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Ward v. Hotpoint Division, General Electric Co.
Citations: 35 N.C. App. 495; 241 S.E.2d 710; 1978 N.C. App. LEXIS 3012Docket: No. 7726SC162
Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; March 7, 1978; North Carolina; State Appellate Court
The appeal centers on whether the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations, which would entitle the defendant to summary judgment. The court assumes the plaintiffs' allegations regarding a defective deep-fat fryer and the date of its sale are true. The plaintiffs argue that their cause of action did not arise until the date of their injury (May 9, 1969) since no contractual relationship existed with the defendant regarding the defective fryer. They assert that the statute of limitations did not commence until their injury occurred, and they cite recent cases (Raftery v. Construction Co. and Pinkston v. Baldwin, Lima, Hamilton Co.) to support their position that a cause of action accrues only upon suffering injury. The plaintiffs argue that G.S. 1-15(b), which requires claims for latent defects to be filed within 10 years of the last act by the defendant, does not apply to them due to the absence of privity and the nature of their injury. Conversely, the defendant contends that the statute of limitations began when the fryer was manufactured in 1962, arguing that the claims arose more than three years prior to the enactment of G.S. 1-15(b). The defendant also claims that the statements in Raftery are merely dicta and do not accurately reflect the law. Nevertheless, the court finds that both Raftery and Pinkston support the plaintiffs' argument that a statute of limitations does not begin until a cause of action has accrued, which occurs upon actual injury. The court acknowledges conflicting case law suggesting that a cause of action may arise at the time of the defendant’s wrongful act, regardless of the plaintiff's relationship with the defendant, referencing earlier decisions that upheld this principle. The Court in Hooper did not reference prior cases, such as Mast v. Sapp and Hocutt v. R.R., which presented opposing views. Hocutt involved flooding due to railroad ditch construction, resulting in injury 20 years later, while Mast dealt with a collapsed water reservoir owned by the City of Winston that had previously caused no harm. The Mast ruling suggested that the legal right to damages only arose when actual injury occurred, defining the initial injury as the moment the reservoir wall fell. In Motor Lines v. General Motors Corp., the Court acknowledged Hooper but left the door open regarding cases without immediate injury. The Supreme Court's decisions in Raftery and Pinkston did not negate the principle that a cause of action accrues upon injury, even for plaintiffs not in privity with the manufacturer. Consequently, for the current case, plaintiffs' causes of action did not begin until the fire that caused their injuries, meaning the statute of limitations under G.S. 1-45(b) does not apply, as their injuries were apparent at that time. Instead, G.S. 1-52(5), a three-year statute, is relevant, having begun on 9 May 1969, and since the actions were filed before the three-year period expired, they are not barred. The trial judge's summary judgment in favor of the defendant is reversed.