United States v. Esteban Leyva Estrada

Citations: 42 F.3d 228; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 35985; 1994 WL 707041Docket: 94-5070

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; December 19, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Esteban Leyva Estrada appealed a five-year mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the district court after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana, under 21 U.S.C.A. Secs. 841(b)(1)(B), 846. Estrada contested the court's factual finding attributing over 100 kilograms of marijuana to him, arguing it was insufficiently supported. The appeal followed a grand jury indictment on two counts: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 100 kilograms of marijuana and distribution of marijuana. Estrada pled guilty to Count One under a plea agreement that resulted in the dismissal of Count Two and a pending Arizona state charge. The plea agreement included a stipulation of facts, indicating that from April 1992 to August 1993, Estrada conspired to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, with approximately 85 kilograms attributed to him personally, while the conspiracy totalled about 117 kilograms. Additionally, Estrada acknowledged that 79 kilograms from the Arizona conspiracy constituted relevant conduct, to be included in the calculation of his sentencing guideline range. The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, agreeing with Estrada's position on the factual findings.

At sentencing, Estrada was attributed approximately 164 kilograms of marijuana, comprising 79 kilograms from an Arizona conspiracy and 85 kilograms for which he admitted personal responsibility in his plea agreement. This attribution resulted in an offense level of 26, which was reduced by 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility, yielding an adjusted offense level of 23. With a Criminal History Category I, this led to a sentencing range of 46-57 months. 

The district court addressed the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 841(b)(1)(B). Estrada argued that both his defense counsel and the Government mistakenly believed the mandatory minimum was triggered by the 164-kilogram amount. He contended that only the 85 kilograms from his offense of conviction should be considered for the mandatory minimum, as the 79 kilograms from the conspiracy were not part of the charged conduct. Estrada maintained that the mandatory minimum did not apply since attribution of 100 kilograms is required to trigger it.

The district court disagreed, asserting that the plea agreement's statement of facts justified the five-year mandatory minimum, suggesting that Estrada anticipated 100 kilograms or more involved in the conspiracy. Consequently, the court imposed a 60-month sentence. 

Estrada contested the district court's finding that the Government had proven he should be held accountable for over 100 kilograms. The Government argued that the court concluded Estrada admitted to this quantity in his plea agreement's stipulation of facts. The summary indicates a disagreement on whether the Government met its burden of proof concerning the drug quantity attributed to Estrada for the mandatory minimum sentence.

Gilliam's guilty plea to a conspiracy charge involving the distribution of at least 30 kilograms of cocaine was evaluated to determine if it justified attributing that amount to him for sentencing. The court clarified that for a defendant to be held accountable for the acts of co-conspirators, those acts must fall within the defendant's agreement and be foreseeable. The indictment's language did not specifically assign any amount of cocaine to Gilliam, paralleling the language in Estrada's indictment and plea agreement, which similarly failed to attribute a specific quantity of marijuana to Estrada beyond the 85 kilograms he personally acknowledged. The district court's assumption that Estrada's acceptance of a five-year mandatory minimum implied culpability for over 100 kilograms of marijuana was rejected, as both parties operated under a misunderstanding regarding the relevant conduct provisions affecting the mandatory minimum. The court concluded that Estrada's acknowledgment could not be seen as an implicit admission of responsibility for that quantity. The Government argued that Estrada's agreement to include 79 kilograms of marijuana from a separate Arizona conspiracy in his sentencing calculations justified the mandatory minimum sentence. However, the court asserted that the mandatory minimum is based solely on conduct related to the offense of conviction, and since the 79 kilograms were not part of the charged offense, they could not affect the applicability of the mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b).

The 79 kilograms of marijuana from the Arizona conspiracy qualifies under U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2) as part of the "same course of conduct or common scheme or plan," thus it is included in calculating Estrada's base offense level under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1. However, the inclusion of this amount in determining the sentencing guideline range does not permit the district court to apply it when assessing the mandatory minimum sentence. Estrada's agreement to include the marijuana for guideline calculations does not imply consent for its inclusion in the mandatory minimum assessment.

The Government argues that the district court found Estrada personally responsible for over 100 kilograms of marijuana in the conspiracy detailed in Count One, asserting that this finding is not clearly erroneous and warrants deference. However, the record indicates that the district court did not make a factual determination regarding Estrada's responsibility for that amount, having chosen to rely on the plea agreement instead. The court's reliance on the plea agreement to conclude that it implied Estrada's acceptance of responsibility for the greater quantity was incorrect. Without proper fact-finding, the court's ability to apply the mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 841(b)(1)(B) cannot be presumed.

Furthermore, the Government claims the district court correctly imposed a five-year sentence, asserting it was the sentence Estrada bargained for. However, the plea agreement does not indicate that a minimum five-year sentence was part of the negotiation. The agreement specifies that the maximum penalty includes a five-year mandatory minimum, but it also clarifies that Estrada's sentence would adhere to the Sentencing Guidelines, that the court has the authority to impose any sentence within statutory limits, and that no promises about the sentence were made. Both parties were under the misapprehension regarding the applicability of the five-year mandatory minimum during the plea agreement process. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that Estrada bargained for a minimum five-year sentence. The court finds that the district court erred in applying the mandatory minimum sentence based on the plea agreement, leading to a remand for resentencing.

The agreement in question mischaracterized the mandatory minimum penalty as the maximum sentence, leading to a vacated and remanded decision for resentencing. The district court conducted a Rule 11 colloquy, during which Estrada acknowledged understanding that his plea would result in at least a five-year prison term. Under Section 841(b)(1)(B)(vii), a five-year mandatory minimum sentence applies for violations involving 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. Following a conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 846, the penalty provisions of Sec. 841(b) apply, and the court must determine the drug quantity attributable to the defendant based on the offense of conviction, referencing Pinkerton principles. Unlike sentencing guidelines that allow consideration of uncharged conduct, the determination for mandatory minimums is restricted to the specific conduct of the offense. In this case, Estrada's guilty plea pertained to a conspiracy distinct from another in Arizona, making the additional 79 kilograms attributed under the guidelines improperly considered for the mandatory minimum. The Government argued that Estrada must have intended to accept a minimum five-year sentence, citing the Gilliam decision, where a similar misunderstanding occurred. However, the court noted that Estrada's objections and lack of acknowledgment of a minimum sentence at sentencing differentiate his case from Gilliam, leading to the conclusion that Gilliam's precedent does not apply here.