James J. Giuffre v. Nicholas Bissell Richard Thornburg Robert Smith Russ Leffert Sam Debella Richard Meyers County of Somerset
Docket: 93-5541
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; August 4, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
The appeal concerns the denial of a motion for summary judgment filed by Prosecutor Nicholas Bissell and several investigative officers from the County of Somerset, who are seeking immunity from claims made by James J. Giuffre under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and constitutional rights violations. The court ruled that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity regarding Giuffre's allegations of Fifth, Sixth, and procedural Fourteenth Amendment violations, reversing the district court's order on this point. However, the court upheld the district court's denial of absolute immunity for Prosecutor Bissell.
Giuffre's claims stem from his arrest on May 10, 1990, related to an alleged drug conspiracy, during which he conveyed ownership of two building lots to the County under forfeiture laws without legal representation. The lots were later sold at auction, and the drug charges against Giuffre were dismissed in 1991 after he cooperated with an investigation. Giuffre filed his lawsuit on May 7, 1992, seeking damages, rescission of the lot sale, and a declaratory judgment on multiple civil rights violations.
The appellants' motion for summary judgment was based on the claim of immunity and was supported by depositions denying Giuffre's allegations. In contrast, Giuffre's evidence raised factual disputes regarding the circumstances of the property conveyance. Ultimately, the district court denied the summary judgment, prompting this appeal. The court also dismissed parts of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction without ruling on the merits of Giuffre's remaining claims.
The district court found that summary judgment was not appropriate due to Giuffre's deposition testimony indicating genuine issues of material fact regarding: (1) the alleged coercive and unconstitutional actions of the appellant officials; (2) the existence of a civil rights conspiracy; (3) the County's purported policy targeting criminal defendants with significant assets; and (4) the County's alleged failure to properly train and supervise the officials. The court did not extensively address the individual officials' claims of immunity, ruling that Prosecutor Bissell was not entitled to absolute immunity because his actions could be deemed investigatory. Furthermore, none of the individual officials received qualified immunity as Giuffre presented a genuine issue of material fact concerning violations of clearly established laws.
On appeal, the County and the officials argued for summary judgment, asserting that Giuffre failed to establish a viable cause of action under Section 1983 for constitutional violations, that the officials lacked personal involvement necessary for liability, and that they were protected by absolute or qualified immunity. They also contended that the evidence was insufficient to hold the County liable under Giuffre's claims.
The appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of absolute immunity for Prosecutor Bissell but reversed the denial of qualified immunity for the other officials regarding alleged violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The appeal was otherwise dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It was noted that while Giuffre's claims for declaratory judgment and rescission of the forfeiture had not been ruled upon, his damage claims were connected to a claim for prospective injunctive relief, which precluded interlocutory review of the immunity denial.
The Prisco opinion establishes that the Mitchell collateral order doctrine is not applicable for joining claims for injunctive relief and monetary damages. The marginal advantage for a governmental official from interlocutory review regarding proof of damages is outweighed by the systemic detriments of allowing piecemeal reviews in ongoing cases. Although this rule is unique to the court of appeals, it must be adhered to when a plaintiff presents a colorable claim for injunctive relief alongside a damages claim.
Proper application of the Prisco rule necessitates determining if the claim for injunctive relief is colorable. In Giuffre's case, his claim for rescission of property forfeiture is unviable, as acknowledged by his counsel during oral arguments. Giuffre failed to name the necessary individuals who allegedly conspired with the officials and the County, which holds the title to the lots, would be the appropriate defendant for prospective relief. The individual officials could not rescind the sale, thereby limiting Giuffre's claims to compensatory and punitive damages only.
Since Giuffre's complaint seeks only monetary damages, the Prisco rule is deemed inapplicable. This situation emphasizes the need for immediate appellate review to preserve the officials' immunity from trial, as failing to do so could encourage plaintiffs to include nonactionable equitable claims solely to obstruct prompt review of official immunity denials. This concern has been noted by other courts that have rejected the Prisco approach, highlighting the potential for harassment of officials through frivolous claims.
Giuffre contends that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal due to the district court's denial of immunity based on material factual disputes. However, the court clarifies that immediate appealability is not negated by the presence of unresolved factual issues, referencing Kulwicki v. Dawson. It emphasizes that material facts must be viewed favorably for the non-moving party and highlights its jurisdiction to assess whether the officials' actions violated clearly established constitutional rights. The district court failed to determine if the officials were entitled to immunity or identify the specific constitutional rights allegedly violated, merely stating there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the violation of established laws.
The court asserts its authority to review whether the plaintiff has claimed a violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, as establishing whether a right is "clearly established" requires confirming a constitutional violation occurred. Giuffre specifies claims under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments against individual officials, which the court can review for immunity as a matter of law.
However, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment for Giuffre's other claims against the County and the appellant officials. Specifically, the claims in Counts 4 and 5, regarding the failure to train and supervise, are not immediately appealable as the County is the real party in interest and cannot assert a qualified immunity defense under the Mitchell doctrine. The court further references Owen v. City of Independence, establishing that municipalities do not receive qualified immunity for constitutional violations.
The interlocutory order of the district court that denied the appellant officials immunity regarding Giuffre's state claims in Counts 6, 7, and 8 is currently unreviewable. According to precedent, only certain immunity-related decisions are appealable, specifically those that are separable and collateral to rights asserted in the action. The denial of a claim of qualified immunity under state law is appealable only if the state grants substantive immunity for actions performed in official capacity. The New Jersey Tort Claims Act provides immunity from liability but not from suits related to official duties, leading to the dismissal of the officials' appeal on this basis.
The court's jurisdiction is confined to reviewing the denial of absolute immunity for Prosecutor Bissell and the denial of qualified immunity for Bissell and other officials regarding alleged violations of Giuffre's constitutional rights. The factual context surrounding Giuffre's arrest and the forfeiture of his property is essential for evaluating the officials' immunity claims.
The facts indicate that the Somerset County Prosecutor's Office wiretapped Giuffre’s phone after he was identified as a drug dealer. Following the interception of calls related to drug activities and surveillance, a search warrant was executed on May 10, 1990, resulting in the seizure of drugs and financial documents, including deeds to Giuffre's properties. After his arrest, Giuffre was interrogated by law enforcement, where he claimed his requests for an attorney were ignored, leading him to waive his rights out of fear of repercussions. The officers involved denied making any threats and asserted that Giuffre voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and provided a statement.
Giuffre was arrested on charges related to cocaine possession and distribution and claims he was denied contact with his attorney while at Somerset County Jail. On May 11, 1990, he met with Deputy Chief Smith at the Somerset County Police Academy, where discussions about Giuffre possibly becoming a confidential informant occurred. Smith suggested that Giuffre could avoid legal consequences by signing over his two building lots, which he valued at approximately $175,000, to the county. Subsequently, Chief Thornburg informed Giuffre that the county could seize his assets, including his house and car, unless he cooperated. Thornburg allegedly offered Giuffre leniency, including the return of his possessions and dismissal of charges, in exchange for turning over the building lots and facilitating a drug deal as an informant. Giuffre claims he was pressured to make a quick decision without consulting his attorney and faced threats regarding his property and potential charges against his fiancée. Ultimately, Giuffre signed over the deeds to the lots for $1 and was coerced into signing a statement claiming the lots were purchased with drug proceeds, despite his insistence that no illegal funds were used. In response, Thornburg and Smith provided a contrasting account, denying prior knowledge of the lots and asserting that they encouraged Giuffre to retain his assets to aid his informant activities. They also refuted Giuffre's claims of coercion, threats, and denial of legal representation during their discussions.
Prosecutor Bissell did not directly contact Giuffre on May 11, 1990, but instructed Chief Thornburg to pose specific questions to him related to the forfeiture of Giuffre's building lots. Bissell sought information on potential targets for an investigation and whether drug money was used to purchase the lots. He later testified that Thornburg assured him that some of the funds were drug-related. Initially hesitant about an agreement with Giuffre, Bissell was persuaded by Thornburg, who believed Giuffre could provide valuable information.
After Giuffre surrendered the deeds to the lots, he was released on his own recognizance. He informed attorney Richard Grodeck of the forfeiture and the Prosecutor's Office's promise to drop criminal charges in exchange for his cooperation as a confidential informant, although he was advised not to discuss this with an attorney. Grodeck subsequently met with Thornburg and Assistant Prosecutor Wronko to discuss the possibility of returning the lots, but the County suggested a fresh start with the understanding that Giuffre would face prosecution. Grodeck prioritized formalizing the agreement over recovering the lots, as Giuffre’s main objective was to have the charges dismissed. However, the agreement was never documented due to a County policy against written confidential informant agreements.
Shortly after, Giuffre was reportedly instructed by Thornburg and Wronko to dismiss his private attorney to keep the deal intact. Complying, he appeared at a court hearing without counsel, which was postponed to allow him time to hire a new attorney. Giuffre claimed that the Prosecutor's Office arranged for him to obtain a public defender despite his assertions that he did not qualify as indigent. Thornburg, Wronko, and Detective DeBella denied any involvement in Giuffre's decision to discharge his attorney. Giuffre ultimately never returned to court for the drug charges.
Following his arrest, Giuffre began cooperating with investigators, regularly meeting with Detective DeBella and others. In July 1990, Bissell indicated that Giuffre would have the first opportunity to repurchase his building lots; however, Bissell later rejected Giuffre's cash offer of $100,000. Detective DeBella also communicated a County policy of targeting individuals with significant cash and assets, corroborating that they sought more than just drug-related cases.
DeBella denied knowledge of a County policy aimed at targeting individuals with substantial assets, asserting that his comments to Giuffre were intended to convey that removing a drug dealer's financial resources would hinder their ability to operate. On October 31, 1991, Giuffre had his criminal charges dismissed due to his cooperation in prosecuting four other defendants for drug offenses. Concurrently, the County sold Giuffre's two forfeited lots at a public sale, each for $10,000.
In reviewing the officials' appeal regarding the denial of immunity, the court examined whether Prosecutor Bissell was entitled to absolute immunity. The district court ruled that Bissell did not qualify for absolute immunity regarding actions that could be seen as investigative. Bissell contended that his actions were core prosecutorial functions related to evaluating information for criminal prosecution, distancing himself from the investigative processes leading to the forfeiture deal with Giuffre.
The document outlines the legal standards for prosecutorial immunity under Sec. 1983, noting that absolute immunity applies to quasi-judicial actions, including courtroom activities and certain related out-of-court conduct. Conversely, actions taken in an investigative or administrative capacity only receive qualified immunity. There are also scenarios where a prosecutor's conduct may fall outside their official role, negating any immunity.
The determination of immunity involves a functional analysis of the actions in question, considering historical basis for immunity, risks of harassment or litigation, and alternatives for redress. If absolute immunity is not applicable, qualified immunity protects actions deemed objectively reasonable in light of the constitutional rights involved, evaluated based on the officer's knowledge at the time of the alleged violation.
The initiation of prosecution is a fundamental aspect of a prosecutor's role, granting them absolute immunity when making such decisions, even without a good faith belief in wrongdoing. This immunity is counterbalanced by judicial safeguards for defendants, such as probable cause hearings and dismissal of charges. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons clarified that a prosecutor's administrative and investigatory functions, not related to advocacy, do not enjoy absolute immunity; they may instead be covered by qualified immunity. The burden is on the official seeking absolute immunity to justify it. In Buckley, a prosecutor was denied absolute immunity for allegedly fabricating evidence and making false statements, indicating that such actions fell outside the advocacy role.
In assessing Prosecutor Bissell's alleged conduct, the complaint against him involves conspiracy claims related to the deprivation of Giuffre's rights, including rejecting a buyback offer for property that was later sold at a significantly lower price. Evidence shows Bissell was actively involved in discussions about the forfeiture of Giuffre's property and directed inquiries into Giuffre's dealings with suspected drug offenses. Notably, Bissell approved the property forfeiture and its eventual sale without proper appraisal. Given this context, Bissell's actions, particularly those related to the property's sale, are characterized as administrative duties, which do not warrant absolute prosecutorial immunity under the precedent established in Buckley.
Bissell has not demonstrated that absolute immunity protects him from liability concerning his conduct in the transaction with Giuffre. His actions do not fall under the category of prosecutorial acts related to the initiation of judicial proceedings, as the approval of Giuffre's escape from serious drug charges does not initiate prosecution, but rather avoids it. Bissell acknowledges that the negotiations focused on dismissing charges instead of securing a guilty plea. Furthermore, he fails to provide any historical or common-law precedent supporting absolute immunity for prosecutors advising on informal transactions like Giuffre's release in exchange for cooperation and property. The court distinguishes this case from prior rulings on in rem civil forfeiture, noting that Bissell's transaction lacked written documentation and judicial oversight. Advising law enforcement during forfeiture negotiations is viewed as similar to a prosecutor providing legal advice during investigations, which does not confer absolute immunity. This rationale parallels the Supreme Court's decision in Burns v. Reed, which found no historical support for extending absolute immunity to legal advice given to police in investigative contexts, underscoring that Bissell's actions do not align with the protections typically afforded to prosecutors involved in case screenings and judicial fairness.
The Court determined that granting prosecutors absolute immunity for advice given to police, while only providing police officers with qualified immunity for following that advice, is inconsistent. The Court emphasized that although a prosecutor's actions may relate to prosecutorial decisions, absolute immunity is not as expansive as to cover all such actions. This reasoning, reaffirmed in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, suggests that when prosecutors and detectives perform similar functions, they should be afforded the same level of immunity.
Prosecutor Bissell failed to demonstrate that the risk of frivolous litigation could not be mitigated by qualified immunity, which serves to protect judicial processes from harassment associated with litigation. Furthermore, since Giuffre was never formally charged with a crime, he lacks recourse through the criminal justice system for the alleged misconduct. The judicial system's existing safeguards reduce the necessity for private damages actions to address unconstitutional behavior.
The Court found that Bissell did not establish that he was acting as an "advocate" when he directed police actions aimed at questioning Giuffre and ensuring the legality of property purchases. These actions lacked a functional connection to the judicial process and thus did not warrant absolute immunity. Consequently, Prosecutor Bissell is entitled only to qualified immunity, reflecting the Court's cautious approach to recognizing absolute prosecutorial immunity.
The denial of qualified immunity is a legal issue reviewed de novo by courts. The Supreme Court emphasizes that addressing this question allows for the dismissal of baseless suits without requiring defendants to undergo burdensome defenses. Qualified immunity aims to protect defendants from unwarranted liability and demands arising from lengthy litigation. To determine a government official's entitlement to qualified immunity, the Supreme Court's two-part test from Harlow v. Fitzgerald is applied. This test states that officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability unless their actions violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would know.
The "clearly established" standard, as defined in Anderson v. Creighton, requires that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear for a reasonable official to understand that their actions are unlawful. It is not necessary for the exact action to have been previously deemed unlawful, but rather that the unlawfulness must be apparent based on existing law. A threshold determination must be made regarding whether the plaintiff's asserted constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the officials' actions.
The district court failed to assess whether the plaintiff had asserted a violation of a constitutional right or a clearly established right. The individual defendants claimed entitlement to qualified immunity, referencing the objective reasonableness standard reaffirmed in Anderson v. Creighton. The plaintiff alleged that certain defendants denied him the right to counsel and unlawfully took his property without due process. The court concluded that whether the defendants violated clearly established laws presents a genuine issue of material fact. Consequently, in reviewing the district court's denial of qualified immunity, the focus is on whether reasonable officials in the defendants' position could have believed their conduct was lawful based on the relevant case law.
The determination of whether Giuffre's constitutional rights were "clearly established" during the actions of the officials is crucial, without initially deciding if a constitutional violation occurred. Qualified immunity, which protects officials unless they acted incompetently or knowingly violated the law, is central to this assessment. Giuffre claims his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated during a custodial interrogation; however, he acknowledges that violations of Miranda procedures do not equate to constitutional violations. The remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion of evidence, not a civil rights claim under Section 1983. The Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination, while the right to counsel during interrogation is a procedural safeguard. Giuffre argues that the conduct of the officers transcended Miranda, asserting they did not intend to allow him to exercise his right to remain silent. He cites Cooper v. Dupnik, which suggested a Section 1983 claim could arise from compelled statements, but this reliance is deemed misplaced. The dissenting opinions in Cooper argue that a violation occurs only when statements are admitted in court, highlighting that the law Giuffre depends on is not clearly established.
The court determined that the law regarding Fifth Amendment rights was not clearly established during the time of Giuffre's alleged violations in 1990, nor is it clearly established today. The precedent set in Cooper involved unique circumstances where law enforcement officers admitted to a deliberate interrogation plan that violated a suspect's rights, which is not the case for Giuffre, who did not allege similar conduct from the officers involved. As a result, it was concluded that a reasonable officer would not have been aware that their actions violated Giuffre's rights, leading to the conclusion that Sergeant Meyers and Detectives Leffert and DeBella are entitled to qualified immunity concerning Giuffre's Fifth Amendment claims.
Additionally, Prosecutor Bissell, Chief Thornburg, and Deputy Chief Smith were granted partial summary judgment on Giuffre's Sixth Amendment claims regarding the denial of his right to counsel. The court affirmed that Giuffre's Sixth Amendment right had not attached at that time, as it only arises with the initiation of formal judicial proceedings, which did not occur in Giuffre's case. His informal interactions with the Prosecutor's Office did not constitute the formal plea bargaining process, and he had not been formally charged with any offenses, further supporting the denial of his claims.
Counsel's guidance is essential during plea bargaining; thus, a plea without counsel must be set aside. Giuffre's claim that his interaction with officials constituted a plea bargain is unpersuasive because the negotiations focused on dismissing charges and forfeiting property, not a guilty plea. Since Giuffre was never formally charged or pleaded guilty, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not triggered, and the officials are entitled to qualified immunity regarding this claim. Giuffre also asserts violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. His procedural due process claim fails due to lack of a violation of clearly established federal law, as state law violations do not support a Section 1983 claim. Consequently, the officials are entitled to qualified immunity for this claim as well. However, Giuffre's substantive due process claim raises sufficient concerns, as the alleged actions of the officials could be considered "conscience-shocking," potentially constituting a violation of substantive due process. The standard for such a violation requires that the government’s actions must amount to an abuse of power that shocks the conscience, aiming to prevent oppression by governmental authority.
The arguments presented by the individual officials asserting that they did not unlawfully deprive Giuffre of his property are unconvincing. They claim that under the "relation-back doctrine," title to Giuffre's property transferred to the State before they interacted with him, thus shielding them from liability. However, this doctrine, which retroactively vests title, is not automatic and requires a judicial order to take effect, as established in United States v. A Parcel of Land. The doctrine is meant to protect innocent purchasers, not public officials from liability in cases of alleged coercive and fraudulent forfeiture like Giuffre's.
The officials also argue that their actions had no legal consequence on the forfeiture of Giuffre's property, which sidesteps the core issue of whether the property legally belonged to the County. If, as Giuffre alleges, the lots were not acquired with illegal drug proceeds, their alleged coercion in obtaining a false statement from him would have had significant legal implications regarding the forfeiture. The voluntariness of Giuffre's statement is crucial to determining if he was deprived of his property without due process.
The officials do not dispute that coercive conduct to induce a suspect's statement would violate Giuffre's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, but they maintain that they did not act as Giuffre claims. Their denial does not suffice for a qualified immunity defense. The court lacks jurisdiction to determine if the district court correctly denied the officials' summary judgment motion on Giuffre's substantive due process claims, as their defense merely contests the factual allegations rather than addressing the legal principles at stake. Consequently, the resolution of these issues must await a trial where factual determinations can be made.
Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding alleged violations of Giuffre's substantive due process rights, necessitating a factual record to be developed at trial. Consequently, the officials' appeal concerning the district court's denial of immunity related to these substantive claims under the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be considered. The district court's order from July 29, 1993, denying absolute immunity to Prosecutor Bissell is affirmed. However, the court reverses the order denying qualified immunity for the individual officials concerning Giuffre's claims of Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. This portion of the order is remanded for the district court to enter partial summary judgment for the officials on these claims. The remainder of the appeal is dismissed due to lack of appellate jurisdiction, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Additionally, the relevant statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1, indicates that certain interests, including controlled substances and proceeds from illegal activities, are subject to forfeiture and do not confer property rights. During oral arguments, it was conceded by all counsel that, despite evidence of Giuffre's involvement in drug distribution, he had not been indicted. Giuffre's attorney acknowledged the presence of cocaine at his residence at the time of arrest. The County officials expressed that an indictment at this stage could appear as vindictive prosecution given Giuffre's civil action, leading to a strategic decision not to pursue charges to avoid inconsistencies in the trial.
Giuffre's eight-count complaint names several defendants, including Somerset County Prosecutor Nicholas Bissell and various members of the Prosecutor's Office and local police. Key allegations include conspiracy to deprive Giuffre of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985, violations of constitutional rights, a de facto targeting policy for prosecution based on asset ownership, and failures in training and supervision of subordinates by the Prosecutor's Office. Additionally, claims under New Jersey law are asserted in counts five through seven.
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b) outlines the conditions under which a district judge can certify an order for immediate appeal. Specifically, if the order involves a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for differing opinions, and if an immediate appeal could expedite the litigation's resolution, the judge must document this in writing. The Court of Appeals may then permit the appeal at its discretion, provided an application is made within ten days of the order's entry. Notably, such an appeal does not stay district court proceedings unless ordered by the district judge or the Court of Appeals.
During oral arguments, Mr. Giuffre's counsel clarified that the primary relief sought was monetary compensation for two lots, with some additional minor damages also being claimed. Furthermore, the complaint against official defendants implies that the County is effectively liable in this case. The County does not have a qualified immunity defense.
Additionally, it is noted that Mr. Giuffre recorded conversations with investigators while at the County Prosecutor's Office, which were subsequently shared with his public defender and sent to the New Jersey Attorney General's Office. The Attorney General's investigation into Giuffre's claims of official misconduct concluded without corroborating evidence, leading to the closure of the case. Relevant documents were then forwarded to the United States Attorney's Office for further examination of the same allegations.
