United States v. Gary Lamont Williams, A/k/a/ Hiriam King Williams
Docket: 94-50065
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; January 30, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Gary Lamont Williams, also known as Hiriam King Williams, pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) and was sentenced to 188 months in prison. He appeals this sentence, arguing that it was incorrectly enhanced due to the application of the Career Offender provisions in the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1). The district court deemed that Williams had two prior convictions classified as 'crimes of violence,' one of which was a 1981 California conviction for second-degree burglary under California Penal Code § 459. Williams contests that this burglary conviction does not qualify as a 'crime of violence,' as defined by the Guidelines, which includes offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year that involve burglary of a dwelling or conduct posing a serious risk of physical injury. The California statute defines burglary broadly, encompassing entry into various types of buildings with intent to commit theft or a felony, which can include non-dwelling structures. The court may assess whether a conviction qualifies as a 'crime of violence' using two methods: examining the statutory elements of the crime or analyzing the actual conduct charged. While the California statute is broader than the U.S.S.G. definition, Williams’ plea of nolo contendere to entering a residence to commit larceny establishes that his conduct fits within the definition of a 'crime of violence' as outlined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1)(ii). Therefore, the court upheld the classification of his prior conviction as a 'crime of violence.' Williams pleaded nolo contendere to unlawfully entering an occupied structure, a conduct that poses a significant risk of physical injury to others, qualifying as a crime of violence under sentencing guidelines. Appellant cites United States v. Parker, where a prior conviction under California's second-degree burglary statute was deemed not a "violent felony" for sentence enhancement due to the absence of specified "unlawful or unprivileged entry" in the charging document. However, in Williams's case, the 1981 indictment explicitly stated he "willfully and unlawfully entered" a residence with intent to commit larceny, a formulation previously recognized as constituting a violent felony. The court referenced similar rulings in United States v. O'Neal and United States v. Dunn, affirming that burglary is classified as a violent crime for enhancement purposes when the charging documents outline the essential elements of unlawful entry with criminal intent. The appellant's claim that the California statute permits consensual entries of non-residential structures is rejected, as the charging instrument clearly indicated the unlawful entry of a residence. The ruling is AFFIRMED.