State v. Foust

Citations: 150 Ohio St. 3d 1286; 2017 Ohio 5718Docket: No. 17-AP-021

Court: Ohio Supreme Court; May 2, 2017; Ohio; State Supreme Court

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Four assistant prosecuting attorneys from Cuyahoga County filed affidavits seeking the disqualification of Judge Cassandra Collier-Williams from a capital case, which she has overseen since January 2013, currently awaiting a new mitigation hearing. The court determined that disqualification was not warranted. The background reveals that Kelly Foust was convicted of aggravated murder in 2001 and sentenced to death, a ruling later affirmed by the court in 2004. However, in 2011, the Sixth Circuit found that Foust's attorneys had provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately present mitigation evidence, thus vacating his death sentence unless a new hearing was held within 180 days. Although a new mitigation hearing was granted in 2012, multiple delays occurred, leading to the current situation. The prosecutors’ claims for disqualification included allegations of unreasonable delays, bias, and predisposition towards a life sentence for Foust. In her defense, Judge Collier-Williams provided a detailed account of the case’s history, attributing delays to unforeseen circumstances like illness. The court noted that while the case has experienced unusual delays, the judge’s actions did not demonstrate egregious neglect or bias that would necessitate her removal under R.C. 2701.03.

Prosecutors allege that Judge Collier-Williams displayed bias against the state and predetermined Foust’s sentence, citing her comments characterizing the state's death penalty efforts as 'silly' and 'a waste of time.' The judge denies some comments and provides context for others, acknowledging her opinion that a life sentence without parole could be a suitable resolution during discussions about Foust's case. She argues that these remarks were preliminary and conditional, aimed at facilitating settlement discussions, rather than indicative of bias or a fixed judgment.

The judge asserts she has not formed a definite opinion regarding Foust’s sentence, maintaining that her conditional opinions do not undermine the presumption of her impartiality. The review of the allegedly biased comments, along with the judge's responses, does not support claims of hostility or preconceived judgment against the state. Additionally, conflicting evidence regarding comments the judge denies making does not suffice to challenge her impartiality.

Regarding her ruling to assign a jury for Foust’s mitigation hearing, the prosecutors contend this decision was based on a misinterpretation of Hurst v. Florida and contravenes Ohio law. However, the determination of the judge's interpretation cannot be made in a disqualification affidavit, and adverse rulings alone do not indicate bias.

Lastly, the prosecutors claim Judge Collier-Williams improperly delayed the case to allow the incoming prosecutor to decide on pursuing the death penalty.

In May 2016, Judge Collier-Williams indicated a willingness to postpone the mitigation hearing until January to allow the new prosecutor time to evaluate the case, suggesting the new prosecutor might choose to continue the death penalty or resolve the matter differently. The judge expressed that this could save costs for the State of Ohio and minimize future appeals. Prosecutors contended that the judge's reliance on the potential strategy of the incoming prosecutor was inappropriate, as it encroached on the incumbent prosecutor's authority, who had eight months remaining in his term. However, the judge also cited other reasons for the continuance, including the unavailability of Foust’s mitigation expert and the withdrawal of his counsel. Although the judge's comments were deemed improper, they did not indicate bias or predetermination of Foust’s sentence, appearing instead to stem from concerns about judicial efficiency.

The prosecutors, who believed the judge's remarks demonstrated bias, delayed filing an affidavit of disqualification for ten months, doing so only after an unfavorable jury ruling. This timing suggests their request for disqualification was influenced more by the adverse ruling than the judge's earlier comments. It is established that a judge typically cannot be disqualified after extensive involvement in a case unless extraordinary circumstances arise. The prosecutors did not provide adequate evidence to meet this burden, resulting in the denial of their affidavits of disqualification, allowing the case to continue before Judge Collier-Williams.