Honiss W. Cane, Jr. v. Worcester County, Maryland George M. Hurley John E. Bloxom Reginald T. Hancock Floyd F. Bassett Jeanne Lynch, Members, Worcester County Board of Commissioners, and George H. Dryden Hinson Finney Mark Frostrom, Washington Legal Foundation Center for Voting and Democracy United States of America, Amici Curiae
Docket: 94-1579
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; September 16, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Honiss W. Cane, Jr. and others (plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit on behalf of African-American residents of Worcester County, Maryland, claiming that the at-large election system for the County Board of Commissioners diluted their voting strength, violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding the electoral system discriminatory and ordered the implementation of a cumulative voting system within 60 days. The County appealed, disputing both the finding of a violation and the remedy prescribed. The Fourth Circuit Court upheld the district court's determination of a Section 2 violation but found that the adoption of the cumulative voting scheme was an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Worcester County, characterized as predominantly rural, had a population of 35,028, with 21.26% being African-American. The Board of Commissioners consisted of five members elected at large, with a residency district system in place. Prior to the lawsuit, the County had modified its election scheme by dividing the County into five residency districts, removing the at-large commissioner position, and creating a fifth designated post in response to changes in population distribution.
After a bench trial, the district court issued a memorandum opinion on January 7, 1994, finding that Worcester County's electoral scheme violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court ordered the County to submit a remedial plan within 60 days. The County claimed that its current plan, Bill 93-6, complied with voting rights laws, but plaintiffs proposed two alternative plans: Plan A, which included five single-member districts with one majority African-American district, and Plan B, a cumulative voting system allowing voters to allocate five votes in a countywide election. The court rejected Bill 93-6 as inadequate to address the Section 2 violation and chose Plan B, citing the County’s preference for an at-large system.
Section 2 prohibits practices that deny or abridge voting rights based on race or language minority status, requiring that political processes be equally open. A violation is established when a protected class has less opportunity to participate in the electoral process. To prove vote dilution in multimember districts, members of a protected minority must demonstrate three preconditions: sufficient size and compactness to form a majority in a single-member district, political cohesion, and the ability of the majority to vote as a bloc to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.
Establishing the three preconditions from Gingles is necessary for a court to assess if a multimember district's use violates Section 2, based on a comprehensive evaluation of circumstances. The inquiry focuses on whether the electoral structure, in conjunction with social and historical factors, results in unequal opportunities for minority and majority voters to elect representatives. Key factors for consideration include: historical voting discrimination against the minority, racial polarization in elections, voting practices that facilitate discrimination, exclusion from candidate selection, impacts of past discrimination in education and employment on political participation, use of racial appeals in campaigns, success of minority candidates in elections, responsiveness of elected officials to minority needs, and the validity of justifications for the challenged voting practices. No single factor is decisive, and the determination that an election scheme dilutes minority voting power is a factual conclusion subject to a "clearly erroneous" review standard.
In analyzing the first Gingles precondition, the district court examined alternative single-member district plans proposed by the plaintiffs, noting that the African-American population's dispersion required district lines to cross election districts and municipalities. However, the court concluded that a majority African-American district could be created without being excessively irregular, as the population was concentrated in small areas. The court found that the districts, while not symmetrical, were compact and not indicative of gerrymandering. Thus, it affirmed that Worcester County's African-American voters formed a sufficiently large and geographically coherent group for a majority district. For the second Gingles precondition, the court highlighted that the statistical analyses presented were unreliable due to insufficient data and the limited number of districts.
The court reviewed the results of both endogenous and exogenous elections, finding significant political cohesion among African-Americans in Worcester County, influenced by race, political party, and candidate experience. Evidence indicated that in towns transitioning to single-member districts, African-Americans were elected from newly established majority districts. The African-American population demonstrated political activity, notably through support for the NAACP. The district court determined that African-Americans in Worcester County are politically cohesive.
In examining the third Gingles precondition, the court analyzed two county commissioner elections where the African-American minority-preferred candidates received minimal white voter support. Exogenous elections reflected similar trends, with minority-preferred candidates generally garnering a low percentage of white votes. The court identified this white bloc voting as legally significant, particularly under the at-large electoral system that forced minority candidates to compete countywide against white candidates. Despite an average white crossover vote of 19%, the court found that this electoral structure undermined African-American political strength, noting that no African-American candidate had ever won a countywide contest against a white candidate.
After confirming that the three Gingles preconditions were met, the court considered additional historical factors, including the historical disenfranchisement of African-Americans in Maryland and discriminatory voting practices. Ultimately, the court concluded that the electoral system for the Worcester County Commission, in conjunction with past and present discrimination, deprived African-Americans of equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect preferred representatives. The court affirmed that the at-large residency district system diluted African-American votes, thereby violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Once a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is confirmed, a district court must allow the relevant legislative body the first chance to create a remedial plan. The court’s review and authority to impose a remedy depend on the legislative body's actions. If a proposed remedy is submitted, the court can only assess its legality, not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. If the plan meets legal standards, the court is required to defer to legislative decisions regarding the remedy's specifics, reflecting the political dynamics involved. If the legislative body does not respond or offers an unacceptable remedy, the district court must then create a suitable plan.
The County contends that the district court wrongly deemed Bill 93-6 legally unacceptable. A remedy is considered legally unacceptable if it violates voting rights or fails to meet the standards applicable to an electoral challenge. Bill 93-6, which removed the commissioner-at-large position and established a fifth residency district while maintaining at-large elections for all five commissioners, did not address the vote dilution issue, as minority-preferred candidates remained unlikely to succeed under this system. Therefore, the district court correctly rejected Bill 93-6.
Regarding the district court’s imposed remedy, the County argues that cumulative voting is too radical to be judicially mandated as a remedy for a Section 2 violation. While Justice Thomas indicated that federal courts could potentially impose cumulative voting under certain circumstances, this case does not require determining if such an imposition is warranted. The court found that the district court abused its discretion in adopting the cumulative voting scheme proposed by the plaintiffs, emphasizing that it should have given deference to the County's legally acceptable remedy. The prior ruling in McGhee noted that if the legislative proposal is legally acceptable, the court must defer to legislative judgments about the remedy's nature and scope.
Even when a legislative body does not provide a viable remedy or offers an unacceptable one, a court must, to the extent possible, uphold the legislative policy judgments underlying the electoral framework while complying with Section 2. The court's discretion should aim to approximate the legislature's reapportionment plan, as established in case law such as White v. Weiser and Whitcomb v. Chavis. In assessing the plans from the plaintiffs, the district court acknowledged its duty to defer to legislative decisions regarding remedies and to align statutory requirements with county political goals. It chose Plan B, the cumulative voting plan, based on two main reasons: it would facilitate all citizens voting for all candidates, thereby promoting the collective interest of the County, and it would prevent the division of municipalities into districts. However, the court did not adequately consider the County's legislative preference for residency requirements that ensure Board members are responsive to diverse local interests, as highlighted in the legislative findings of Bill 93-6. These findings emphasized the historical significance of maintaining representation from different regions within the County. By adopting Plan B, the district court disregarded the expressed legislative intent, which aimed to retain residency districts to ensure diverse representation and local knowledge on the Board. Ultimately, the court's ruling did not sufficiently defer to the legislative prerogatives regarding the electoral process dynamics.
Failure by a political subdivision to propose a legally acceptable remedy necessitates the district court to create a compliant remedy that aligns with Section 2 and reflects the County's policy judgments. The district court did not evaluate the legality of the existing electoral scheme—Bill 93-6—at the time of the proceedings, resulting in the County being uninformed about its electoral system's violation of Section 2 when required to propose a remedy. Consequently, the district court is instructed to allow the County to submit its own remedial plan for addressing the Section 2 violation. The court affirmed certain aspects of the case, reversed others, and remanded for further action.
The plaintiffs include individuals and organizations challenging the electoral system, and the district court noted two proposed plans: Plan A, which involves single-member districts with one majority black district, and Plan B, a cumulative voting system allowing voters to cast multiple votes for candidates in at-large elections. The court's opinion regarding the residency districts was unclear, though the parties acknowledged their abolition under the new cumulative voting framework.
The County argued that the plaintiffs did not meet the first Gingles precondition of geographical compactness, as creating a single-member majority African-American district would require racially drawn lines, which the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno deemed contrary to representative democracy. However, the Court also recognized that race can be considered in redistricting, as long as traditional districting principles are not disregarded in a manner that results in districts defined solely by race.
The County argues that establishing a majority African-American district would violate traditional districting principles by necessitating the division of at least two municipalities. However, the court clarifies that the division of municipalities does not automatically disqualify a proposed majority-minority district from adhering to these principles, referencing Clark v. Calhoun County, which indicates that geographical compactness can still be proven despite such divisions. The evidence presented shows that the plaintiffs' single-member district plans align with other districting principles, including historical divisions within the County and natural boundaries like waterways. Furthermore, the residents within the proposed majority African-American district share common socioeconomic and political interests, a principle that supports districting practices. The proposed district's shape is not considered geographically bizarre and resembles previous electoral districts, countering the County's claims regarding its compactness. The court finds that the existing electoral structure under Bill 93-6 is functionally equivalent to prior arrangements for the purposes of a Section 2 analysis, eliminating the need for a remand to reassess potential violations. The County expressed a preference for a single-member district plan while acknowledging past reluctance to show preference between plaintiffs' plans due to misunderstandings of prior legal rulings. The court clarifies that the cited case, Harris, does not support the County's interpretation regarding admissions of liability, emphasizing that once a government agrees to a consent decree, it cannot later contest the need for relief based on its electoral system's compliance.
