Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; September 16, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves Jerome S. Wagshal appealing against Mark W. Foster and others, concerning whether a court-appointed mediator is entitled to absolute immunity from damages in a lawsuit by a dissatisfied litigant. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of such immunity.
In June 1990, Wagshal initiated a lawsuit in D.C. Superior Court against Charles E. Sheetz, leading to a referral for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in October 1991 under the supervision of Judge Richard A. Levie. The ADR program required participation but did not bind the parties unless they agreed to binding arbitration. Judge Levie selected Mark W. Foster as the neutral case evaluator, and the parties signed a statement ensuring confidentiality and the evaluator's neutrality, which included provisions against subpoenas and voluntary testimony by the evaluator.
Following the initial session, Wagshal questioned Foster's impartiality. Foster requested Wagshal to either waive his objection or formally pursue it. After receiving no clear response, Foster recused himself and reported to Judge Levie, recommending continued ADR proceedings and suggesting that Wagshal engage in good faith mediation efforts.
Judge Levie subsequently held a conference call to excuse Foster, during which Wagshal's counsel expressed concerns about Foster's withdrawal indicating bias. Judge Levie maintained that he would not inquire into Foster’s opinions due to the confidentiality of the mediation process, and neither Wagshal nor his counsel requested Judge Levie's recusal.
Judge Levie appointed a new case evaluator after the settlement of the Sheetz case in June 1992. Subsequently, in September 1992, Wagshal filed a federal lawsuit against Foster and sixteen members of his law firm, alleging violations of his due process and jury trial rights under the Fifth and Seventh Amendments, and seeking damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Along with federal claims, Wagshal included local law claims such as defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, arguing that Foster's mediation pressured him into an unfavorable settlement.
The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, ruling that Foster was protected by absolute immunity, akin to judges. Although Wagshal's request for injunctive relief is theoretically not barred by judicial immunity, he lacked standing to pursue it on behalf of others and failed to demonstrate a likelihood of future injury.
Foster claimed quasi-judicial immunity against the damages claim, which could apply to case evaluators and mediators acting within their official duties. Courts have extended absolute immunity to various judicial role players, including prosecutors and mediators, while the Supreme Court has denied it to judges performing administrative functions. The burden lies on the official claiming immunity to justify its application.
Three key factors determine quasi-judicial immunity: the comparability of the official’s functions to those of a judge, the intensity of the controversy suggesting potential harassment, and the presence of adequate safeguards to manage unconstitutional conduct without private damage suits.
A case evaluator in the Superior Court performs judicial functions, including identifying issues, scheduling motions, and coordinating settlements, which involve significant discretion and align with tasks judges undertake in adjudication and case management. Although Wagshal argues that mediation differs from judicial adjudication, the process of facilitating settlements is inherently linked to adjudication, supported by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which outlines pre-trial conference tasks similar to those performed by case evaluators. Wagshal does not claim that a case evaluator's role is purely administrative, and the evaluative tasks are closely tied to adjudication, thus not rendering them administrative in nature. Moreover, disappointed litigants might seek recourse against evaluators for perceived biases, as they cannot sue judges due to judicial immunity. Finally, adequate safeguards exist, allowing parties to address misconduct by applying to a judge or seeking recusal if necessary, indicating that institutional protections are in place within the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) framework.
Wagshal contends that Foster cannot claim absolute immunity as a mediator because his actions were not judicial and he acted without jurisdiction. This argument is grounded in references to case law indicating that judicial immunity protects judges from liability even for erroneous actions, provided those actions are within the scope of their judicial functions. The court finds that Foster’s actions—announcing his recusal and providing insights on mediation—fall within the typical responsibilities of a case evaluator. Wagshal’s assertion that Foster's statements post-recusation negate immunity is dismissed as unfounded, as such communications are appropriate for a case evaluator. Additionally, Wagshal's claim of Foster acting without jurisdiction, based on the absence of explicit authority for case evaluators, does not meet the stringent standard for proving a complete absence of jurisdiction. The judicial officer must be aware of lacking jurisdiction or act against clear statutes denying such authority. Foster, discharging his duties under color of authority as a case evaluator, is thus protected. Wagshal's constitutional challenges regarding the use of case evaluators are inadequately articulated and not addressed. The court concludes that absolute quasi-judicial immunity applies to mediators and case evaluators within the Superior Court’s ADR process, affirming the district court's judgment.
