Court: Ohio Supreme Court; September 20, 2006; Ohio; State Supreme Court
An appeal was made regarding a judgment that granted a writ of mandamus to compel a municipal court clerk to pay withheld fine moneys to Montgomery County, which were offset against unpaid costs associated with unsuccessful state-law prosecutions. In 1977, the Ohio Attorney General issued Opinion No. 77-088, stating that counties are responsible for costs related to unsuccessful prosecutions in municipal courts. Following this, the Kettering Municipal Court Clerk began billing Montgomery County for such costs and remitting fines from successful prosecutions. However, in 2001, Clerk Gerald Busch stopped remitting costs for successful prosecutions while continuing to bill the county for unsuccessful cases. Montgomery County subsequently notified the clerk that it would not pay these bills. The clerk then decided to deduct these costs from the fines collected. Court costs for dismissed or acquitted cases were initially set at $45 and later increased to $51, with specific allocations for various funds. In 2003, the Attorney General reaffirmed that counties must pay court costs for unsuccessful prosecutions. Despite this, the clerk continued to deduct significant amounts (totaling $478,954.21 from April 2001 to March 2005) from what was owed to the county, which affected the Dayton Law Library Association’s funding due to reduced payments from the county.
On September 24, 2003, the Dayton Law Library Association filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Kettering Municipal Court Clerk Busch to remit withheld funds and stop deducting amounts from state-law fines for unpaid bills. Appellant Clerk Andrea J. White, successor to Busch, filed a cross-claim against the Montgomery County Board of Commissioners and Treasurer, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the county to pay Kettering court costs from unsuccessful state-law criminal cases. The clerk also requested credits for payments made to the county and for the calculation of amounts owed to the Law Library to include all payments made by Kettering. Montgomery County respondents filed their own cross-claim for a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk to pay them for costs deducted from fines since February 2002 and sought to prohibit the clerk from continuing this practice. On August 15, 2005, the court of appeals granted mandamus to both the Law Library Association and the Montgomery County respondents, ordering the clerk to pay Montgomery County the withheld fine money. On November 7, 2005, the court determined the clerk owed $471,914.86 to Montgomery County, and on December 9, 2005, final judgment was entered in favor of the Law Library Association and Montgomery County respondents for that amount plus interest and costs. The case is now under the clerk's appeal, asserting that the court of appeals erred in granting the writs of mandamus and denying her claim. The clerk argues she has the right to deduct costs related to unsuccessful prosecutions from the amounts due to the county, without contesting the county's entitlement to the fines and costs.
The clerk argues that R.C. 1901.26 and 1901.261 grant the municipal court authority to impose complaint fees and fees for supporting various funds on the county in unsuccessful state-law prosecutions. R.C. 1901.26 mandates that municipal courts establish a fee schedule for civil and criminal actions. R.C. 1901.261 allows the court to add fees for court and clerk computerization needs, not exceeding three dollars for the court and ten dollars for the clerk per action or appeal.
However, the interpretation of these statutes is crucial. While the clerk claims the statutes unambiguously require the county to cover these costs, the analysis reveals otherwise. First, neither statute explicitly authorizes complaint fees in criminal cases. Second, there is no specification that costs are to be borne by the county. Additionally, when the General Assembly intends to assign costs to the county, it uses clear language, as seen in provisions regarding juror fees.
The court acknowledges that the municipal court can charge costs to the losing party, but in unsuccessful prosecutions, the losing party is technically the state, not the county. The court of appeals supported this view, noting that although Montgomery County is treated like any other litigant in terms of cost responsibility, the broader statutory framework indicates that the City of Kettering prosecutes certain state law violations in the municipal court, with Montgomery County having specific financial obligations related to these prosecutions.
Responsibilities include covering a portion of salaries and health insurance for municipal court employees. The Revised Code mandates that the Kettering Municipal Court Clerk pay specific fines and forfeited bond money to Montgomery County while allowing the City of Kettering to retain certain fees from state-law prosecutions. Montgomery County is expressly required to cover some costs associated with these prosecutions.
The General Assembly has carefully defined the relationship between Montgomery County and the Kettering Municipal Court regarding state-law offenses, indicating no intent to impose additional fees on the county as sought by the Kettering Municipal Court Clerk. The Clerk's argument, based on R.C. 1901.31(F) which mandates municipal court clerks to remit collected fines to the county treasury, overlooks other provisions that designate the municipality as the recipient of costs and fees, thereby making the municipal court the primary beneficiary.
Consequently, the court of appeals correctly determined that the Clerk could not offset municipal court payments owed to the county with costs from unsuccessful state-law prosecutions. A ruling contrary to this would improperly alter the language of R.C. 1901.26 and 1901.261. If the General Assembly intended for the result the Clerk advocates, it would have explicitly stated so, as it has in other statutes where the county is held liable for costs. The appellees were entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus, leading to the affirmation of the court of appeals' judgment.
