State ex rel. Hitchcock v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division
Docket: No. 67847
Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; October 7, 1994; Ohio; State Appellate Court
On September 7, 1994, Tim and Cherie Burich filed a prohibition action to prevent the Cuyahoga County Probate Court from finalizing the adoption of Shampail Hitchcock, a child they previously fostered. The Buriches, who are white, allege that the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services wrongfully removed Shampail from their care and placed her with a black family, the Abdullahs, for adoption. They claim that the County's actions were based solely on race, violating their constitutional rights, and that they filed a federal lawsuit, which has not yet been heard on the merits.
The Buriches acknowledge they are not parties to Shampail's adoption case and have not filed any petitions or motions regarding her adoption. Nevertheless, they became parties to a juvenile court case concerning Shampail after a custody review hearing, where they aimed to raise issues regarding the County's conduct, including alleged racial discrimination. Despite this, the juvenile court's order did not show any intent from the Buriches to adopt Shampail.
The County and Abdullahs applied to finalize the adoption despite the juvenile court's intent to maintain jurisdiction over the custody issue. The juvenile court had ordered the adoption case to be held in abeyance until the resolution of its own proceedings. The Buriches filed their prohibition action shortly before the probate court's scheduled hearing, arguing that the probate court should not have jurisdiction while the juvenile court is involved. Ultimately, the court denied the emergency motion for writ of prohibition and dismissed the case.
Prohibition is argued by the Buriches, claiming that the County and the Abdullahs are pursuing an adoption finalization hearing in violation of the juvenile court’s order, which could render significant issues moot. They assert that finalization would cause them irreparable harm due to the difficulty of overturning an adoption. However, their claims lack specificity regarding potential harm and are ultimately unconvincing. The complaint is deemed defective for failing to identify the relators and the appropriate respondent, as it does not clarify whether the respondent is Judge John Donnelly, Judge John E. Corrigan, or the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County. Furthermore, the Certificate of Service does not mention the probate court or judges, indicating procedural flaws.
The juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction does not prevent adoption proceedings in the probate court, as R.C. Chapter 3107 grants the probate court exclusive jurisdiction over adoption. The interpretation that would allow the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over custody while preventing adoption proceedings is dismissed as illogical. The Buriches incorrectly cite R.C. 2151.353(E)(1), which states that the juvenile court retains jurisdiction until the child is adopted, thus indicating that the probate court can exercise its jurisdiction in adoption matters concurrently. Additionally, R.C. 3107.11 outlines required notice provisions for adoption proceedings, supporting the notion that probate courts can hear adoptions for children under the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
The provision allows a probate court to proceed with an adoption even if the court with custody of the child disagrees. Ohio’s adoption law, particularly R.C. 3107.06(D), has changed; previously, no adoption orders could be issued while custody proceedings were active, but this requirement has been repealed. Now, an adoption may only be granted with the written consent of certain parties, including the juvenile court, if the legal guardian cannot consent. Key features of this amendment include: (1) the juvenile court's power is conditional, becoming relevant only when the custodian lacks consent authority, and (2) the juvenile court's authority is no longer jurisdictional, as the requirement for it to suspend or terminate its case is removed.
The probate court can grant adoptions despite the juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction, as supported by case law. In *In re Adoption of Ridenour*, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the juvenile court could not impose conditions on the probate court’s adoption decisions, emphasizing the probate court's exclusive jurisdiction in adoption matters and the need to prioritize the child’s best interests. Similarly, in *Biddle*, the Supreme Court affirmed that a probate court has jurisdiction to hear adoption cases even when custody is under the jurisdiction of a divorce court. This underscores the probate court's authority to make adoption decisions independent of other court orders.
The Ohio Supreme Court determined that it would be illogical for the probate court to hold exclusive jurisdiction over adoption cases while being unable to act due to the continuing jurisdiction of another court. This principle was reaffirmed in *Syversten v. Carrelli*, where the domestic relations court's continuing jurisdiction over custody did not prevent the probate court from addressing adoption matters. In *State ex rel. Portage Cty. Welfare Dept. v. Summers*, the court ruled that the probate court's jurisdiction was not impaired by the requirement for consent from Portage County, as such consent does not create a jurisdictional bar. It emphasized that the juvenile court's consent is also not a jurisdictional barrier for probate court authority in adoptions. The probate court retained jurisdiction for adoptions even when another court had continuing jurisdiction, as established in *In re Adoption of McDermitt* and further supported by decisions from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County. The argument against concurrent jurisdiction in adoption cases was found unpersuasive, as adoption claims differ significantly from abuse or neglect claims. The requisites for prohibition were reiterated, including that the exercise of power must be unauthorized by law and that there must be no adequate legal remedy available.
The probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over adoption cases, and the juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction does not impede probate proceedings, rendering prohibition inapplicable. The Buriches lack standing to pursue a prohibition action, as they are neither parties to the probate court proceedings nor have they demonstrated an injury to a legally protected interest. Their status as former foster parents does not confer standing, as established in prior case law, and there is no indication they attempted to intervene in the adoption process or express a desire to adopt Shampail. Concerns about their standing were noted by the juvenile court. Additionally, the Buriches' complaint was filed dilatorily, shortly before the adoption hearing, which raises issues of diligence. Previous cases highlight that late filings in prohibition actions, especially those affecting adoption, have been dismissed due to lack of urgency and proper timing. The court emphasizes that a writ of prohibition should be used sparingly and only to promote justice, with its approval resting in the court's discretion.
Extraordinary writs are not to be issued in cases where there is uncertainty. In this case, the court expresses doubt about the relators' standing to pursue the prohibition action and notes the dilatory nature of the filing. As a result, the court exercises its discretion to dismiss the application for a writ of prohibition and denies the motion for an emergency writ, requiring the relators to pay costs. The judgment is affirmed by Judges James D. Sweeney and David T. Matia.
At the time of the case, R.C. 3107.06(D) mandated consent from relevant parties for adoption, a requirement now found in R.C. 3107.06(C). The court clarifies that the ruling in Summers regarding subsection (D) does not necessarily bind the juvenile court. Jurisdiction is determined by which court is first invoked to handle the matter, as established in John Weenink, Sons Co. v. Court of Common Pleas. The court does not address whether invoking probate court jurisdiction for child adoption ends juvenile court authority, although it notes that a prior ruling from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County has indicated that it does.
