Lisa Caruso, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. William Forslund and Nicholas Palladino, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants

Citations: 47 F.3d 27; 31 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1455; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 2147Docket: 486

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; January 30, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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Lisa Caruso, the plaintiff-appellant-cross-appellee, and defendants William Forslund and Nicholas Palladino, defendants-appellees-cross-appellants, appealed a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, entered on January 26, 1994. Caruso's lawsuit, initiated under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, claimed civil rights violations due to the defendants' search of her home while investigating a missing child case. A jury found the search to be unreasonable but awarded no damages to Caruso. Following the trial, Caruso sought nominal damages and a new trial for punitive damages; the defendants sought judgment as a matter of law regarding liability or, alternatively, a new trial. The district court awarded nominal damages to Caruso but denied her request for punitive damages and attorney's fees, while also denying the defendants' motions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment but on different grounds concerning the denial of a new trial for punitive damages.

On September 14, 1988, Detective Forslund was approached by Donna Neuman, who claimed her daughter Nicole had been abducted and possibly located in East Haven. Neuman did not possess a custody order or a criminal complaint but provided a birth certificate identifying Nicole's mother as her. Forslund, after gathering information from Maine confirming an active bulletin regarding Nicole's abduction, proceeded to Caruso's residence without a warrant. There was conflicting testimony about the entry, with claims that the officers entered Caruso's home without consent. Upon entering, they encountered Caruso and several children but received no information regarding Nicole’s presence.

Caruso became upset due to inquiries regarding Nicole, leading her to request that officers leave her home. Testimony indicated that at least one officer searched other rooms. During this time, Caruso contacted her father, Nicholas Caruso, who arrived and was informed by Detective Forslund about a complaint from Ms. Neuman regarding Ira Perkins. Mr. Caruso identified Nicole and contacted Mr. Perkins. Evidence suggests that they later met at the East Haven Police Department, where Perkins was told he could retain custody of Nicole until proper custody papers were provided by Ms. Neuman, who returned to Maine without Nicole.

Caruso subsequently filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging violations of her rights, including unreasonable search claims. At trial, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law after the plaintiff's case-in-chief, which the court reserved. After all evidence, the motion was renewed, and the court granted it for all claims except the unreasonable search claim. Proposed jury instructions on punitive damages were presented, but the court decided not to address them until liability was established, and Caruso did not object.

The jury was asked three questions regarding the unreasonable search and its causation of injury, ultimately finding that the defendants had conducted an unreasonable search that caused injury but awarded no damages. Following the verdict, the court requested briefs on the issue of nominal damages, and the jury was dismissed without objection from Caruso.

Caruso later moved for nominal damages and a new trial on punitive damages. The defendants sought judgment as a matter of law again or, alternatively, a new trial. The district court awarded Caruso $1.00 in nominal damages but denied the motion for punitive damages, citing a lack of evidence showing the officers acted with evil intent or reckless indifference to her rights. Consequently, the court ruled that Caruso was not entitled to punitive damages and found she was also ineligible for attorney's fees due to the nominal damages awarded.

The court rejected the defendants' motions, affirming that sufficient evidence supported the determination of an unreasonable search and seizure. Both parties are appealing the judgment. Caruso claimed the district court wrongly denied her request for a new trial on punitive damages, arguing that the standard for establishing liability under section 1983 should apply to punitive damages as well. However, her right to a punitive damages determination was deemed waived, negating the need to consider her argument or the court's finding against punitive damages. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 stipulates that a party cannot challenge jury instructions unless an objection is made before the jury deliberates. Caruso's attorney confirmed there were no exceptions to the charge given, preventing Caruso from later contesting the jury instructions, including those on punitive damages. Although the district court indicated it would defer punitive damages instructions until after the liability verdict, Caruso's failure to object before the jury's dismissal meant she forfeited the chance to argue for punitive damages. 

Additionally, Caruso contested the denial of attorney's fees, which the district court denied based on the precedent set by Farrar v. Hobby, suggesting that in cases where only nominal damages are awarded, fee awards are typically inappropriate. The court ruled her victory was merely "technical" since no compensation was granted, thus deeming a fee award unreasonable. The decision regarding attorney's fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Caruso, having received nominal damages for violations of her constitutional rights, is considered a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. However, the award of attorney's fees is contingent upon the degree of success achieved. Since Caruso was awarded only nominal damages, typically, no attorney's fees are justified. The district court properly exercised its discretion in denying such fees, as Caruso failed to prove any claim for monetary relief despite alleging multiple rights violations. While she argued that her case differed from a precedent where a plaintiff sought substantial damages, the record indicates that she did seek compensatory damages, as explicitly stated in her complaint and jury instructions. Thus, the court found no abuse of discretion in its ruling.

In a cross-appeal, defendants challenged the denial of their post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, contending that the jury's finding on the unreasonable search claim was unreasonable. However, the standard for such a judgment requires that there be only one conclusion reasonable persons could reach. The defendants failed to meet this standard, and their arguments were rejected.

The defendants entered the plaintiff's home without a warrant or any documentation regarding the custody of the child they were searching for. Evidence indicated that the entry was made without consent and despite the plaintiff's insistence that the defendants leave, they refused. Additionally, at least one defendant searched areas beyond the living room without consent. The jury found these actions to be unreasonable, and the defendants' argument regarding the welfare of the child did not justify the search's reasonableness. The jury's conclusion was supported by sufficient evidence, leading to the affirmation of the district court's denial of the defendants' motion for a new trial, as a new trial is only warranted in cases of serious error or miscarriage of justice. 

One Circuit Judge concurred, expressing disagreement with the majority’s indication that the plaintiff waived the right to have punitive damages decided by failing to object during the trial. This judge emphasized that the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages was not withdrawn and that a court should not assume withdrawal without clear evidence. The judge noted that the jury was asked factual questions regarding the unreasonable search and its connection to the plaintiff's injury but was not asked to issue a general verdict. The judge argued that the questions were submitted under Rule 49(a) rather than Rule 49(b), and thus did not preclude the consideration of punitive damages.

When a jury is tasked only with answering interrogatories rather than returning a general verdict, and if an essential question is omitted from those interrogatories without prior request from the parties for the court to submit that question, the court must answer it. If the court fails to make an explicit finding on the omitted question, it is assumed to have made a finding consistent with the judgment entered, unless such an assumption is inappropriate. The plaintiff in this case did not timely request the court to submit the punitive damages question to the jury, indicating that the court should have decided that issue itself.

Even if the jury's questions do not encompass all aspects of the plaintiff's claim and could be viewed as a "general verdict," Rule 49(b) does not imply a waiver of issues the plaintiff did not intend to abandon. The silence in Rule 49(b) regarding procedures when a "general verdict" addresses only part of a claim should not lead to a conclusion of abandonment. Instead, the discrepancy between the plaintiff's claim and the jury's responses should be addressed following the procedures in Rule 49(a).

In cases where the trial judge has not addressed an undecided question or has indicated it could not rule favorably for the plaintiff, remanding for a decision may be warranted. However, in this instance, the trial court explicitly expressed its belief that the plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages, suggesting that punitive damages were not the focus of this case. The court indicated it would likely set aside any jury verdict awarding punitive damages. Consequently, the court's statements can be interpreted as a ruling against the plaintiff on that issue under Rule 49(a), negating the need for a remand, and supporting the affirmation of the judgment. The plaintiff's testimony revealed that while she claimed civil rights violations, her primary concern was not monetary compensation but rather acknowledgment of the wrongdoing, indicating a desire for an apology rather than financial restitution.