Court: Ohio Supreme Court; May 8, 2002; Ohio; State Supreme Court
David Norgard commenced employment with Brush Wellman, Inc. in 1981 as a fluoride furnace operator and soon developed a severe rash that progressed to skin ulcers, alongside other health complications. Despite ongoing treatment at the plant dispensary and reassurances regarding his health, Brush Wellman suspected he might have heightened sensitivity to beryllium and began conducting blood tests and referrals to the National Institute of Health. The company filed a workers’ compensation claim for beryllium sensitivity on his behalf while he was laid off from 1981 to 1984, during which he continued to receive pay and benefits.
Upon returning to work, Norgard remained exposed to beryllium and continued to experience severe reactions. In June 1992, he was diagnosed with chronic beryllium disease (CBD), prompting an amendment to his workers’ compensation claim and his placement on disability leave. Norgard sought support through a company-sponsored CBD group and became a facilitator with his wife. From 1993 to 1995, he and group members pursued information about CBD, but Brush Wellman discouraged their efforts, citing shareholder concerns.
In 1995, upon learning about lawsuits involving Brush Wellman, Norgard contacted a law firm that revealed the company had withheld critical information regarding the risks associated with beryllium exposure. Within two years, Norgard filed an intentional-tort action against Brush Wellman, with his wife joining for loss of consortium. After dismissing their initial lawsuit, they filed a new action within one year. Brush Wellman's motion to dismiss was denied, but it later sought summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, which the trial court granted without an opinion. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, and the current discretionary appeal questions whether the intentional-tort claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Both parties agree on the two-year statute of limitations under R.C. 2305.10 and the applicability of the discovery rule, but they dispute what event triggered the statute of limitations.
Brush Wellman contends that the statute of limitations for Norgard's claim began in August 1992, when Norgard first learned of his CBD diagnosis linked to workplace conditions. This perspective conflates Norgard’s awareness of his illness with awareness of Brush Wellman's alleged wrongful conduct. Conversely, Norgard asserts the limitations period commenced in October 1995, upon discovering Brush Wellman's misconduct. The court sides with Norgard, reversing the court of appeals’ decision and ordering a trial.
Typically, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations starts upon the wrongful act's occurrence. However, the discovery rule allows for the statute of limitations to begin only when a plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered through reasonable diligence, both their injury and its cause by the defendant's conduct. The O’Stricker case clarifies that both elements must be met for the statute to commence. The court has repeatedly emphasized that merely discovering an injury does not suffice to trigger the statute unless there is an indication of the defendant's wrongful conduct.
In Browning v. Burt, the court distinguished between medical malpractice and negligent credentialing, concluding that knowledge of malpractice alone does not imply awareness of a hospital’s credentialing issues. An "alerting event" must occur to trigger investigation into potential negligent credentialing. Similarly, in Ault v. Jasko, the court held that the statute of limitations on a sexual abuse claim did not begin until the plaintiff recognized the abuse, highlighting the necessity of discovering both the injury and the perpetrator's conduct for the statute to be applicable.
In Collins, a wrongful-death claim arose after the victim's body was discovered nearly five months post-mortem, with the cause identified as multiple stab wounds. Mark Sotka was indicted for the murder, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. The estate's administrator, Luckye Collins, filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against Sotka in February 1995, but the trial court dismissed it as time-barred, asserting it was filed over two years after the death. The court of appeals upheld this dismissal, but the higher court reversed the decision, emphasizing that the statute of limitations for wrongful death claims does not start with the date of death but rather when the plaintiff acquires knowledge of the wrongful act causing the death.
The ruling clarified that a claim is contingent upon proving wrongful conduct, distinguishing between mere injury and the culpable actions leading to that injury. The statute of limitations begins when the plaintiff learns of the wrongful conduct, consistent with the discovery rule's intention of ensuring fairness. This principle applies similarly to negligent credentialing and employer intentional tort claims, which only accrue once the plaintiff discovers sufficient facts about the employer's wrongful actions.
In the case of Norgard, the court determined that the statute of limitations was triggered in October 1995 when Norgard became informed about his employer's intentional misconduct related to his illness. Prior to this, he lacked the knowledge to establish a claim against Brush Wellman. Since Norgard filed his lawsuit within two years of acquiring this critical information, the court concluded his claim was timely, reversed the court of appeals' judgment, and remanded for further proceedings, with some justices dissenting.
