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Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. McClain
Citation: 99 Ohio St. 3d 248Docket: No. 2002-2224
Court: Ohio Supreme Court; July 16, 2003; Ohio; State Supreme Court
Mark A. McClain, an attorney from Cleveland, Ohio, was admitted to practice law in 1982 but had his license indefinitely suspended on June 5, 2002, due to professional misconduct. The Cuyahoga County Bar Association subsequently filed an amended complaint against him, detailing further violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The panel found that McClain failed to adequately represent a client in personal-injury and medical-malpractice cases, which he took on in December 1998. He did not respond to the client's inquiries, missed critical court appearances, and failed to inform her of case dismissals, resulting in the expiration of the statute of limitations for re-filing. Additionally, he neglected a second client’s race- and sex-discrimination case, leading to its dismissal due to his failure to oppose a summary judgment motion. McClain attempted to argue for relief from this judgment based on severe depression but did not provide evidence to support his claim. His actions constituted three violations of DR 6-101(A)(3) for neglecting entrusted legal matters and a violation of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) for not cooperating with the investigation. In recommending sanctions, the panel noted McClain's extensive history of professional misconduct, including previous neglect and failure to cooperate. However, they also considered mitigating factors such as his eventual cooperation, good reputation, community involvement, attempts to repay owed funds, and ongoing treatment for mental illness, which contributed to his misconduct. Ultimately, the panel concluded that he was not currently capable of practicing law. An indefinite suspension from the practice of law has been recommended for the respondent, to run concurrently with an existing suspension that began on June 5, 2002. The board affirmed the panel's findings and recommendation but clarified the suspension's start date. The respondent objected, arguing that his history of misconduct was improperly characterized as aggravating and claimed that his mental health issues warranted a mental-illness suspension rather than formal disciplinary measures. He cited a recent medical report showing improvement and requested a one-year suspension, credit for time served, and the opportunity for reinstatement under monitoring and treatment conditions. This objection was overruled, emphasizing that the expedited procedure for mentally ill attorneys serves public protection, not as a means to evade discipline. The respondent also contested the characterization of his clients as "vulnerable," arguing that the harm caused was minimal due to their low chances of success. The board's findings on these matters were upheld. The appropriate sanction was determined by assessing the nature of the violations, actual harm, mental state, and similar precedents, concluding that an indefinite suspension is justified for repeated neglect linked to mental illness. Consequently, the respondent is indefinitely suspended from practicing law in Ohio, effective June 5, 2002, and must reimburse a client $1,000 for discrimination claim services. Costs are assessed against the respondent, with a concurrence from most justices and dissent from two.