State ex rel. Bednar v. City of North Canton

Citation: 69 Ohio St. 3d 278Docket: No. 93-628

Court: Ohio Supreme Court; May 11, 1994; Ohio; State Supreme Court

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The court affirms in part and reverses in part the judgment of the court of appeals regarding the application of R.C. 124.44, which mandates appointment from an eligibility list for police department vacancies. Bednar argues for appointment based on this statute, while the city asserts its home rule authority under Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, as detailed in its charter and Ordinance No. 21-92, allowing deviation from R.C. 124.44. The charter grants the municipality extensive local self-government powers, and Ordinance No. 21-92 specifies a maximum number of police lieutenants. The city references State ex rel. E. Cleveland Assn. of Firefighters v. E. Cleveland to support its position that home rule can supersede state civil service statutes. However, the court notes that the court of appeals found Ordinance No. 21-92 lacked the necessary specificity required by State ex rel. Bardo v. Lyndhurst, which emphasized that home rule authority must be explicitly stated in the charter to conflict with state law. The court instructs that in the absence of express conflict, provisions should be harmonized, and notes that a charter provision cannot nullify state law through delegation without clear language. The East Cleveland Charter, cited as sufficient in prior cases, was found to be more specific than North Canton's charter regarding home rule authority over classified services. Section 30 of the North Canton Charter stipulates that ordinances shall define the Civil Service Commission's powers and duties.

The East Cleveland and North Canton Charters differ in their approach to home rule authority, with East Cleveland focusing on ordinances affecting the classified service and North Canton reserving authority for all local self-government powers. Under Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, the appointment of police officers falls under local self-government, which allows municipal corporations to reserve any unexercised home rule powers. The court finds no legal difference between specific and general reservations of such power, affirming that the North Canton Charter's Section 1.02 allows for ordinance enactment that may diverge from R.C. 124.44.

Ordinance No. 21-92 limits the police department to six lieutenants but does not directly conflict with R.C. 124.44, which mandates procedures for filling lieutenant vacancies. Previous case law supports that merely limiting positions does not inherently alter required appointment processes. The court notes that if the charter is silent, state law prevails. Therefore, Bednar was entitled to appointment under R.C. 124.44, with the appellate court's decision affirming this outcome.

On cross-appeal, Bednar seeks back pay and interest, arguing that the city acted in bad faith if such conduct is necessary for recovery. The appellate court denied back pay due to a lack of evidence of bad faith, referencing past cases that allow back pay claims for reinstated public employees under certain conditions.

Interest on back pay has been awarded at the statutory rate, as established in State ex rel. Crockett v. Robinson. In State ex rel. Gibbons v. Cleveland, the court denied police officers' writs of mandamus for back pay due to wrongful denial of promotion, stating that mandamus is not applicable unless the employee's appointment to the civil service position is confirmed. In Morgan v. Cincinnati, the court refined the Gibbons ruling, declaring that an employee entitled to a promotion delayed due to municipal violations of R.C. 124.44 could recover back pay and seniority. The city was found to have acted in bad faith, differing from Gibbons, where unconstitutional ordinances were the basis for denial. In Hungler v. Cincinnati, which also addressed failure to promote, the court reinstated a lower court's decision granting back pay, despite not explicitly finding bad faith. The city’s actions disrupted the civil service system and violated R.C. 124.37. The court emphasized that abolishing classified positions must adhere to statutory requirements, declaring the city's actions unlawful and void. Ultimately, a unified test for determining eligibility for back pay was established, applicable to both wrongful dismissals and failures to promote, reinforcing the necessity of adherence to civil service laws.

The relator must demonstrate that the dismissal or denial of promotion was wrongful, which can be substantiated within the mandamus action. Following this, the relator needs to prove a clear right to relief by definitively establishing the amount owed. If this clarity is achieved, prejudgment interest is granted as a matter of law. The standardization of the burden of proof does not imply that mandamus is an appropriate remedy for wrongful dismissal when an appeal is sufficient. The court affirms the court of appeals' decision mandating Bednar's promotion to lieutenant, effective July 2, 1992, while reversing the denial of a writ for back pay with statutory interest due to Bednar's failure to prove the city's bad faith. Additionally, since Bednar did not establish the amount of back pay with certainty, the case is remanded for further proceedings. The court agrees with the court of appeals' decision to deny attorney fees, finding no evidence of bad faith or oppressive conduct necessary for such an award. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further action.