United States v. Ruiz

Citation: Not availableDocket: 92-02516

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; January 13, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Linda Ruiz appeals her 10-year statutory minimum sentence imposed under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i) after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. The indictment stemmed from her involvement in a heroin distribution conspiracy in Bryan, Texas, led by Reynaldo Cantu-Castro. Ruiz, who struggled with heroin addiction, supported her habit by exchanging sex and stolen goods for heroin and facilitating transactions between buyers and sellers.

The Presentence Report (PSR) detailed her interactions with an undercover agent in August and September 1990, where she arranged and conducted sales of heroin. Her base offense level was initially calculated at 12, later adjusted to 10 for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a guideline range of 15 to 21 months. However, the PSR concluded that due to statutory requirements, the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years applied, referencing that other conspiracy members sold significantly larger quantities of heroin without adjusting Ruiz's offense level based on their conduct. Ruiz did not contest the PSR's factual findings or the application of the statutory minimum, leading to the affirmation of her sentence by the Fifth Circuit.

At the June 19, 1992, sentencing hearing, Ruiz acknowledged a 10-year minimum sentence. The court sentenced her to 10 years in prison, followed by 8 years of supervised release, based on the Presentence Report (PSR), without making specific findings on the amount of heroin involved in her conspiracy. Ruiz contends the district court erred by not determining the heroin quantity for which she was responsible and by failing to confirm the accuracy of her plea regarding that quantity. However, since she did not object to the PSR or the sentence and accepted the 10-year minimum, the appellate review is limited to identifying plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The standard for plain error requires that any unobjected errors be "plain" and "affect substantial rights," with appellate courts having discretion to overlook errors that do not significantly undermine the fairness of proceedings.

The statutory framework for Ruiz's conviction, under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and § 841, indicates that conspiracy to distribute heroin carries penalties equivalent to those for the underlying offense. Specifically, § 841(b) mandates a minimum sentence of 10 years for violations involving 100 grams or more of heroin for individuals with prior felony drug convictions, while violations involving less than 100 grams do not impose a mandatory minimum. Ruiz argues that the evidence does not substantiate a finding that her offense involved at least 100 grams of heroin, challenging the appropriateness of her 10-year sentence.

The quantity of drugs in a conspiracy offense is not a required element but rather a fact determined by the sentencing court based on a preponderance of the evidence. The court can rely on the Presentence Report (PSR) unless the defendant proves that the information is materially false. Although the PSR did not explicitly state that Ruiz's offense involved 100 grams or more of heroin, it contained sufficient facts supporting a 10-year sentence, including Ruiz’s direct link to the distribution of .632 grams of heroin, her involvement in additional sales, and her statements indicating easy access to heroin. The district court had enough evidence to conclude that Ruiz’s offense involved at least 100 grams of heroin, justifying the application of the 10-year statutory minimum. 

Even if the PSR did not support a finding of 100 grams, the court could still impose a 10-year sentence based on Ruiz's prior felony drug conviction, which would subject her to a maximum of 30 years under 841(b)(1)(C). The 10-year sentence was below this maximum, thus no plain error occurred in the sentencing. Ruiz's argument regarding the absence of a specific finding on the amount of heroin attributed to her raises more complexity. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(D) mandates specific findings for all contested PSR matters, and the court is required to assess the quantity of drugs reasonably foreseeable to the defendant in conspiracy cases. At the time of sentencing, guidelines indicated that a defendant is accountable for actions during the offense that were reasonably foreseeable and conducted in furtherance of the conspiracy.

A count in a criminal case may encompass a wide range of conduct involving multiple participants over time, but the scope of relevant conduct can differ among defendants. Conduct that is outside the bounds of a defendant's agreement or not reasonably foreseeable in connection with the jointly undertaken criminal activity cannot be factored into their offense level. For defendants sentenced under the 1991 guidelines, reasonable foreseeability is not automatically established by mere membership in a conspiracy; it necessitates a separate finding. Sentencing courts must determine both the total quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy and the amount each defendant was aware of or should have anticipated.

The case of Ruiz raises the issue of whether the district court's failure to make these findings constituted plain error under Rule 32 or existing precedent. A deviation from legal rules is classified as 'error' unless waived. Rule 32(c)(3)(D) mandates findings only for controverted matters. Ruiz did not contest specific details regarding her role or the drug quantity in her presentence report (PSR) and only objected to one fact influencing her criminal history score. At sentencing, she raised no objections to the PSR or the imposed sentence. Consequently, these facts were not deemed controversial, eliminating the need for findings under Rule 32(c)(3)(D). Furthermore, Ruiz effectively waived her right to challenge the district court's failure to comply with precedent regarding relevant conduct findings.

Prior cases support this position, indicating that a failure to object can waive the right to contest sentencing findings. Although there is one reported decision where a court found error in the absence of an objection, the applicable appellate review standard was not referenced.

The court referenced United States v. Warters, highlighting that it involved a district court's failure to make required sentencing findings after a defendant's objection to the Presentence Report (PSR). It noted that, except in the Puma case, prior rulings consistently held that a lack of findings was not erroneous if the defendant did not raise a timely objection. Even if the district court's omission in Ruiz's case was viewed as an error, it was not classified as "plain" error, which requires an error to be clearly evident. The court affirmed that any uncertainty stemming from Puma indicated that the district court's failure to make sentencing findings was not plain error. 

The court confirmed that while district courts must make separate findings regarding a defendant's relevant conduct in drug conspiracy cases for guideline purposes, it had not established the same requirement for applying statutory minimum sentences. However, it aligned with other circuits in ruling that the standards for determining drug quantities in conspiracy cases for guidelines also apply to statutory minimums under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).

Regarding Ruiz's argument that the district court erred by not ensuring the factual basis for her plea included the amount of heroin involved, the court rejected this claim. It noted that during the rearraignment, the court explained the elements of the conspiracy offense and the associated penalties, and Ruiz acknowledged the applicable penalty range. The court found an adequate factual basis for her guilty plea based on her admissions. It clarified that the drug amount is not an element of the offense but a matter for sentencing. Therefore, the court ruled that Rule 11 did not necessitate a factual basis for the enhanced sentence before accepting the plea. The district court’s judgment and sentence were affirmed.