United States v. Devon Wayne Smith

Citation: 36 F.3d 128Docket: 94-1115

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; November 13, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Devon Wayne Smith, a Jamaican citizen, entered the U.S. in 1983 and was later convicted of marijuana possession in 1985. Following this conviction, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated deportation proceedings, citing his conviction as grounds for deportation. Smith contested the deportation based on this conviction while admitting to another charge of overstaying his visa. An immigration judge ordered his deportation in 1988, which Smith appealed. While his appeal was pending, he was arrested for possessing firearms, although he was never officially charged for this offense. The INS detained him without bond after a hearing. Smith later entered a conditional guilty plea for illegally reentering the U.S. after deportation, based on a prior aggravated felony conviction. He appealed, arguing that the indictment should be dismissed due to undue burdens on his ability to appeal the deportation order and because his aggravated felony conviction was vacated after his indictment. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions, rejecting his claims.

Smith alleges that the INS detained him without bail to hinder his immigration appeal and coerce him into waiving it. He lacks direct evidence for this claim but notes that there was no record of him being informed about uncharged gun charges or given a chance to defend against them. In November 1989, he was transferred from a Florida detention center to El Paso, Texas, away from his family and legal counsel. Despite his attorney's claims that Smith could not counter the gun charges, no supporting affidavit was provided. Facing prolonged detention, Smith withdrew his appeal and agreed to deportation, which took place in November 1989. He reentered the U.S. in March 1992 but was arrested in March 1993, leading to a federal indictment in May 1993. In October 1993, Smith’s current counsel vacated the original 1985 conviction that prompted his deportation, and Smith attempted to dismiss the indictment by challenging the deportation order. A hearing was held, but he did not seek an evidentiary hearing. The district court denied the dismissal motion and later barred evidence regarding the deportation's validity during trial. On January 12, 1994, the court approved the government's motion to exclude evidence on this issue. Smith then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal. He argues that his ability to collaterally attack the deportation order was improperly restricted, asserting that the INS’s detention deprived him of meaningful judicial review as established in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez. However, the district court’s actions were upheld without error.

A defendant who voluntarily waived his right to appeal a deportation order under counsel's advice is not entitled to challenge that order in subsequent criminal proceedings under Section 1326, as established in United States v. Smith and United States v. Vieira-Candelario. In this case, Smith contends his waiver was coerced, thus differentiating his situation from those precedents. He claims the INS unlawfully detained him, preventing him from challenging his imprisonment, which forced him to waive his appeal to gain freedom. 

The excerpt explores whether any waiver, even if coerced, could prevent a Mendoza-Lopez-type challenge to a criminal indictment under Section 1326. It acknowledges that under certain circumstances, a coerced waiver might deny meaningful judicial review, referencing potential abuses like coerced confessions. The court must assess if Smith’s allegations, if true, indicate coercion that deprived him of such review. Smith's claims suggest that the INS detained him without probable cause to pressure him into withdrawing his appeal, potentially raising a Mendoza-Lopez issue.

However, the record lacks evidence supporting Smith's coercion claims. Evidence indicates he was lawfully detained for weapons violations and had opportunities to challenge his detention, including a hearing with an immigration judge. The absence of formal charges and his transfer do not substantiate claims of deliberate coercion. Ultimately, the conclusion is that there is no evidence showing Smith was denied meaningful judicial review of his deportation order.

Smith argues that the district court failed to consider the merits of his coercion claim and prevented him from presenting supporting evidence. The court did not make specific findings when denying his motion to dismiss, but Smith had not submitted any evidence, including an affidavit, to substantiate his coercion allegation against the INS. He also did not request an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Consequently, the court was justified in dismissing his motion without further consideration.

Smith contends that, regardless of the dismissal, he should have been allowed to present evidence of INS coercion at trial as an affirmative defense under the Mendoza-Lopez doctrine. However, the court found no basis for this argument, asserting that such constitutional issues require a preliminary determination by the court. Although the Ninth Circuit has indicated this issue may go to a jury if not addressed pre-trial, the current court had already granted a preliminary hearing where Smith had the chance to litigate the matter. His failure to request an evidentiary hearing or fully utilize the opportunity given does not justify relitigating the issue at trial. Therefore, the court upheld the dismissal of Smith's motion and exclusion of evidence related to his deportation.

Additionally, Smith challenged the aggravated felony portion of the indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), asserting that his only aggravated felony conviction had been vacated and thus should lead to dismissal of that part of the indictment. The district court rejected this claim, and subsequent case law established that § 1326(b) serves solely as a sentencing enhancement rather than a separate offense. Therefore, the vacation of Smith's felony conviction does not warrant dismissal of the indictment. Smith sought to have this precedent reconsidered, but the court declined to do so, emphasizing that it is bound by prior rulings. The district court had already mitigated any potential error by sentencing Smith as though the aggravated felony conviction did not exist, rendering any error harmless. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings.