Hawkins Construction Co. v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 21
Docket: No. A-93-021
Court: Nebraska Court of Appeals; December 19, 1994; Nebraska; State Appellate Court
Hawkins Construction Company pursued indemnification from the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local #21 (the union) for workers’ compensation benefits paid to an employee provided by the union, Harold DeBrie, who was injured on the job. The Douglas County District Court dismissed Hawkins' amended petition after the union filed a demurrer, citing several grounds: (1) Hawkins' claims were preempted by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA) and barred by Nebraska's statute of limitations for federal claims; (2) the claims conflicted with the exclusive remedy provision of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act; (3) the claims were unsupported by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Hawkins and the union.
Hawkins appealed, asserting that the district court erred in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition. The court affirmed the lower court's ruling, concluding that Hawkins’ amended petition did not adequately state a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation and that the negligence claim was preempted by federal law. The court noted the standard of review for a demurrer, emphasizing acceptance of well-pleaded facts while rejecting the pleader's conclusions.
In assessing the sufficiency of a cause of action, the petition should be interpreted broadly; if it articulates a viable cause, any demurrer claiming otherwise must be dismissed. Hawkins’ amended petition presents two actual causes of action: negligence and negligent misrepresentation, along with three theories of recovery related to negligence. The negligence claims include: (1) a breach of the implied duty to provide a physically fit worker and (2) active liability of the union rather than passive liability of Hawkins.
Regarding negligent misrepresentation, Hawkins contends that the union inaccurately represented the fitness of Harold DeBrie for the job. Key assertions include: (1) the union's obligation to provide workers who are fit for construction tasks; (2) the union's awareness of the physical demands of the job; (3) reliance on the union to supply a capable worker; and (4) knowledge of DeBrie's weakened back condition, which rendered him unfit for the work and susceptible to injury. The union is held liable for failing to provide a suitable worker, not warning Hawkins about DeBrie's condition, misrepresenting his ability to work safely, and neglecting to sufficiently evaluate DeBrie's physical capabilities.
Hawkins’ amended petition alleges that the union failed to inform him of certain facts, but these claims do not support a negligent misrepresentation cause of action under Nebraska law. The Nebraska Supreme Court's definition of negligent misrepresentation, as adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552, requires that false information be supplied by one party to another in a business context. Hawkins’ petition indicates the union provided DeBrie for Hawkins' purposes but lacks any claims that the union supplied false information regarding DeBrie’s condition or health. Therefore, the allegations do not establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation, leading to the trial court's upholding of the union’s demurrer.
Following this, Hawkins is left with a single cause of action for negligence, which the trial court also dismissed, citing three grounds, one of which is preemption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). This section allows suits for violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations to be brought in federal court, and the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that state law claims are preempted if they require substantial interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Consequently, if a state-law claim is closely intertwined with the terms of a labor contract, it is subject to preemption.
The Supreme Court has established that § 301 preemption is intended to ensure federal labor law uniformly prevails over conflicting local regulations, promoting consistent resolution of labor-management disputes. This preemption applies specifically to the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), particularly when disputes relate to employee representation or industrial peace. However, § 301 does not preempt all state law claims connected to CBAs.
Key cases illustrate the application of § 301 preemption: In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, the Court found that a state bad faith claim related to an insurance claim under a disability plan was preempted because it was fundamentally a contract issue that required CBA interpretation. In Electrical Workers v. Hechler, a negligence claim against a union was also preempted, as resolving the claim would necessitate interpreting the CBA regarding the union's duty to ensure workplace safety. Conversely, in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., the Court determined that Lingle's retaliatory discharge claim was not preempted by § 301 since it was rooted in state public policy and did not require CBA interpretation.
Overall, the application of § 301 focuses on whether the resolution of a claim necessitates interpreting a CBA, underscoring the need for a unified approach to CBA-related disputes to avoid inconsistent rulings across jurisdictions.
The employer argued that the state law claim was preempted by § 301 due to its close connection with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), despite the claim not requiring an interpretation of the CBA. The trial court agreed, stating that both the grievance proceeding and state law action would analyze the same facts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed this decision, but the Supreme Court reversed it, emphasizing that parallel factual considerations do not create a dependency on the contractual analysis for preemption under § 301. The Court clarified that § 301 preemption applies only when state claims are substantially dependent on interpreting a CBA or are based on rights created by the CBA. It concluded that state law actions involving identical factual issues to a grievance proceeding are not preempted if they do not require interpreting the CBA.
In the context of Hawkins' negligence claims, the Court noted that Hawkins cited various arguments against preemption, but ultimately found the negligence claim was indeed preempted. Hawkins argued that the negligence claim would not necessitate interpreting the CBA, yet it was determined that any duty owed by the union to provide a fit worker arose from the CBA. Thus, assessing whether the union breached its duty would require defining terms from the CBA, confirming that the claim is preempted under Supreme Court precedents.
Analysis under § 301 requires federal law application, as established in Lueck, where the court determined that state tort claims arising from a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) are preempted. The tort claims are intertwined with contract interpretation, as any liability assessment involves the contractual obligations defined by the CBA. In the current case, the union's duty to provide a "skilled worker" to Hawkins is derived from the CBA, necessitating interpretation of the term to assess the union's responsibilities, such as conducting background checks or requiring medical exams. This interpretation falls under federal law, leading to the conclusion that Hawkins' negligence claim is preempted by § 301.
The trial court's ruling on preemption suffices to validate the union's demurrer, as any single basis for a demurrer can uphold the decision. While Hawkins can still pursue an action against the union in state court, state courts maintain concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over LMRA actions. However, the statute of limitations for filing a § 301 claim in Nebraska is three years. Hawkins' claim, related to events from 1987 and not filed until 1992, fell outside this limitation period, rendering it invalid. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of Hawkins' amended petition with prejudice was appropriate. The ruling affirms that Hawkins' claims were preempted by § 301 and barred by the statute of limitations.
