Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; May 21, 2010; Ohio; State Appellate Court
An appeal was made from the Sandusky Court of Common Pleas' summary judgment in favor of Naquel I. Binder, following a motor vehicle accident involving Binder's minivan. The appellants, Samantha, Tammy, and Kenneth Clonch, raised two specific assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred by granting summary judgment despite genuine issues regarding Binder’s control of the vehicle and (2) the court incorrectly granted summary judgment when the non-moving party had established a rebuttable presumption of Binder’s liability.
The accident occurred on July 6, 2002, when Lancan Holbrook, driving Binder's minivan, failed to stop at a stop sign, resulting in a collision that killed another driver and severely injured Samantha Clonch. The Clonch family filed a lawsuit against Holbrook, Binder, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on October 13, 2006, seeking damages. Holbrook claimed bankruptcy relief for financial obligations stemming from the accident and sought to change the case venue to Sandusky County, which was granted.
In her motion for summary judgment filed on July 16, 2007, Binder argued she should not be held liable for Holbrook’s actions, asserting she did not control his driving. Her motion included her affidavit, Holbrook’s affidavit, and a police report indicating he was not under the influence during the accident. Binder explained that Holbrook drove the minivan with her permission due to his greater driving experience and the need for passenger capacity. Both Binder and Holbrook stated the trip was for personal pleasure and not business-related.
On July 27, 2007, the trial court denied Holbrook’s motion to dismiss but limited any recovery from him to insurance benefits due to his discharged debts in bankruptcy. On September 10, 2007, State Farm moved for summary judgment, asserting that both Holbrook and Binder had automobile liability insurance policies with them at the time of the accident but claimed that no benefits were available under Holbrook’s policy. State Farm contended that appellants could only claim benefits through Binder’s policy and sought dismissal of the appellants' bad faith claim against them. The motion included policy documents and affidavits from Holbrook, Binder, and State Farm's insurance agent.
On November 13, 2007, the trial court found unresolved factual issues regarding the attribution of Holbrook’s negligence to Binder, leading to the denial of summary judgment for both Binder and State Farm. Subsequently, on May 16, 2008, State Farm filed a supplemental motion regarding benefits under Holbrook’s policy. On June 10, 2008, Binder renewed her summary judgment motion concerning her control over the minivan during the accident, supported by her and Holbrook’s deposition testimonies which indicated that Holbrook solely controlled the vehicle.
The trial court denied both supplemental motions on July 18, 2008. On March 24, 2009, State Farm sought reconsideration of a prior judgment, which was followed by Binder filing her own reconsideration motion on March 26, asserting her lack of control over the vehicle during the incident. Appellants moved to strike Binder’s motion, claiming it was improperly filed without court permission, but the court denied this motion on May 8, 2009.
On July 23, 2009, the trial court ruled that there were no disputed material facts, and in favor of the appellants' position, granted Binder’s reconsideration motion and dismissed the complaint against her. Appellants then filed a timely notice of appeal on August 21, 2009.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Binder on two grounds: first, disputes remain regarding her control over the minivan driven by Holbrook; second, Binder failed to counter the presumption of liability for Holbrook’s negligence. The appellate court reviews summary judgment de novo, affirming it only when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the evidence, viewed favorably for the nonmoving party, leads to a conclusion that grants judgment to the moving party as a matter of law.
Appellants reference the precedent set in Ross v. Burgan, which establishes that if a vehicle owner rides as a passenger, a rebuttable presumption arises that they have control over the vehicle and the driver acts as their agent. If unchallenged, any negligence from the driver is attributed to the owner-passenger. The court also notes that the right to control—not actual control—determines liability. Various cases have analyzed this presumption and the agency relationship, asserting that if evidence suggests the owner-passenger lacked control, a factual issue for the jury arises.
In this instance, evidence indicates that Binder and Holbrook cohabitated, and Holbrook had permission to use her minivan. He had previously driven it, but Binder was unsure of the route he took to their destination. Binder's response about Holbrook's adherence to her driving directions was noncommittal. Additionally, Holbrook used Binder's vehicle due to capacity issues with his pickup truck. The facts presented necessitate further examination of Binder's control over the vehicle and Holbrook's agency status, warranting a jury's resolution.
Holbrook and Binder both confirmed that Binder did not direct Holbrook's driving of the minivan. Holbrook indicated in his deposition that he possessed his own set of keys for the vehicle and did not require Binder's explicit permission to use it, although he occasionally informed her of his intentions. When asked if he would stop the minivan at Binder's request, Holbrook asserted that it was entirely his decision. The court determined that a rebuttable presumption exists that Binder had the right to control the minivan and that Holbrook was acting as her agent during their trip to King’s Island on July 6, 2002. The court also found sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact regarding whether this presumption could be rebutted. Consequently, the trial court's decision to grant Binder’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment and dismiss the complaint against her was deemed erroneous. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the Sandusky Court of Common Pleas and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, it referenced a prior case indicating that parties in a negligence action are not considered in a joint venture unless they share a common interest in the undertaking and have equal rights to direct its management.
