State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Docket: No. 95-896
Court: Ohio Supreme Court; October 31, 1995; Ohio; State Supreme Court
Appellants argue that the court of appeals incorrectly denied their writ of prohibition because the dismissal of a prior common pleas court action should bar Ingle’s subsequent declaratory judgment action in probate court under the doctrine of res judicata. To obtain a writ of prohibition, appellants must demonstrate that the probate court and Judge Corrigan are about to exercise unauthorized judicial power, and that denying the writ would result in irreparable harm without other remedies. It is undisputed that the appellees are poised to exercise judicial power in Ingle's declaratory judgment action regarding the decedents’ estates.
Appellants maintain that the dismissal of Ingle's previous complaint, which occurred after a jury trial had begun, serves as an adjudication on the merits that precludes the subsequent probate action involving the same parties and claims. However, the court finds this argument unsubstantiated, noting that res judicata is an affirmative defense that does not strip the second tribunal of its jurisdiction to consider the defense's validity. Case law reinforces that the existence of a res judicata defense does not prevent a court from adjudicating an action. Additionally, the current case does not reflect any abusive repetition of legal actions that would justify a writ of prohibition.
Since the probate court has the jurisdiction to rule on the res judicata defense and appellants can appeal any unfavorable decision, the writ of prohibition is not warranted. Furthermore, at the time of the court of appeals' decision, the probate court referee had only recommended dismissing appellants' motion in the declaratory judgment action, with no final judgment having been issued. Prohibition cannot substitute for an appeal of an interlocutory order.
Appellants’ first proposition of law is denied. In their second proposition, they claim the probate court, led by Judge Corrigan, lacks jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action, which they argue is essentially a wrongful conversion of assets by a personal representative. Despite not raising this issue in earlier proceedings, it is not considered waived, as jurisdictional challenges cannot be waived. A writ of prohibition is available only if there is a clear jurisdictional restriction. Absent such a restriction, a court with general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own authority, and parties have the right to appeal jurisdictional determinations. The probate court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, can only handle matters expressly allowed by law. Relevant statutes grant probate courts jurisdiction over declaratory judgments related to estate administration. It has been established that such actions can assess the validity of inter vivos transfers affecting estate property. The court finds that the allegations in Ingle's complaint are broad enough to affirm the jurisdiction of the probate court. The court of appeals correctly ruled that Judge Corrigan did not lack jurisdiction and that appellants had a proper avenue for appeal. Therefore, appellants’ second proposition is denied, and the court of appeals’ judgment is affirmed.
