parent education, foster care, or institutional care facing scrutiny regarding their efficacy and safety. The Constitution does not provide clear guidance on these complex social issues, reflecting a lack of enforceable federal statutes. Consequently, the court's actions have allowed the ACLU and DCFS to assume a legislative role in Illinois child welfare policy, with the consent decree resembling a statute rather than a remedy for legal violations. The situation has led to litigants behaving like politicians, engaging in disputes and public posturing, and inviting non-parties to lobby for their interests. The judge's attempts to encourage compromise by moving discussions off the record mirror legislative practices, shifting the nature of the proceedings into a more political arena.

Patrick Murphy, the appellant, supports the consent decree but seeks a larger role in the proceedings, believing his influence in court is stronger than in the legislative process. However, having agreed to transfer the political question to the judiciary, Murphy is in a weak position to demand that the case be treated with the adversarial litigation tools. His arguments for intervention have been undermined by a recent court decision that denied such a request, and he has not challenged the adequacy of the ACLU's representation, despite wanting to gain control from them. Discontent with the representative's decisions does not justify intervention.

Regarding his claims about the constitutional right to access judicial chambers, Murphy fails to recognize established limitations on court powers to keep proceedings off the record. He overlooks common law principles in favor of broader constitutional arguments, which ultimately leads to his dismissal. There is no constitutional right to access a judge's chambers, akin to Congress's discretion to keep its internal meetings private. The government often enjoys privileges to conduct business off the record, supported by various precedents that affirm limited rights of public access.

Lawyers for the ACLU and DCFS can negotiate privately, and the district judge can send a mediator to assist without constitutional issues. The First Amendment does not guarantee access to summary jury trials or historically closed judicial proceedings, as established in case law (Cincinnati Gas Co., Capital Cities Media, United States v. Corbitt). Although Congress has recognized the public interest in open deliberations through laws like the Freedom of Information Act and the Sunshine Act, these are recent developments; historically, many federal agencies operated in private until the Sunshine Act mandated open meetings in 1976. The judiciary also conducts discussions and opinion drafting in secrecy post-oral argument, and the Constitution does not require public access to all chambers conferences. The question of whether specific secret discussions constitute an abuse of discretion is not currently addressed. Murphy's inquiry about the necessity of open chambers conferences receives a general response, with further evaluation of meeting treatments under non-constitutional doctrines anticipated. The judiciary should refrain from absorbing political procedural rules and defer to elected officials on political matters.

Murphy's initial motion to intervene in September 1990 was denied by the district court due to his failure to show a direct interest or the necessity of his experience for resolving the case, with the court citing potential disruption to case progress. A second motion in April 1991 was similarly denied, leading Murphy to appeal both denials and the consent decree. The appeal was rejected as untimely and as Murphy lacked standing to contest the consent decree. Additionally, Murphy, acting as guardian ad litem, filed a state court lawsuit against the DCFS on behalf of children affected by sexual abuse, which was ruled moot by the Illinois state appellate court, stating that the needs of the plaintiffs were met by the federal consent decree. Murphy also initiated two federal lawsuits, but one was dismissed for overlapping with the existing B.H. class action, and the other addressed procedural matters. Furthermore, the excerpt notes that various district courts have ruled against press access to certain court communications, particularly those involving inadmissible evidence, emphasizing the importance of a fair trial. The plaintiffs indicated that public access might be restricted in cases involving specific children or workers due to privacy concerns.