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Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians Arthur Gahbow Walter Sutton Carleen Benjamin Joseph Dunkley v. State of Minnesota Minnesota Department of Natural Resources Joseph Alexander, Commissioner of Natural Resources, County of Aitkin County of Benton County of Sherburne County of Crow Wing County of Isanti County of Kanabec County of Mille Lacs County of Morrison County of Pine, Intervenors-Appellants, John W. Thompson Jenny Thompson Joseph N. Karpen Leroy Burling Glenn E. Thompson Gary Kiedrowski, Intervenors-Defendants. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians Arthur Gahbow Walter Sutton Carleen Benjamin Joseph Dunkley, United States of America, Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee v. State of Minnesota Minnesota Department of Natural Resources Joseph Alexander, Commissioner of Natural Resources, County of Aitkin County of Benton County of Sherburne County of Crow Wing County of Isanti County of Kanabec County of Mille Lacs County of Morrison County of Pine, Intervenors, John W. Thompson Jenny Thompson Joseph N. Karpen Ler

Citation: 48 F.3d 373Docket: 94-3566

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; February 28, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In the case involving the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians and the State of Minnesota, several parties, including landowners and Minnesota counties, appealed the district court's Phase I orders. These orders, dated August 24 and October 13, 1994, denied a request for certification for interlocutory appeal and for injunctive relief, respectively. The appellants argued that the district court's decisions were final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and should be reviewed under the collateral order doctrine, asserting that these orders granted the Band new privileges and impacted property rights. However, the court determined that the Phase I rulings were not final and did not meet the criteria for the collateral order exception, as the issues could be reviewed after Phase II. Additionally, the court emphasized that the appellants failed to file timely appeals, thus waiving immediate appeal rights. The court dismissed the appeals from the Phase I order as premature but allowed for the injunctive relief denial to be appealed, focusing on the issue of irreparable harm. The district court retained jurisdiction over Phase II while the appeal on the injunction denial proceeded.

Legal Issues Addressed

Appealability of Injunction Denials under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)

Application: The court found that the denial of an injunction is immediately appealable, but the broader review of Phase I rulings is unnecessary for this process.

Reasoning: The injunction issue can be resolved without a full review of the Phase I rulings, dismissing the appeals from the Phase I order as premature.

Collateral Order Doctrine

Application: The court rejected the argument that the Phase I orders are appealable under the collateral order doctrine because the issues are reviewable after Phase II of the litigation concludes.

Reasoning: Furthermore, this decision does not qualify under the collateral order exception as it is reviewable after Phase II of the litigation concludes.

Final Orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

Application: The court determined that the Phase I rulings in the case are not final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as they address only threshold issues and do not resolve the validity of specific state laws or their interaction with Band members' treaty rights.

Reasoning: The August 1994 decision is deemed non-final as it only addresses threshold issues without resolving the validity of specific state laws or their interaction with Band members' treaty rights.

Timeliness of Appeal Notices

Application: The court noted that the Landowners and the State waived their right to immediate appeal by failing to file timely notices of appeal.

Reasoning: The Landowners and State also waived their right to immediate appeal by failing to file timely notices of appeal.