Darrel Wayne Hill, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellant/cross-Appellee
Docket: 93-2894, 93-3159
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; August 16, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
In February 1980, Darrel Wayne Hill committed a robbery at a gasoline station in Pencil Bluff, Arkansas, during which he kidnapped and shot two individuals: E.L. Ward, the station owner, and Donald Teague, an Arkansas Game and Fish officer. Ward survived the attack, but Teague was killed. Hill was charged with six crimes, pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, and was convicted in July 1980. His sentences included life imprisonment for attempted murder of Ward, death for Teague's murder, and 50 years for two counts each of kidnapping and robbery.
On direct appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court vacated the kidnapping and robbery convictions related to Teague, ruling they were lesser included offenses of murder. A subsequent postconviction relief petition resulted in the same conclusion for the charges related to Ward.
In late 1982, Hill filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and errors by the state trial court regarding venue change and jury consideration of prior convictions. In mid-1993, the federal district court granted Hill's petition, finding significant ineffective assistance of counsel concerning his mental health history and errors in jury instructions on prior convictions. While the court upheld the venue decision, it vacated Hill's convictions and sentences for attempted murder and murder, ordering the state to retry him or release him.
The state appeals rulings from the district court regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and the use of prior convictions. Mr. Hill cross-appeals the venue ruling. The court reverses the district court's decision on ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase but affirms it for the penalty phase. Mr. Hill's cross-appeal on the venue motion is also affirmed. Consequently, Mr. Hill's convictions for attempted murder and murder are reinstated, but his life sentence for attempted murder and death sentence for murder are vacated, directing a retrial on penalties.
Mr. Hill's ineffective assistance claim centers on his mental illness history, which he argues should have been investigated and used as a basis for an insanity defense and mitigating circumstances. The state contends that Hill did not raise the guilt phase issue in state courts, rendering it procedurally defaulted unless he shows cause and prejudice for this default. The state concedes that Hill raised the penalty phase issue.
The court examines whether Hill adequately presented the ineffective assistance claim regarding the guilt phase to the state courts. A federal court may consider claims in a habeas petition if the petitioner has fairly presented them to the state. In Hill's postconviction relief petition, he referenced his lawyers' failure to present evidence of psychiatric treatment shortly before the trial, asserting that this evidence was relevant for both phases of the trial and could support an insanity defense and claims of diminished capacity.
Mr. Hill's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is evaluated under a consistent legal standard applicable to both the guilt and penalty phases of his state trial, focusing on his mental illness history that could support an insanity defense and mitigating circumstances. The court finds that the issue of mental condition is interlinked across both phases, challenging any attempt to compartmentalize it. Mr. Hill adequately presented his ineffective assistance claim to the Arkansas Supreme Court, despite not articulating it with precision, as the factual and legal bases were sufficiently conveyed. The court identifies necessary commonality between his state and federal claims, asserting that the state courts were aware of the due process implications tied to his claims. Consequently, the court concludes that Mr. Hill has not defaulted on his ineffective assistance claim, allowing for a merits evaluation. This claim centers on his attorneys' failure to investigate and present his extensive mental health history, which includes multiple hospitalizations from the late 1960s through 1979. Such evidence could have been pivotal in both the guilt phase and for mitigating circumstances during sentencing.
Mr. Hill voluntarily committed himself to an Oklahoma hospital in 1968 at age 27, shortly after being released from prison. Hospital records indicate that both Mr. Hill and his wife reported a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia from his time in prison. Upon admission, he exhibited anxiety, feelings of unreality, and auditory hallucinations, specifically hearing his deceased father urging him to commit suicide. Mr. Hill attributed much of his distress to his father's death during a police encounter while they were involved in a burglary, which he believed caused ongoing trauma and paranoia. He reported persistent auditory hallucinations and a profound fear of being killed, despite recognizing that these voices were not real.
During his hospital stay, he was treated with anti-psychotic medication, which reportedly alleviated his hallucinations within four days. After a week, he left the hospital without informing anyone. His discharge diagnosis included sociopathic personality, antisocial type, alcoholism, drug addiction, and paranoid schizophrenia.
In 1970, Mr. Hill was court-ordered to a second Oklahoma hospital for competency evaluation related to robbery charges. A psychological assessment indicated sociopathic tendencies with possible violent behavior. After three weeks, doctors concluded he was not experiencing an acute psychotic episode and diagnosed him with antisocial personality before his release back to the court.
In 1979, while facing car theft charges, Mr. Hill was evaluated in jail by a psychiatrist. The evaluation noted his history of paranoid schizophrenia and previous treatment with anti-psychotic drugs. The psychiatrist recommended hospitalization for care and treatment, citing concerns about Mr. Hill's ability to understand the charges against him and cooperate with his legal defense.
Mr. Hill was admitted to a hospital in Oklahoma under court order, displaying severe delusions, including beliefs of persecution and auditory hallucinations, particularly involving conversations with his deceased father. He was prescribed anti-psychotic medication, which was temporarily discontinued to assess his behavior. Upon cessation of the medication, his psychosis returned; however, once reintroduced to medication, he showed significant improvement and became cooperative, socializing well without causing issues. Mr. Hill was discharged after two and a half months, diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, alcohol addiction, and multiple drug dependencies. Following his release, he attended outpatient treatment monthly until he missed an appointment in January 1980. Shortly thereafter, he was arrested in Arkansas following a robbery, attempted murder, and murder.
The document also discusses the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, which aims to ensure fair trials for criminal defendants, referencing Strickland v. Washington. To claim ineffective assistance, a petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice to the defense. The standard for evaluating attorney performance considers whether it fell outside the bounds of competent assistance, requiring adequate investigation and development of relevant evidence and theories.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to effective legal counsel, which is essential for justifying reliance on legal proceedings' outcomes. Deficiencies in counsel's performance must be shown to be prejudicial to the defense to qualify as ineffective assistance under the Constitution. The defendant bears the burden of proving that, absent the errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed, thereby undermining confidence in that outcome. In cases challenging convictions, the focus is on whether the errors would have led a reasonable factfinder to have doubts regarding guilt. For death sentence challenges, the inquiry centers on whether the sentencer would have weighed aggravating and mitigating circumstances differently without the errors.
The Supreme Court has suggested that a harmless-error analysis may follow a finding of ineffective assistance, but only after constitutional trial errors are confirmed. In Starr v. Lockhart, it was noted that ineffective assistance claims represent trial errors, which can be evaluated against other trial evidence for their potential harmlessness. A reviewing court in a habeas context may need to assess if any significant ineffective assistance claim was also harmless using the Brecht standard, which considers whether the error had a substantial impact on the jury's verdict. However, no cases explicitly demonstrate that courts have actually engaged in this harmless error analysis after identifying ineffective assistance in habeas proceedings.
Moreover, one court has indicated that the prejudice assessment in an ineffective assistance claim parallels the harmless-error analysis. This creates a logical inconsistency if one can evaluate an error's impact for Strickland's prejudice determination but not for harmless error analysis. Courts must be able to assess the prejudicial effects of errors consistently across both frameworks.
A determination of whether a criminal defendant has experienced constitutionally significant ineffective assistance of counsel involves a prejudice inquiry, which assesses if counsel's errors undermined confidence in the trial's outcome. This analysis aligns with harmless-error standards in habeas cases. Without further guidance from the Supreme Court, a separate harmless-error analysis is deemed unnecessary for evaluating ineffective assistance claims in habeas petitions.
In the case of Mr. Hill, appointed counsel sought a psychiatric examination shortly after his appointment on February 13, 1980, indicating potential use of an insanity defense. To succeed, Mr. Hill needed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was unable to conform his conduct to legal standards due to mental illness. Following a court order, he underwent psychiatric evaluation on March 14, 1980. Mr. Hill disclosed previous hospitalizations and treatments for mental health issues, which were communicated to the evaluating hospital.
On April 11, he was released, diagnosed as drug-dependent but not psychotic. His attorney attempted to obtain hospital records from Arkansas but did not pursue records from Oklahoma, mistakenly believing they would be included in the Arkansas records received on May 1. A motion hearing on May 22 revealed that Mr. Hill's lawyers were unsure if they would pursue an insanity defense and sought a second psychiatric evaluation, which was denied by the trial court due to insufficient grounds, despite the upcoming trial date of June 9. The court subsequently ruled Mr. Hill competent to stand trial.
Mr. Hill informed his first lawyer on March 8 about his previous hospitalizations in 1968 and 1979, as well as outpatient treatment in Oklahoma and psychiatric placements during incarceration. The lawyers received records from the Arkansas hospital on May 1, which did not include information about the Oklahoma treatments. Despite claiming to have requested these records by May 22, they did not actually do so until May 27, just two weeks before trial. The Oklahoma records were finally received on June 10, which led to a trial postponement until July 7 due to one lawyer's military service. These records included significant medical notes suggesting Mr. Hill may have exhibited signs of schizophrenia as early as 1970 and indicated that he responded to anti-psychotic medication but regressed when it was discontinued.
Although the trial was set for July 7, Mr. Hill's lawyers only sought a second psychiatric evaluation on June 27. During the trial, they called only the clinical psychologist who had interviewed Mr. Hill, neglecting to call any doctors or introduce relevant medical records, despite their admissibility under Arkansas rules of evidence. The psychologist's testimony did not address Mr. Hill's medication response or regression either. Mr. Hill's first lawyer later admitted to contacting only one or two of the five doctors mentioned in the Oklahoma records, citing concerns over the potential negative and defensive nature of their testimonies. He further failed to provide a reason for not introducing the Oklahoma medical records through the psychologist who testified.
Mr. Hill's initial attorney expressed hesitance to present Mr. Hill's criminal and prison records to the jury, fearing that such evidence might be introduced by the state through his medical records from Oklahoma. Although the attorney admitted those criminal details were not in the records, he raised concerns about "prior bad acts" by Mr. Hill, which were also not documented in the medical records. An expert in capital litigation testified at the evidentiary hearing that defense counsel should have promptly obtained Mr. Hill's hospitalization records and sought expert testimony to counter an unfavorable court-ordered psychiatric evaluation. He criticized the defense for not performing these tasks until the last minute and saw no valid tactical reason for not introducing the medical records.
During the trial, Mr. Hill's insanity defense argued that he was a paranoid schizophrenic prone to violent outbursts against authority figures. However, the state’s psychiatrist, who evaluated Mr. Hill during his hospitalization, found him to be "without psychosis" and believed he had the capacity to comply with the law at the time of the alleged offense. Mr. Hill's lawyers did not question the psychiatrist about the potential effects of anti-psychotic medications on Mr. Hill. The assessment of Mr. Hill's legal representation is based on whether it fell below professionally competent standards, acknowledging that while the defense did not obtain or introduce all relevant medical records, some critical information was reflected in the testimony of the defense psychologist.
Mr. Hill has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, characterized by delusions of persecution. A psychologist's evaluation revealed indications of acute turmoil and psychosis in Mr. Hill, along with signs of weakening ties to reality and internal forces causing distress. The psychologist reviewed Mr. Hill's past hospital records, confirming a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and a "schizoid personality." Regarding Mr. Hill's mental state during the events in question, the psychologist opined that his chronic paranoid schizophrenia would likely impair his ability to appreciate the criminality of his actions or conform his conduct to legal standards.
The psychologist noted that paranoid schizophrenics often believe they are well and typically only adhere to medication under close supervision; they tend to stop taking medications once such supervision ends, leading to a resurgence of psychosis. Although Mr. Hill's defense did not explicitly argue insanity due to his discontinuation of anti-psychotic medication, the psychologist's testimony implicitly supported this notion. However, critical facts were omitted, including Mr. Hill's history of responding well to medication, his consistent use of anti-psychotic drugs from mid-June to mid-December 1979, and his missed outpatient appointment in mid-January 1980, shortly before the criminal incidents. The defense's potential argument of insanity based on Mr. Hill's failure to continue medication was acknowledged as significant and relevant by his initial lawyer and the clinical psychologist who testified for the defense.
Mr. Hill significantly benefits from antipsychotic medication but tends to discontinue it without compulsion, leading to a high risk of psychotic episodes. A clinical psychologist's report, which detailed Mr. Hill's history of improvement on medication followed by relapse upon discontinuation, was not introduced by his lawyers during his state court trial. This oversight suggests that they failed to consider available defense theories related to his insanity. The report, available prior to trial, could have strongly supported an insanity defense based on Mr. Hill's medication noncompliance, unlike the defense presented, which was based on an implausible reaction to a vehicle insignia. The inadequacy of the defense presented raises concerns about the competence of Mr. Hill's legal representation. Furthermore, during cross-examination, the psychologist acknowledged Mr. Hill's early exposure to drugs and chronic alcohol use, which was consistent with his behavior leading up to the incident. The psychologist also indicated that some test results pointed to antisocial conduct rather than mental illness. Overall, the failure to present a credible, well-documented defense may have prejudiced Mr. Hill's case, undermining confidence in the guilty verdict.
The state's psychiatrist diagnosed Mr. Hill as drug-dependent but not psychotic, identifying abuse of heroin, amphetamines, cocaine, alcohol, barbiturates, and morphine. Both the state and defense psychologists noted Mr. Hill's substance abuse issues in their testimonies. Under Arkansas law, insanity is an affirmative defense that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The key question for the guilt phase was whether Mr. Hill's lawyers should have highlighted his previous treatment with anti-psychotic drugs and the potential cessation of their use shortly before the events in question. Given the evidence of his substance abuse, the court found insufficient grounds to doubt the fairness of the trial, affirming the conviction.
During the penalty phase, Mr. Hill's defense called only one witness, a minister, who testified about Mr. Hill's challenging family background and isolation. The defense did not present further witnesses or documentary evidence regarding Mr. Hill's medical history. The jury sentenced Mr. Hill to life in prison for attempted murder, with Arkansas law allowing a life sentence or the death penalty for murder based on specific aggravating circumstances. The jury's decision required unanimous agreement on the existence and weight of these aggravating factors, as well as justification for a death sentence.
Statutory aggravating circumstances during Mr. Hill's trial included: prior commission of a violent felony, creating a great risk of death to others, and committing murder to evade arrest, as outlined in Ark. Code Ann. Sec. 5-4-604(3), (4), and (5). The prosecution argued that all three applied to Mr. Hill, and the jury agreed. Mitigating circumstances available for consideration included extreme emotional disturbance, unusual pressures, and impaired capacity to understand the wrongfulness of actions due to mental health issues or substance abuse, as per Ark. Code Ann. Sec. 5-4-605(1), (2), and (3). The defense suggested that these mitigating factors, especially the impairment, were present, but the jury found none, resulting in a death sentence for the murder of Mr. Teague.
A critical issue regarding the imposition of the death penalty is whether Mr. Hill received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. The effectiveness of counsel is assessed by their ability to counter the state's aggravating circumstances and present mitigating evidence. Historical evidence of emotional disturbance is significant in mitigation. Mr. Hill informed his first lawyer about his hospitalization in 1968 and a subsequent psychological evaluation referenced this hospitalization, yet his lawyers did not obtain the relevant medical records. Given the high stakes of a death sentence, it was essential for Mr. Hill's legal team to gather comprehensive information about him for the penalty phase of the trial.
Counsel's failure to obtain Mr. Hill's earliest hospitalization records resulted from inadequate preparation rather than a tactical decision. Previous cases indicate that all relevant information was available to counsel during the representation. Notably, records from 1968 document Mr. Hill's positive response to anti-psychotic medication, highlighting his mental state at the time of hospitalization. The lawyers' deficient performance during the guilt phase of Mr. Hill's trial was compounded by their inability to present this critical information during the penalty phase, particularly regarding his history with anti-psychotic drugs and the likelihood of his discontinuation prior to the incidents in question. This oversight is deemed outside the bounds of "professionally competent assistance" as per Strickland v. Washington.
The subsequent analysis must evaluate whether the absence of this evidence prejudiced the jury's decision regarding mitigating circumstances. Specifically, it questions whether there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have identified at least one mitigating circumstance had the evidence regarding Mr. Hill's medication history been presented. The failure to communicate this information raises doubts about the jury's determination that no mitigating factors were present. Even if the jury found Mr. Hill not insane at the time of the crimes, evidence of the impact of his non-compliance with medication could have significantly contributed to establishing mitigating circumstances related to severe mental disturbance or impaired capacity to understand the wrongful nature of his actions.
Mr. Hill's documented positive response to anti-psychotic medication and his regression into psychosis upon discontinuation of the drugs provided compelling evidence of his long-standing mental health issues at the time of the crime. This evidence was significantly more credible than the theory that his violent outburst was triggered by the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission insignia. A clinical psychologist testified that Mr. Hill's deterioration aligned closely with the crime's timing, indicating a strong likelihood of his psychosis during that period. An expert in capital litigation noted that juries tend to impose life sentences when given contextual explanations for a crime, rather than viewing defendants as inherently malicious.
The failure of Mr. Hill's lawyers to present this critical evidence likely prejudiced his case, as it could have highlighted mitigating circumstances related to his mental health. The court expressed skepticism about the jury's determination that no mitigating factors existed, suggesting a reasonable probability that the jury would have recognized at least one mitigating circumstance if adequately informed. Furthermore, the court questioned whether the jury would have found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, emphasizing that this assessment requires a nuanced judgment rather than a simple numerical comparison. Overall, there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been presented, it could have influenced the jury's decision regarding the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
A reasonable probability exists that, even if the jury found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones, they would not have concluded that these circumstances justified a death sentence beyond a reasonable doubt, as per Ark.Code Ann. Sec. 5-4-603(a)(3). The failure of Mr. Hill's attorneys to present evidence regarding his anti-psychotic medication history and his regression to a psychotic state upon discontinuation rendered the penalty phase of his trial fundamentally unfair. This undermines confidence in the jury's decision to impose a life sentence rather than a longer term for the attempted murder charge. Consequently, both sentences are vacated, and the case is remanded for the state to retry the penalty for the murder of Mr. Teague and the attempted murder of Mr. Ward, with Mr. Hill bound by the finding of four or more prior felonies for the latter charge.
Regarding Mr. Hill's cross-appeal on the change of venue, he claims pretrial publicity prejudiced the venire and that the district court did not independently review the venue and voir dire proceedings. He also points out that the state trial court failed to explicitly determine whether an impartial jury could be selected. The Supreme Court has stated that appellate courts must independently evaluate voir dire testimony in such cases. However, findings of impartiality should only be overturned when manifest prejudice is evident. The district court provided detailed accounts of the venue-related testimony and juror responses, referencing the record in its decision to deny habeas relief on the venue issue.
The district court independently reviewed the venue and voir dire from Mr. Hill's state trial, determining that an impartial jury could be selected, as evidenced by the state trial court's decision to swear in the chosen jurors. In habeas proceedings, a trial judge's determination of juror qualifications carries a presumption of correctness, grounded in the credibility and demeanor of jurors. Federal courts should only overturn state findings of jury impartiality if convinced of manifest error, which is closely related to the standard of fair support in the record. The court found that the state trial court's conclusion regarding the jury's impartiality was adequately supported by the record, with no manifest errors identified in the proceedings. Mr. Hill's claims concerning the partiality of six specific jurors were also evaluated, emphasizing that assessing individual juror bias involves evaluating demeanor and the juror's statements of impartiality, which warrants deference to the trial court's findings. After reviewing the voir dire transcript, the court upheld the state trial court's determination that the jurors were impartial. Consequently, Mr. Hill's convictions for attempted murder and murder were reinstated, but his sentences were vacated for a retrial on the penalty.
