Kinnamon v. Scott

Citations: 40 F.3d 731; 1994 WL 693190Docket: 94-20911

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; December 12, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Raymond Carl Kinnamon seeks a stay of execution from the federal courts, having previously been denied in his first habeas petition on September 15, 1994. After filing a request to recall the mandate and seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) on November 30, 1994, this request was also denied on December 8, 1994. Concurrently, state trial judge Ted Poe denied Kinnamon's motion for a stay of execution and related requests, citing findings that included the appointment of Marsha Rutenbar as his representative and her lack of action over 18 months regarding the filing of a post-conviction relief petition. Kinnamon subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief on December 9, which was denied by Judge Poe the next day, leading to a denial of relief by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

Kinnamon filed a second federal habeas petition, which was granted by Judge Hoyt, allowing a stay of execution and permitting him to proceed in forma pauperis. The state appealed this decision. Kinnamon's first claim involves alleged due process violations related to jury instructions on intent, which had previously been rejected in his initial federal habeas. The second claim asserts a constitutional error regarding his inability to inform the jury during sentencing about the minimum 20-year prison term he would face without good time credits if not sentenced to death, based on the precedent set in Simmons v. South Carolina.

Ignoring the lack of a contemporaneous objection and the precedent set by Teague v. Lane, the court declines to extend Simmons beyond cases where the sentencing alternative to death is life without parole. Kinnamon raises claims of jury taint and prejudice, asserting that the trial judge failed to conduct a hearing on juror Edwana Corley’s concern regarding the defendant's access to juror information sheets after lunch. Judge Poe acknowledged Corley's statement but did not hold a hearing on potential juror prejudice, suggesting that jurors should not expect to be oblivious to courtroom activities. The court found that the jurors’ concern about the defendant examining personal information did not indicate any constitutional issue, as such awareness could coexist with an open-minded approach to guilt.

Additionally, Kinnamon claims a denial of due process due to an alleged emotional outburst from the victim’s daughter during the trial. This incident, described by Kinnamon’s sister and a juror, involved the daughter entering the courtroom and loudly expressing her distress. However, the court concluded that this brief and emotional reaction did not convey any new information to the jury. The state habeas judge and the prosecutor both denied any recollection of the incident, reinforcing the view that it did not constitute a prejudicial error of constitutional significance. Claims regarding ineffective counsel in managing these issues were similarly dismissed.

Kinnamon alleges that two jurors prejudged his case, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to address this issue earlier or preserve it for direct appeal. His sister, Sandra Crisler, and wife, Faye Valentine, provided affidavits stating they overheard jurors in a restroom discussing their belief in Kinnamon's guilt before the trial concluded. The state trial judge found the affidavits unpersuasive and upheld the trial's fairness, asserting that trial counsel, Stan Schneider, was not ineffective for not pursuing the matter since reasonable inquiry did not yield evidence to support the claim.

Kinnamon's current counsel argues that she lacked sufficient time to investigate claims of ineffective assistance, starting from her appointment in October 1994. She contends that hostile attitudes from the trial judge towards the Texas Resource Center hindered her ability to gather information. Allegations of ineffectiveness presented by Kinnamon are described as speculative, lacking specific details or evidence, including claims regarding the failure to present medical evidence and Kinnamon's work history during sentencing.

Kinnamon also asserts ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, but again, these claims are based on speculation about potential developments with more time. The court finds no basis for habeas relief, noting that all allegations were available during Kinnamon's initial federal petition. It rejects claims that he did not authorize the first petition and clarifies that he has had the benefit of counsel throughout. The court vacates the stay of execution, indicating that the issues raised have not been sufficiently developed.