Forest Henry SHIPES, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TRINITY INDUSTRIES, Defendant-Appellee

Citations: 31 F.3d 347; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25511; 65 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43,261; 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 385Docket: 91-5013

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; September 14, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves an appeal concerning the retroactive application of section 113(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which addresses the award of expert witness fees as part of legal costs. The central issue is whether this section applies to conduct and rulings that occurred prior to the Act's effective date. The Fifth Circuit Court, following the Supreme Court's decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., concluded that section 113(b) does not apply retroactively in this instance, affirming the district court's judgment. 

Prior to this ruling, the circuit had determined that various sections of the 1991 Act were not retroactive. The Supreme Court had clarified that certain provisions of the Act, specifically sections 1016 and 1027, do not apply to pre-enactment discrimination cases, while leaving some questions about other provisions unresolved. In addressing the retroactivity of section 113, the court recognized a conflict in statutory interpretation principles: one dictates applying the law at the time of judgment, while another holds that laws are not retroactively applied unless explicitly stated. The court evaluated whether applying section 113 would impair existing rights, increase liabilities, or impose new duties based on past actions, ultimately ruling against its retroactive application in this case.

TI contends that applying section 113 in this case would retroactively increase its liability by $63,305.91 for expert witness fees, which were not recoverable prior to the 1991 Act, as established by precedent. Although TI's position aligns with certain interpretations in the Landgraf opinion, it contradicts other aspects, particularly regarding the application of procedural changes to ongoing cases. The court noted that procedural rules, such as those governing attorney's fees, are typically applicable to pending cases without retroactive implications. The district court's denial of expert witness fees occurred before the enactment of the 1991 Act, and since the ruling was based on the law applicable at that time, it committed no reversible error. Consequently, the court affirms the district court's decision without addressing whether section 113 would apply in future cases involving expert witness fees adjudicated after the 1991 Act's enactment.

In Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992), the court determined that section 114(1) does not have retroactive applicability. Additionally, in Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1372 (5th Cir. 1992), the same ruling was made for section 101(2)(b). Valdez v. San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, 974 F.2d 592, 594-95 (5th Cir. 1992), and Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263, 1267 (5th Cir. 1992), also confirmed that sections 101(2)(b) and 102(c)(1) and section 102(c) respectively do not apply retroactively. Furthermore, Wilson v. Belmont Homes, Inc., 970 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir. 1992), ruled that section 102 as a whole does not apply retroactively. The excerpt references Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994), and Landgraf, U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), noting that the latter case emphasizes that provisions of an Act should be treated individually regarding their retroactive effect, highlighting the principle that new rules must be evaluated based on ordinary judicial practices concerning pending cases and pre-enactment conduct. The 1991 Act was signed into law on November 21, 1991.