Court: Ohio Supreme Court; July 25, 2001; Ohio; State Supreme Court
The court is addressing a conflict among various appellate courts regarding whether R.C. 2151.421 imposes liability for failing to report known or suspected child abuse under R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) and 2744.03(A)(6)(c). The case involves Amber Campbell, an eighth-grade student at Baker Junior High, who participated in a peer mediation program coordinated by teacher Debra Mallonee. During mediations in March 1996, Campbell disclosed to Mallonee that a family friend, David Burton, made her uncomfortable through inappropriate physical contact and advances. Campbell also shared a fabricated story about a sexual encounter to gain Mallonee's attention, believing she was not being taken seriously regarding Burton's behavior. Mallonee recalled the events differently and did not report Campbell’s concerns about Burton to any authorities, instead advising Campbell to inform her mother and avoid Burton. Following the mediation, Campbell alleged that Burton continued to harass her. In March 1997, Campbell and her parents filed a lawsuit against Fairborn City Schools' Superintendent and Board of Education, and later against Mallonee, claiming that their failure to report the abuse under R.C. 2151.421 led to Campbell suffering psychological harm and permanent injury.
The court consolidated two cases and, on January 27, 1999, granted summary judgment in favor of Clifton and Mallonee, finding them immune from liability under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). Fairborn also received summary judgment, being deemed immune under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). The appellants appealed this decision to the Greene County Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's ruling, stating that R.C. 2151.421 did not impose liability as defined by R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) and R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c). Subsequently, the appellants requested the court of appeals to certify a conflict, which was granted with references to several related cases. The matter is now before the court, which recognizes a conflict and has allowed a discretionary appeal concerning whether R.C. 2151.421 imposes liability on political subdivisions and their employees for failing to report suspected child abuse. The court answers affirmatively, stating that R.C. 2151.421, through R.C. 2151.99, does impose such liability, thus reversing the court of appeals' judgment and remanding for further proceedings. The analysis involves a three-tiered examination of R.C. Chapter 2744 regarding sovereign immunity and its exceptions, particularly focusing on R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), R.C. 2744.02(B), and R.C. 2744.03, with R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) being particularly relevant as it addresses liability expressly imposed by law.
An employee may be held liable if the Revised Code explicitly imposes such liability, as indicated in the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) and R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c). R.C. 2151.421 requires certain individuals, including school personnel, to report known or suspected child abuse. Failure to report constitutes a fourth-degree misdemeanor under R.C. 2151.99. The court emphasizes that the term "liability" in the context of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) and R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c) encompasses both criminal and civil responsibilities, as the statute does not specify a distinction between them. Thus, liability as defined in R.C. 2151.421 is a clear imposition of duty, relevant to the protection of children rather than the interests of political subdivisions or their employees. The court refutes appellees' claim that liability refers only to civil penalties, affirming that the General Assembly intended for the term to reflect any legal obligation imposed by the Revised Code.
R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) grants immunity from civil liability to political subdivisions, while R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) allows for exceptions when liability is expressly imposed by other sections of the Revised Code. The absence of the word "civil" in R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) indicates that the legislature did not intend to limit the exception to civil liability. In R.C. 2151.421, which aims to protect children from abuse and neglect, the General Assembly encourages reporting suspected abuse by providing immunity from both civil and criminal liability for those required to report and imposes a criminal penalty for failure to report under R.C. 2151.99. Consequently, R.C. 2151.421 explicitly imposes liability for failing to report suspected child abuse, negating any claim of immunity for Fairborn.
Applying the three-tiered analysis of R.C. Chapter 2744, Fairborn is generally immune under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) unless an exception applies. The relevant exception is found in R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), which indicates that Fairborn is liable for failing to report as required by R.C. 2151.421. The subsequent sections, R.C. 2744.03 and R.C. 2744.05, do not provide additional defenses or limit damages in this case, confirming that Fairborn is not immune from liability.
For Clifton and Mallonee, their claim of immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) is also subject to exceptions, specifically R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c), which parallels R.C. 2744.02(B)(5). Since liability can be expressly imposed by the Revised Code, their immunity claim is similarly negated, leading to the conclusion that both Clifton and Mallonee can also be held liable under the same legal rationale applied to Fairborn.
An employee of a political subdivision can be held liable for failing to fulfill a duty under R.C. 2151.421, as clarified in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c). However, the court does not determine the liability of the appellees in this case, only that sovereign immunity does not apply to them. The evidence presented may or may not substantiate the claim that the appellees should have reported concerns raised by Campbell regarding inappropriate behavior. The court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands the case to the trial court. Testimony indicates that Burton made Campbell uncomfortable by attempting to touch and kiss her, though details of the information shared by Campbell vary. The case is governed by R.C. 2744.02 and 2744.03, as amended in 1994. Both parties refer to the current version of R.C. 2151.421, which was not effective at the time of the alleged failure to report, but no substantive differences between the current and former versions necessitate distinction. The public-duty doctrine cannot be invoked as a defense against failure to report suspected child abuse under R.C. 2151.421, as established in Brodie v. Summit Cty. Children Serv. Bd., and the analysis in Saivicki v. Ottawa Hills does not apply. R.C. 2151.421(G)(1) has been updated to R.C. 2151.421(G)(1)(a). The document also references cases that impose duties without expressly establishing liability.
