State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin County Court of Appeals

Citations: 118 Ohio St. 3d 368; 889 N.E.2d 500Docket: No. 2008-0573

Court: Ohio Supreme Court; May 23, 2008; Ohio; State Supreme Court

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An original action seeks a writ of prohibition to stop the court of appeals from proceeding with an appeal and a writ of mandamus to compel its dismissal. The court finds that the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction under R.C. 2323.52(F)(2) and (I), granting the extraordinary relief requested. The relators, F. William Sapp and Paul Liu, are defendants in the case Berman v. Liu, where the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas declared Larry Berman a vexatious litigator and prohibited him from initiating legal proceedings without prior permission. Berman filed a notice of appeal on November 30, 2007, without seeking necessary permission, and later requested leave to appeal after the 30-day window had passed. The court of appeals denied motions to dismiss the appeal, stating that Berman's appeal regarding his vexatious litigator status was not an abuse of process, thus granting him leave to proceed. Subsequently, Sapp and Liu filed for a writ of prohibition and mandamus against the court of appeals, naming Berman as a respondent, leading to further legal proceedings.

The court is evaluating whether to dismiss a case, issue an alternative writ, or grant a peremptory writ under S.Ct. Prac.R. X(5). Dismissal is warranted if, after accepting all factual allegations in the relators’ complaint as true and making reasonable inferences, it is clear they are not entitled to the extraordinary relief they seek. Conversely, if the facts are undisputed and clearly support the relators’ request, a peremptory writ will be issued. 

Prohibition and mandamus can be granted if a lower court indisputably lacks jurisdiction, preventing unauthorized jurisdictional exercises and correcting previous unauthorized actions. In such cases, relators do not need to prove the absence of alternative legal remedies.

The current matter involves Berman's appeal, focusing on whether the court has jurisdiction under the vexatious-litigator provisions of R.C. 2323.52. "Vexatious conduct" is defined as behavior intended to harass or cause injury without legal merit. A "vexatious litigator" is someone who has persistently engaged in such conduct across various courts. 

The common pleas court identified Berman as a vexatious litigator, issuing an order that restricts him from initiating or continuing legal actions in specified courts without prior court approval. Consequently, under R.C. 2323.52(D)(1), Berman is barred from initiating or continuing any legal proceedings in a court of appeals without first seeking leave from that court, as stipulated in R.C. 2323.52(F)(2).

A person classified as a vexatious litigator must obtain leave from the appropriate court before initiating or continuing legal proceedings, as outlined in R.C. 2323.52. If they fail to do so, the court must dismiss their actions. In this case, Berman, designated as a vexatious litigator, filed an appeal without such permission, thus violating R.C. 2323.52(D)(3) and (F)(2). When alerted to this noncompliance, the court of appeals was obligated to dismiss the appeal as mandated by R.C. 2323.52(I). Furthermore, Berman sought permission to appeal after the statutory 30-day window had lapsed, rendering his request invalid. The court of appeals incorrectly suggested an exception to the statute for appeals regarding vexatious litigator status, which the statute does not support, as courts cannot modify statutory language. The court of appeals also mistakenly granted Berman's late motions for leave to proceed, which should have been denied. The court claimed that R.C. 2323.52 conflicted with the Appellate Rules, but there is no actual conflict; the Appellate Rules set general filing procedures, while R.C. 2323.52 imposes additional requirements for vexatious litigators. Statutory provisions defining jurisdiction and the rights of parties are considered substantive law.

R.C. 2323.52 is classified as substantive law, impacting the rights of individuals designated as vexatious litigators regarding their ability to initiate or continue lawsuits. As such, it takes precedence over conflicting procedural rules. The case In re Removal of Osuna illustrates that substantive law can override procedural rules. The court of appeals incorrectly relied on State ex rel. Ragozine, which dealt with non-jurisdictional statutory requirements, whereas the current case is jurisdictional. Upon notification that Berman failed to obtain the necessary leave to file his appeal, the court was mandated to dismiss the appeal due to the expiration of the 30-day appeal period. Consequently, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over Berman's appeal. The court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition to halt any further proceedings on the appeal and a writ of mandamus to compel dismissal. A concurrence was noted from Mover, C.J. and Justices Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, O’Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, while Justice Pfeifer dissented, advocating for dismissal of the cause.