State v. Johnson

Citations: 190 Ohio App. 3d 750; 944 N.E.2d 270Docket: No. CA2009-12-307

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; November 28, 2010; Ohio; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Sudinia Johnson appeals his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, which the Butler County Court of Common Pleas upheld. Detective Mike Hackney received credible information from three confidential informants about Johnson's cocaine trafficking activities, including recent large transactions and plans to acquire more drugs. Hackney, aware of Johnson’s use of a white Chevy van, conducted a trash pull at Johnson’s residence, where they found credit card receipts indicating gas purchases in Cincinnati and Chicago. A GPS device was attached to Johnson’s van to track its movements. 

Subsequent tracking revealed the van’s location at a shopping center in Cook County, Illinois. Retired Immigration and Customs officer Bob Medellin confirmed the van's presence at the shopping center and observed Johnson and another individual, Otis Kelly, interacting with the vehicle. Medellin followed the two as they returned to Butler County, maintaining communication with Hackney, who coordinated with law enforcement for a potential stop upon their return to Ohio. 

Deputy Daren Rhoads initiated a traffic stop after observing Johnson’s van commit a marked-lane violation, specifically an abrupt right turn that crossed two lanes of traffic. This led to the eventual apprehension of Johnson and Kelly.

Rhoads initiated a traffic stop on Johnson, during which other officers provided backup. Johnson was directed to exit his vehicle, allowing Rhoads to deploy a canine unit, which indicated a passive response at both the driver’s and passenger’s doors. After Johnson consented to a search, officers conducted a preliminary sweep of his van but found no narcotics. Johnson’s van was then moved to a separate location where officers had already detected narcotics in a Ford driven by Otis Kelly, leading to the discovery of seven kilos of cocaine in the Ford's trunk.

Subsequently, Rhoads and an interdiction officer searched Johnson's van again, focusing on the undercarriage, but found no drugs. During this time, Johnson was placed in a police cruiser and spoke with Agent Gregory Barber after receiving a Miranda warning, admitting his involvement with the cocaine. Johnson's keys were seized, and one key opened the hidden compartment in Kelly's Ford. He revealed he had obtained the cocaine in Chicago to sell in Middletown to repay debts and had spent the remaining money on various items, which were later found at his home and storage unit after search warrants were issued.

The search yielded significant items, including over 50 pairs of Nike Air Jordans and vehicles. Johnson faced charges of trafficking, possession of cocaine, and having weapons while under disability. He filed several motions to suppress evidence, claiming unlawful actions by law enforcement, but the trial court denied all motions. Johnson was acquitted of the weapons charge, pleaded no contest to the other charges, and received a 15-year prison sentence, with items seized being subject to forfeiture. Johnson now appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress regarding the GPS device placement. The appeal asserts this argument is without merit.

Appellate review of a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact, with the trial court acting as the trier of fact and best positioned to resolve factual issues and assess witness credibility. An appellate court must accept the trial court's factual findings if supported by credible evidence but independently reviews the legal conclusions drawn from those facts without deference. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring a defendant to demonstrate a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. This expectation is determined using a two-part test: whether the individual exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy and whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.

In the case at hand, the defendant, Johnson, argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his van, asserting that law enforcement should have secured a search warrant before installing a GPS device on it. However, the court found that monitoring the van's movement did not constitute a search or seizure since there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle's exterior, which is visible to the public. The undercarriage of the vehicle, considered part of its exterior, similarly does not afford a reasonable expectation of privacy. Johnson failed to provide evidence that he intended to keep the undercarriage private. Testimony revealed that the van was parked on a public street, and Johnson did not challenge the circumstances of its positioning or indicate efforts to maintain privacy from public scrutiny. Consequently, the placement of the GPS device on the van did not require a warrant, as supported by relevant case law.

Johnson contends that law enforcement's tracking of his van's movements constituted an illegal search and seizure. However, the court finds this argument unpersuasive, referencing established Supreme Court precedent that vehicles have no reasonable expectation of privacy on public roads. In United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court ruled that tracking a vehicle's movement via a beeper did not violate the Fourth Amendment, emphasizing that vehicles, by their nature, are subject to public scrutiny. Johnson attempts to differentiate his case by arguing that modern GPS technology offers more precise tracking than the beeper used in Knotts, and seeks to invoke principles from cases like Katz, which dealt with private communications, and Kyllo, which involved thermal imaging in private residences. However, the court asserts that Johnson's situation differs fundamentally because he made no effort to conceal his van or his travels, parking it on a public street without any privacy measures. Additionally, GPS devices are widely available to the public, further diminishing any claim to a reasonable expectation of privacy in this context.

The information obtained from the GPS device is equivalent to what could have been gathered through traditional visual surveillance, as testified by Detective Hackney. He noted that the GPS merely provided approximate location data and duration at specific sites, which could also be determined by following Johnson on public roads. The Fourth Amendment does not classify this form of tracking as a search, and previous case law supports the use of technological advances in law enforcement without requiring a warrant, as these tools are seen as enhancements rather than replacements for human observation. Although Johnson argues that GPS tracking offers a more comprehensive view, the court maintains that efficiency in police work does not equate to unconstitutionality. Hackney's use of GPS to monitor Johnson's van did not yield any more information than could have been observed without technology. Additionally, the testimony highlighted that information obtained from a human informant, Rudy Medellin, was significantly more detailed and instrumental in the investigation, leading to the discovery of cocaine, which surpassed the insights gained from the GPS data.

Johnson argues that the installation and monitoring of a GPS device by law enforcement without a warrant infringes upon his reasonable expectation of privacy and right to free association. He contends that such surveillance grants the government unrestricted access to individuals' locations, which could include visits to sensitive places like a minister, psychiatrist, or abortion clinic. While acknowledging that GPS can track individuals' movements, it is emphasized that choosing to travel to certain destinations on public roads implies a voluntary disclosure of that information. Therefore, law enforcement does not require a warrant to monitor a person's driving on public streets, including via GPS.

Johnson references three state court cases where GPS installation was deemed a search necessitating a warrant. However, these cases are deemed unpersuasive because they rely on the specific provisions of state constitutions, which may offer greater protections than the Fourth Amendment. New York's highest court, in New York v. Weaver, held that GPS installation constitutes a search under its state constitution, emphasizing broader interpretations that safeguard individual rights. Similarly, Washington's Supreme Court found that GPS installation requires a warrant under its constitution, which provides more extensive privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment. Oregon's Supreme Court also mandated a warrant for GPS installation, rejecting the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard in favor of inherent privacy rights.

Despite these rulings from other states, it is argued that Ohio's constitution does not offer the same level of protection as the Fourth Amendment, suggesting that Johnson's appeal lacks a strong constitutional basis in Ohio.

The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Ohio's Constitution does not provide greater restrictions or broader guarantees than the Fourth Amendment concerning searches and seizures. In State v. Robinette, the court found the language of Section 14, Article I of Ohio's Constitution nearly identical to that of the Fourth Amendment, and there was no compelling reason to interpret them differently. It emphasized that Ohio’s constitutional provisions regarding search and seizure align with those of the Fourth Amendment and that the absence of explicit state constitutional protections beyond the Fourth Amendment should not result in broader interpretations.

In the case of Johnson, the court overruled his first argument, stating he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the undercarriage of his vehicle, and that installing a GPS device to track the vehicle did not constitute a search or seizure under either constitution. Johnson’s second argument claimed that his traffic stop violated his rights. However, the court found that a police officer can legally stop a vehicle based on probable cause of a traffic violation, regardless of any ulterior motives. Deputy Rhoads testified that Johnson's vehicle crossed a fault line and made an abrupt right turn across two lanes of traffic, establishing probable cause for the stop. Although Johnson argued his turn was safe and compliant with traffic regulations, the court upheld the legality of the stop based on the officer's observations.

The Ohio Supreme Court established that a traffic stop is constitutionally valid if an officer observes a motorist violate lane markings, as demonstrated in State v. Mays. Deputy Rhoads witnessed Johnson’s van drift over the lane markings and make an abrupt right turn from a straight lane. This marked-lane violation justified the traffic stop despite a lack of erratic driving. The trial court, after reviewing video evidence, concurred that there was reasonable suspicion for the violation. Johnson subsequently contested the duration of his detention and the legality of the search following the stop. However, the law permits a detention long enough to address the original purpose of the stop, including issuing a ticket or conducting necessary checks. Deputy Rhoads conducted a canine sniff during this time, which indicated drugs in two locations on the van. Johnson consented to a detailed search after the dog’s alert. The actions taken were within the appropriate timeframe for the traffic stop, and Rhoads’ failure to issue a citation does not negate the lawful initiation of the stop. Consequently, the court upheld the legality of the stop and the subsequent search, affirming the judgment. The document also references the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures under both the Ohio Constitution and the Fourth Amendment.