South Community, Inc. v. State Employment Relations Board

Citations: 38 Ohio St. 3d 224; 527 N.E.2d 864; 1988 Ohio LEXIS 283; 1988 WL 86894Docket: No. 87-953

Court: Ohio Supreme Court; August 24, 1988; Ohio; State Supreme Court

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Holmes, J. R.C. 119.12 permits appeals of adjudication orders from agencies, defined in R.C. 119.01(A) as functions of government entities under sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code. R.C. 4117.02(M) explicitly includes the State Employment Relations Board (SERB) within this framework, making it subject to Chapter 119, including rulemaking procedures outlined in R.C. 119.03(H). Appellants argue for a restrictive interpretation of R.C. Chapter 119, suggesting it only applies to rulemaking, which would exempt SERB's adjudications from its appeal processes. However, this interpretation contradicts the language of R.C. 4117.02(M), particularly the use of "including," which indicates a broader scope rather than a limitation. Unlike other agencies, such as the Bureau of Employment Services, which has specific limitations on the application of R.C. Chapter 119, SERB is generally subject to all provisions of the chapter. Appellants further contend that the appeal rights under R.C. Chapter 4117 are exclusive, with specific procedures defined in R.C. 4117.13(D) and R.C. 4117.23 for certain types of appeals. Nonetheless, these provisions do not conflict with R.C. 4117.02(M) but merely outline the necessary procedures for specific appeals, affirming the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas for unfair labor practice appeals.

The board's factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. The court of common pleas holds exclusive jurisdiction to issue temporary relief, restraining orders, and to modify or set aside board orders. R.C. 4117.23 allows employees to appeal penalties for unauthorized strikes to the board and subsequently to the court but lacks specific procedures for such appeals. R.C. 4117.13(D) and 4117.23 address special circumstances distinct from general reviews under R.C. 119.12. Appeals from unfair labor practice proceedings and unauthorized strike penalties are narrower than general R.C. 119.12 issues. R.C. 4117.06(A) designates the State Employment Relations Board (SERB) as the final authority on appropriate bargaining units, with its determinations being final and not subject to court appeal. In this case, the issues of whether employees are "public employees" under the Act and voting eligibility in a rerun election do not fall under the non-appealability of SERB's orders. Consequently, general appeal rights under R.C. 119.12 apply. Appellant SERB argues that a previous decision (State, ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44) recognized no such appeal right, but the case involved a mandamus action regarding the constitutionality of a statute and did not support SERB’s position. The court found no adequate legal remedy under R.C. 2506.01 for appeals of SERB decisions because it applies only to local political subdivisions, not state agencies, and reaffirmed that SERB's determinations on bargaining units are final.

The appellants contend that their appeal should be denied based on a comparative analysis of Ohio's Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). It is established that the National Labor Relations Board governs private sector labor relations, while the State Employment Relations Board (SERB) oversees public sector labor relations. The Ohio General Assembly has recognized these public policy distinctions in enacting R.C. Chapter 4117. Despite the relevance of the NLRA for context, Ohio's Act explicitly allows for the appeal in question through R.C. 4117.02(M), which aligns with the legislative intent to subject SERB to R.C. Chapter 119. Consequently, R.C. 4117.02(M) provides a statutory right of appeal and grants jurisdiction to the court of common pleas to address the issues raised by South Community. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed, with Chief Justice Moyer and Justices Locher and Wright concurring, while Justices Sweeney, Douglas, and H. Brown dissent.