State ex rel. Lee v. Trumbull County Probate Court

Citations: 83 Ohio St. 3d 369; 700 N.E.2d 4Docket: No. 98-411

Court: Ohio Supreme Court; October 14, 1998; Ohio; State Supreme Court

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Lee's request for oral argument in his appeal was denied by the court, as S.Ct. Prac.R. IX(2) does not require the court to grant such a request. The court noted that Lee failed to demonstrate any factors justifying oral argument or explain its necessity. Consequently, the court proceeded to review the merits of Lee's appeal.

Lee contended that the court of appeals erred in granting the probate court's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which had been converted from an untimely Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion. For a dismissal under Civ.R. 12(C), it must be clear that there are no facts Lee could prove that would warrant relief. Lee sought a writ of prohibition, requiring him to show that the probate court was about to exercise unauthorized judicial power and that he would suffer injury without the writ.

Lee adequately alleged that the probate court exercised jurisdiction by appointing an administrator for Isaly's estate. However, the general rule states that unless a court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, it can determine its own jurisdiction, and any challenge can be remedied by appeal. Prohibition is applicable only if the court clearly lacks jurisdiction. The probate court, being a court of limited jurisdiction, is bound by statutes defining its powers. Although the probate court claimed jurisdiction under R.C. 2107.11 and 2113.01, these statutes do not grant it the authority to administer Isaly's estate.

R.C. 2107.11 is inapplicable as it pertains solely to the jurisdiction of probate courts regarding the probate of a will, and the probate court determined that Isaly died intestate. R.C. 2113.01, which allows the probate court to grant letters of administration upon the death of a resident of Ohio intestate, does not apply as "domicile" differs from "residence." Isaly was a resident of Hong Kong at her time of death. The court of appeals incorrectly asserted that the probate court's jurisdiction was justified because assets were located in Trumbull County, citing Howard v. Reynolds, which confines Ohio probate court jurisdiction over nonresident estates to property within Ohio. The state where property is located retains the authority to regulate its administration upon death. R.C. 2129.04 states that jurisdiction for ancillary administration of nonresident decedents extends only to Ohio property. Thus, neither Howard nor R.C. 2129.04 allows an Ohio probate court to manage a non-Ohio intestate estate. The probate court erroneously granted administrative authority over Isaly's non-Ohio properties (in Michigan, California, and Massachusetts) despite her nonresident status. Lee's prohibition complaint suggests potential grounds for relief as the probate court may lack jurisdiction over these properties. However, Lee's argument regarding comity and the recognition of the Hong Kong proceeding is unfounded, as comity is based on courtesy, not obligation.

Ohio is not required to give full faith and credit to wills that have been validated in foreign countries, as specified in R.C. 2129.06 and 2129.07. This principle is supported by case law, such as State ex rel. Smith v. Smith, which reinforces that a state probate court may disregard a foreign adoption decree if it conflicts with Ohio law. Additionally, Lee cannot invoke the jurisdictional priority rule from the Hong Kong proceedings because that rule applies solely to state courts of concurrent jurisdiction. The court of appeals incorrectly dismissed Lee's prohibition action under Civ.R. 12(C) without considering its merits. Consequently, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings, including the submission of evidence and briefs, in line with the established practice of remanding for further action after an erroneous dismissal. The decision was reached with concurrence from Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook, and Lundberg Stratton, JJ.