Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 9, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
A class action suit was filed by former air traffic controllers, dismissed for participating in a 1981 strike, against the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Office of Personnel Management. The plaintiffs sought mandamus and injunctive relief, including back pay, and a declaratory judgment against OPM's policy that indefinitely barred them from federal employment, claiming it was unconstitutional on four grounds: as a bill of attainder, an ex post facto law, a denial of due process, and a denial of equal protection. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), a decision that was affirmed on appeal.
The case originated from the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike in August 1981, during which federal law prohibited individuals from holding government positions if they participated in a strike. Although the statute imposed an absolute disqualification, a regulation allowed the OPM to deny employment for up to three years following a disqualification determination. Following the strike, President Reagan issued an ultimatum to the controllers, resulting in the plaintiffs' dismissal for noncompliance. The OPM then announced a maximum three-year debarment for the controllers. However, on December 9, 1981, President Reagan modified this policy, allowing discharged controllers to apply for federal employment outside their former agency after the three-year period.
Authority has been exercised to allow federal agencies to accept and process employment applications from individuals previously discharged as air traffic controllers due to a strike, in accordance with civil service procedures. However, it was determined that these discharged controllers would not be suitable for reemployment with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as their return would negatively impact operational efficiency and safety. Consequently, their applications for FAA positions should be processed with this unsuitability in mind.
Following a presidential directive, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) issued a bulletin stating that individuals whose employment was terminated due to the strike would not be eligible for reinstatement in the FAA. Nevertheless, OPM would review applications from these individuals for other federal positions on a case-by-case basis. Despite this, plaintiffs alleged that the FAA misled them about their eligibility for reemployment, which was contradicted by a subsequent bulletin indicating an indefinite debarment from FAA positions.
After the three-year period following their termination, OPM received applications from the discharged controllers but refused to conduct suitability determinations, adhering instead to the indefinite debarment policy outlined in previous bulletins. The plaintiffs then filed a lawsuit claiming that this policy constituted a bill of attainder, an ex post facto law, a denial of due process, and a denial of equal protection. They argued that the OPM improperly interpreted the presidential directive by not reevaluating suitability for reemployment after the three-year debarment period.
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), and the appellate review affirmed this dismissal, recognizing the need to accept the plaintiffs' well-pleaded facts as true and drawing reasonable inferences in their favor.
Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress from enacting bills of attainder, defined by the Supreme Court as laws that determine guilt and impose punishment on specific individuals without judicial trial. A bill of attainder must meet three criteria: (1) identification of affected individuals, (2) imposition of punishment, and (3) absence of a judicial trial. The clause is integral to the separation of powers doctrine, historically limiting legislative authority, as the judiciary is deemed better suited to adjudicate guilt and punishment.
The district court concluded that the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) indefinite disbarment policy is an executive action, thus not subject to the attainder prohibition. However, the Supreme Court has not definitively addressed whether the ban applies to executive actions. While traditionally, bills of attainder involve legislative condemnation, there is concern that allowing executive actions to circumvent this prohibition could lead to abuses similar to historical bills of attainder.
The discussion references a precedent indicating that administrative rules, when based on Congressional authority, can be treated similarly to statutes regarding constitutional protections. It is posited that an agency's interpretation of a presidential directive might also be viewed as a legislative action for the purpose of assessing compliance with the bill of attainder clause. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to resolve this issue at present, as the conclusion is that OPM's actions do not constitute "punishment" as defined in the context of bills of attainder.
The Court has not adopted a broad definition of 'punishment' when evaluating bills of attainder. Justice Frankfurter noted that governmental infliction of harm does not inherently equate to punishment, as there can be non-punitive reasons for such actions. The Court uses a three-pronged test for determining if an enactment inflicts punishment: (1) whether it aligns with the historical definition of legislative punishment, (2) whether the burdens imposed serve legitimate non-punitive purposes, and (3) whether there is intent to punish reflected in the legislative or administrative record. The Nixon Court recognized that barring individuals from certain employments constitutes a historically impermissible punishment. In this case, the plaintiffs' claims satisfy the first prong. However, even if a specific group is targeted and subjected to punitive-like burdens, the enactment can still be valid if it aims for legitimate, non-punitive outcomes and lacks clear punitive intent. The assessment hinges on whether the legislative aim is to punish for past actions or to regulate qualifications for a profession, as demonstrated in DeVeau v. Braisted, where a statute disqualifying felons from waterfront positions was upheld for its regulatory intent. Similarly, in Schellong, provisions for deporting individuals involved in Nazi persecution were deemed non-punitive despite their harsh implications. President Reagan's directive, as implemented by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), was characterized as a nonpunitive measure aimed at maintaining the efficiency of the FAA's operations and ensuring the safety of air traffic control.
A comparison with the case of Cummings v. Missouri highlights the legal principles at issue. In Cummings, the Supreme Court invalidated a Missouri Constitution provision requiring an oath from individuals seeking certain professions, which was unrelated to their qualifications. In the current case, there is a clear connection between the imposed restrictions and a legitimate governmental aim, as President Reagan asserted that mixing controllers who had been fired for striking with their replacements would jeopardize FAA operations' safety and efficiency. The court evaluates whether the challenged enactment is punitive by examining the legislative or administrative intent, requiring "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent" to invalidate it. In Selective Service, for instance, the Court found no punitive intent despite legislators' critical remarks about nonregistrants. Plaintiffs refer to 1984 public opinion polls favoring Reagan's handling of the PATCO strike as evidence of a partisan political motive behind OPM's indefinite disbarment policy. However, these polls cannot demonstrate punitive intent since they were published two years after the relevant actions. The court rejects the plaintiffs' request to infer punitive intent from OPM's broadening of the debarment policy, concluding that the administrative record does not support such an inference, as the constitutionality of the Act must be assessed based on its explicit terms and the intent of Congress, rather than subjective interpretations of political context.
Plaintiffs argue that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by extending the debarment period from three years to an indefinite duration after their termination for striking. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits laws that retroactively impose punishments for acts that were not punishable at the time they were committed or increase existing punishments. Although regulations can have the force of law regarding ex post facto prohibitions, the court indicates it need not determine if OPM's policy equates to a rule from the United States Parole Commission. It concludes that even if the policy imposed a new sanction, it would not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, as the sanctions—specifically, ineligibility for certain federal jobs—are civil in nature, not criminal. The Supreme Court has historically interpreted the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply only to criminal laws, as seen in past cases involving deportation and membership in the Communist Party.
Plaintiffs also claim OPM's refusal to assess their suitability for reemployment after three years violates their due process right to pursue their professions, citing 5 C.F.R. Sec. 731.303 for the three-year limit and alleging that a presidential directive did not authorize extending the debarment. The court disagrees with the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the presidential directive and their assertion that OPM did not provide adequate due process. It notes that the OPM Director has broad discretion in interpreting presidential directives related to federal personnel matters, and such interpretations must be reasonable and not plainly erroneous. When an agency alters its policy, it must provide a reasoned analysis for the change rather than ignoring prior standards.
5 U.S.C. § 7311 prohibits any person who strikes against the U.S. government from federal employment, establishing an indefinite ban without conditions. Although 5 C.F.R. § 731.303 may suggest a less strict policy, the President has the authority under 5 U.S.C. § 3301 to issue directives that can override existing regulations. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) interpreted the presidential directive to impose an indefinite ban on former controllers who participated in strikes, applicable not just to FAA positions but also to related agencies. This interpretation aligns with prior Federal Circuit rulings. The OPM's determination of an indefinite ban is deemed reasonable and consistent with the presidential directive, leading to the conclusion that the plaintiffs' due process rights hinge on whether they received appropriate protections.
The Supreme Court has not recognized a legitimate claim of entitlement for applicants seeking benefits, but the plaintiffs’ prior employment with the FAA may suggest a protected interest. Essential due process requires notice and opportunity for a hearing before deprivation of liberty or property. Assuming OPM’s decisions affect a constitutionally protected interest, the court concluded that determining each plaintiff's participation in the PATCO strike sufficed as due process. The district court noted that the plaintiffs were identified as strike participants through a judicial process that afforded them proper protections. The plaintiffs did not contest this finding, and once their participation was established, no further proceedings were necessary, as the presidential directive imposed a clear and indefinite ban on their employment eligibility with the FAA and related agencies.
Plaintiffs argue that OPM's indefinite debarment policy violates their equal protection rights. Courts generally refrain from overturning government actions that do not burden suspect groups or fundamental interests, as established in Gregory v. Ashcroft. Since the right to government employment is not deemed fundamental and the plaintiffs do not belong to a suspect class, they must demonstrate that the policy fails rational basis review. Under this standard, the policy can only be deemed irrational if its disparate treatment of groups does not relate to legitimate legislative purposes. The plaintiffs assert that the policy is irrational because it denies them a suitability determination available to previous classes of federal employees and to convicted drug felons. However, factual correctness alone does not invalidate the policy under the Equal Protection Clause. The government is not required to treat all classes equally or address all issues uniformly. The court cites precedents indicating that different evils may warrant different remedies. The explanations provided in the presidential directive align with legitimate government objectives of safety and efficiency in air traffic administration, effectively countering the plaintiffs' claim of irrationality.
An indefinite period of debarment from employment with the FAA and related agencies was deemed a reasonable interpretation of President Reagan's directive concerning air traffic controllers who unlawfully struck against the U.S. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) implemented policies that did not violate the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, or plaintiffs' rights to due process or equal protection. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint was affirmed. The new bulletin issued by OPM expired on January 20, 1985, and was reissued unchanged as FPM Bulletin 731-9, expiring on October 20, 1986. Although President Clinton's subsequent repeal of the indefinite debarment rendered the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief moot, their claims for back pay and attorney's fees remain pending. Defendants asserted various grounds for dismissal, including jurisdictional issues and res judicata, but the court did not find merit in these arguments, leading to a ruling based on failure to state a claim. The court determined that OPM's policy did not constitute punishment under the Bill of Attainder Clause, thus negating the need to evaluate the policy against a third test element. Under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 3301, the President has the authority to regulate civil service admissions to enhance efficiency, assess applicant qualifications, and designate duties for inquiries related to these regulations.
