United States v. Sergio Robles, Also Known as Felix Luis Rivera, and Luis Cruz
Docket: 94-1410, 94-1411
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; October 19, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Sergio Robles and Luis Cruz were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 and 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1). They filed a joint motion to suppress evidence obtained from their residence, which the district court denied without a hearing. Both defendants pleaded guilty but preserved their right to appeal the suppression ruling. The appeal is now before the Seventh Circuit.
In January 1994, a cooperating individual (CI) working with the DEA arranged a cocaine sale with Robles, who claimed to have access to Colombian cocaine. On May 20, 1993, Robles contacted the CI to sell three kilograms of cocaine and instructed the CI to meet him at a gas station. After following Robles to a separate location, he handed the CI a black plastic bag containing the cocaine, leading to their arrest.
Post-arrest, DEA agents returned to Robles and Cruz's residence without a search warrant. They knocked on the front door but received no response. Observing individuals inside through a window, the agents entered through an unlocked back door, citing exigent circumstances to prevent potential destruction of evidence. They secured the premises and gathered those present. The appellate court has vacated the district court's denial of the suppression motion and remanded for further proceedings.
Robles' wife, Yamileth Arango, arrived at their residence shortly after agents secured it. The government claims she consented to a search, during which agents discovered four kilograms of cocaine and over $20,000 in cash. In contrast, Robles contends that agents had already retrieved the drugs by the time Arango returned. The defendants filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, which the district court denied without a hearing, basing its decision on affidavits and a DEA report. Robles and Cruz pleaded guilty but preserved their right to appeal the suppression ruling. They argue that the district court erred in denying their motion and in not holding an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court will only overturn factual findings if there is clear error. The district court justified the warrantless entry into the residence based on exigent circumstances, concluding there was probable cause for believing additional drugs were present and that agents acted to prevent destruction of evidence. It also found Arango's consent valid and determined the defendants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in a common area of the apartment building.
Warrantless searches are generally deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but exceptions exist, notably the exigent circumstances exception, which permits warrantless entries when there is an urgent need for action that precludes obtaining a warrant. The government must demonstrate that agents had an objectively reasonable belief that exigent circumstances necessitated their entry. In this case, agents believed there was a risk of evidence destruction—specifically, thirty kilograms of cocaine—based on information provided by a confidential informant (CI). Key factors included prior knowledge of drug transactions involving co-defendants and the presence of additional individuals who could potentially destroy evidence.
Upon arrival, agents identified themselves but received no response from individuals inside the residence, prompting them to enter through the back door due to concerns that evidence might be discarded. The potential for destruction of drugs constituted exigent circumstances, as the nature of the evidence was transient. Although telephonic warrants were an option, the exigent circumstances only materialized after the agents arrived, leaving them uncertain about the timeline for potential evidence destruction. The district court concluded that these conditions sufficiently justified the warrantless entry.
Officers entered a residence under exigent circumstances, which allowed for their entry but not for an immediate search without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. They secured the residence for eight hours while obtaining a warrant, and once the exigent circumstances were addressed, the risk of evidence destruction was mitigated. During this time, they observed contraband in plain view, which can be seized without violating a defendant's rights, as established in Arizona v. Hicks and other precedents. While officers are allowed to seize contraband seen during a lawful search, the specific circumstances of how evidence was found are critical. In this case, the officers discovered cocaine and cash in a closet, but the record does not clarify whether the bags were open or their contents visible. Generally, a warrant is needed to open containers unless their incriminating nature is immediately apparent. Given that black plastic bags are commonly used for various purposes, the court cannot conclude whether the bags' contents were evident without further investigation. The issue is remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing regarding the applicability of the plain view exception. Additionally, the defendants argue that consent to search is a significant factor, despite the government's claim of major factual disputes on this matter, which must also be addressed since the seizure was not otherwise justified.
Consent from a person with common authority over a premises is valid against an absent, non-consenting co-authority holder. The government asserts that Yamileth Arango consented to a search of her residence at 3000 N. Lowell, supported by an agent's account of a conversation with her upon her return home. However, the defendants contend that Arango could not have consented because she arrived after agents had already left the residence with evidence of cocaine. Conflicting affidavits from both parties create a material dispute, necessitating an evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of the testimonies and establish the facts. While exigent circumstances justified the officers' entry, it remains unclear whether the seizure of cocaine and money was legal. The judgment of conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded for a hearing to determine if the evidence was in plain view during the agents' securing of the residence or if it was obtained with Arango's consent. The district court also noted the absence of evidence regarding the defendants' reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement, although the defendants assert it is part of their apartment, which would affect the consent issue if confirmed.
