Jessie Tilson v. Forrest City Police Department Joe Goff, Chief, Jessie Tilson v. Forrest City Police Department Joe Goff, Chief Bill Dooley, Sgt., Individually and in His Official Capacity Dewey Ramsey, Officer, Individually and in His Official Capacity Dave Parkman, Sheriff, Individually and in His Official Capacity

Citations: 28 F.3d 802; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 16549Docket: 93-1204

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; July 5, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case of Jessie Tilson against the Forrest City Police Department and Chief Joe Goff, stemming from a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. Tilson alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when he was arrested without probable cause and unlawfully detained for fourteen months without charges being filed against him. The case began with Tilson's arrest on April 4, 1989, by officers Bill Dooley and Dewey Ramsey, who were investigating him as a Missouri parole violator linked to a murder. Tilson was later formally arrested for murder on April 17, 1989, with a warrant issued by an Arkansas Circuit Judge. Despite his detention, the county prosecutor did not take action to indict or release him. 

The jury ultimately found that Officers Dooley and Ramsey did not violate Tilson's rights but ruled against the Department and Goff for failing to prevent Tilson's unlawful incarceration. The defendants sought a judgment as a matter of law and a new trial, but the district court denied these motions. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the jury's verdict lacked a legally sufficient basis to support Tilson's claim, reversing the district court's decision and indicating that judgment as a matter of law should have been granted for the defendants.

An appellate court reviews a district court's denial of a posttrial motion for judgment as a matter of law using the same standard applied by the district court, requiring that evidence be viewed favorably toward the prevailing party. The appeals court must affirm the denial if reasonable individuals could reach differing conclusions based on the evidence. Despite this deference, the court must reverse the lower court's decision if the evidence is insufficient to establish liability under Section 1983. 

For liability under Section 1983, the jury must find evidence of direct participation in a constitutional deprivation by the defendants. Respondeat superior is not sufficient for liability; specific actions leading to constitutional violations must be identified. A supervisor, like Goff, can be liable if he directly participated in the violation or if his failure to train or supervise resulted in the deprivation, with deliberate indifference as the standard for liability in such cases. 

For the Department to be liable, it must be shown that the alleged unconstitutional action was implemented by an officially adopted policy or a governmental custom that resulted in the violation. Allegations of inaction or laxness may establish a custom if they are permanent and well-settled, provided they are the driving force behind the constitutional violation.

Tilson's complaint includes allegations of arrest without probable cause, unlawful incarceration for fourteen months, and questioning without legal representation. Specifically regarding the arrest claims, Tilson must demonstrate that Goff directly participated in the unlawful arrest or that Goff's failure to train or supervise contributed to it.

An examination of the record reveals insufficient evidence to support Tilson's claim against Goff and the Department under Sec. 1983 for arrest without probable cause. Tilson established only that Goff was aware of his arrests but failed to demonstrate that Goff was "deliberately indifferent" to any illegal methods used in obtaining arrest warrants. Key inquiries regarding Tilson's deprivation of liberty include whether he was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to liberty and whether Goff or the Department was responsible for that deprivation. The court declines to address the constitutional question, citing the absence of evidence indicating that any policy or custom of the Department, or Goff's failure to supervise or train, directly caused Tilson's incarceration. The jury found that Goff's knowledge of Tilson's incarceration and the lack of written procedures were insufficient for liability. Additionally, Tilson did not prove that proper police procedures were not followed or that different procedures could have led to a timely probable cause hearing. Consequently, the court reverses the denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law due to a lack of legally sufficient grounds for holding Goff or the Department liable. The court expresses concern over Tilson's significant deprivations but notes that the Arkansas prosecutor responsible for the lack of charges or trial was not a party to the action. The court urges Arkansas to implement a time frame for preliminary hearings, highlighting the necessity of such a rule to protect individual rights and prevent prolonged detention, as experienced by Tilson.

The court reversed the district court's denial of the Department and Goff's motion for judgment as a matter of law, remanding the case with directions to enter judgment for the defendants and dismissing the cross-appeal with prejudice. Senior Circuit Judge Lay dissented, highlighting the wrongful incarceration of Jessie Tilson, an innocent African-American man, for fourteen months without a judicial determination of probable cause following a warrantless arrest. The arrest, dated April 4, 1989, purportedly stemmed from a parole violation, although evidence suggested it was part of a murder investigation. Officers claimed they confirmed Tilson's parole status only via a letter dated September 28, 1990, and he was not presented before a judicial officer as required by Arkansas law and the U.S. Constitution. A warrant for Tilson's arrest on murder charges was obtained on April 17, 1989, but he was not seen in court until June 11, 1990, upon his release via habeas corpus. Tilson sued the Forrest City Police Department and officials under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, with the jury finding that while individual officers did not violate his rights, the City and Police Chief Goff did. The district court denied various motions from the City and Chief Goff, which they appealed. The court emphasized the absence of evidence that Tilson received a probable cause hearing, noting that the Fourth Amendment mandates such a hearing within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest unless extraordinary circumstances exist, placing the burden on the City to justify any delay.

The Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specify a time limit for prosecutors to file an information or release an arrested individual, nor do they mandate a preliminary hearing if no information is filed within a certain time frame. According to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.3, judicial officers must inform an arrestee of the charges and conduct an informal hearing to assess probable cause for detention if they cannot resolve the case. In this instance, there was no evidence that Tilson received such a hearing after his arrest or after the issuance of his arrest warrant on April 17, possibly because he was never formally charged. His arrest without a warrant necessitated a Gerstein probable cause hearing.

The jury found that Chief Goff and the City violated Tilson's constitutional rights, determining that the police department acted with reckless disregard for the rights of suspects by not implementing and enforcing proper procedures. The court will review the evidence in favor of the prevailing party when considering motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Chief Goff's liability is upheld as he does not need to have actual knowledge of a constitutional violation; reckless disregard suffices. He could be held liable for failing to train or supervise officers or for his direct involvement in Tilson's detention. Citing precedents, the court has previously found liability for supervisors based on their knowledge of unlawful detentions, even if they were not directly responsible for the arrest. Cases like Webster v. Gibson and Wayland v. City of Springdale illustrate that both personal involvement in the detention process and knowledge of unlawful detention can establish liability.

Chief Goff was found to have knowledge of Tilson's arrest and the requirement under Rule 8.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure for prompt presentation before a judicial officer. Goff admitted awareness of Tilson’s arrest but did not adequately justify the delay in providing a probable cause hearing. The trial judge appropriately allowed the jury to assess the reasonableness of the detention duration, as this is a factual matter. Previous case law supports that a Fourth Amendment violation related to detention without a probable cause hearing can result in damages under Section 1983. Notable cases include a finding of a 45-hour detention as a violation (Willis v. City of Chicago) and a four-day delay (Hallstrom v. City of Garden City) leading to a remand for damages assessment.

Additionally, Chief Goff could face liability for failing to train or supervise his officers regarding arrest procedures, particularly the obligation to take arrestees before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay. This claim is rooted not in respondeat superior but in Goff's alleged deliberate indifference to arrestee rights. Evidence indicated that Goff had not instituted training or procedural guidelines in his 18 years as Chief. As a result, the jury had grounds to determine that both Goff and the police department were negligent in training officers on handling warrantless arrests and ensuring that probable cause hearings occur promptly.

Deliberate indifference to the prolonged detention of Tilson could establish liability under Section 1983, which aims to safeguard constitutional rights. Chief of Police Goff's minimization of his responsibility undermines the purpose of the Civil Rights Act. The City has an obligation to ensure timely judicial reviews, a duty implicitly assigned to the Police Department's supervisor. The violation of Tilson's Fourth Amendment rights is evident, raising the question of accountability. Chief Goff cannot evade responsibility by blaming his officers if they were not properly trained regarding their constitutional duties. The failure to implement necessary procedures for judicial determination reflects a broader failure of the City of Forrest City, which is responsible for Tilson's detention. 

Municipal liability under Section 1983 is established if a policy or custom leads to unconstitutional deprivation of rights, as noted in Monell v. Department of Social Services. Even if arresting officers qualify for immunity, the municipality cannot claim the same. The City’s lack of procedures for prompt hearings, as mandated by Gerstein, constitutes deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. A jury may find that the City’s inaction and Chief Goff's failures warrant liability. Such inaction, particularly when it amounts to a failure to protect rights, can expose the City to legal responsibility. Municipal officials with policymaking authority can also subject themselves and the government to liability under Section 1983.

Sufficient evidence supports Tilson's claim against the City of Forrest City due to the inaction of Chief Goff, which resulted in Tilson's illegal detention. The absence of any policy enforcing Rule 8.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring a judicial determination of probable cause, contributed to this violation. Defendants acknowledged in their brief that there were no written procedures for criminal cases. The evidence indicates that Tilson was treated as a murder suspect rather than a parole violator, highlighting a violation linked to County of Riverside/Gerstein standards. The necessity for a neutral magistrate's assessment of probable cause is emphasized, as pretrial detention can adversely affect a suspect's employment and family life; in Tilson's case, his wife left him, and he lost his job while incarcerated. 

The analysis raises the question of whether the Chief's and City's failure to create detention policies was a "moving force" behind Tilson's incarceration from April 1989 until June 1990, post-arrest warrant issuance. Although liability might seem to shift to the sheriff and state prosecutor after the warrant was issued, Tilson is still entitled to a new trial regarding his initial two-week detention that infringed on his Fourth Amendment rights.

The existing evidence supports affirming the verdict and judgment regarding Tilson's unlawful incarceration. The City's failure to establish a detention policy is closely linked to Tilson's continued detention without a probable cause hearing, which violated his Fourth Amendment rights. His detention, lasting fourteen months, stemmed from the initial unlawful arrest related to a murder investigation rather than any parole violation, suggesting the parole issue was a pretext for the arrest. The jury could reasonably conclude that this unlawful detention constituted a continuing violation. 

The Civil Rights Act does not absolve joint tortfeasors of liability; thus, contributions from various parties, including law enforcement and legal counsel, do not mitigate the responsibility of those who significantly impacted Tilson's detention. Had the initial requirements for a prompt judicial hearing been met, the state may have struggled to justify Tilson's continued detention. The jury's punitive damages award indicates a belief that the City's actions were malicious or oppressive, justifying liability under Sec. 1983, which aims to remedy constitutional rights violations. The absence of procedural safeguards allowed Tilson's illegal detention to persist, warranting affirmation of the judgment.

A "motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict" previously referred to as such under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) is addressed. The dissent notes that Tilson's April 4 arrest occurred without a warrant, a point contested by the majority. However, Arkansas law allows for the arrest of parole violators without a warrant, as stated in Ark. Code Ann. Sec. 16-93-705(a)(4). Parole officers can arrest without a warrant or authorize another officer to do so via a written statement if they determine a parole violation has occurred.

On April 4, 1989, officers identified Tilson as a parole violator through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which provided a teletype message indicating he was wanted. Following this, Dooley confirmed the teletype with Missouri parole officer Robert K. Newsom and later informed Missouri authorities that Tilson could not be extradited due to evidence he had gathered for a murder charge.

Tilson appeared before a judicial officer who likely provided an informal, non-adversarial probable cause determination, as required by Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.3. However, the court is cautious about assuming he received a proper probable cause hearing solely based on his court appearance. 

Tilson was appointed an attorney on April 19, 1989, and a joint request for a psychiatric evaluation was made, which was granted on May 4, 1989, but not completed until December 4, 1989. During this time, Arkansas law prohibited the prosecutor from proceeding with Tilson's case.

The claims relate to both his parole violation arrest on April 4 and his murder arrest on April 17. A jury interrogatory indicated which defendants were found to have violated Tilson's constitutional rights, with the Forrest City Police Department and Chief Joe Goff being identified as having done so, while two other officers were not. Although Tilson cross-appealed, he did not specify the issues in his brief.

Tilson's cross-appeal argues that the jury made an error by acquitting Dooley and Ramsey and seeks an increased damage award, but these points were not adequately briefed and are thus waived on appeal. The dissent cites the case of Webster to support the notion that Goff's awareness of Tilson's detention suffices for the jury's verdict; however, it is contended that Webster does not allow for Sec. 1983 claims without proof of causation. Unlike the cases referenced, Tilson was detained in the St. Francis County jail, not by Goff or the Department, and the Sheriff's Department and Sheriff were dismissed from the case prior to summary judgment. 

The jury instruction related to Goff's liability required the plaintiff to demonstrate that Goff either encouraged the misconduct or was directly involved, and that he must have authorized, approved, or knowingly allowed the unconstitutional actions of his officers. While the instruction did not explicitly mention a failure-to-train-or-supervise claim, the phrasing regarding knowing refusal to terminate actions by others could imply such a claim. The dissent mischaracterizes Tilson's claim by stating Goff failed to establish police procedures, which Tilson claimed in his complaint but was not covered in jury instructions. The jury's decision to acquit Dooley and Ramsey likely indicates they found probable cause for the arrests or determined the officers lacked the necessary state of mind for liability.

Police officers are granted qualified immunity for unlawful arrests unless the warrant application is severely lacking in probable cause, rendering any belief in its validity unreasonable. In the case at hand, while the jury received a good-faith defense instruction, it was noted that the plaintiff, Tilson, did not receive a probable cause hearing after his arrest, which violated his due process rights. Parole revocation affects conditional liberty tied to specific restrictions rather than absolute liberty. The dissent's assertion regarding the jail being part of city government was countered by evidence showing Tilson was held in a county jail. Additionally, Tilson failed to present evidence linking the Department or an officer to his prolonged incarceration of 14 months, which is essential for a Section 1983 claim, as vicarious liability does not apply. Concerns about Tilson's deprivation are acknowledged, but a successful claim requires proof of causation linking the defendants to the alleged constitutional violation. Furthermore, Tilson's opportunity to file a claim appears barred by the statute of limitations, as Arkansas's three-year limit for personal injury claims applies to Section 1983 actions. Finally, it was noted that Officer Ramsey's testimony indicated that Tilson's arrest may have been a pretext for interrogation regarding a murder, and delays in presenting an arrestee to a magistrate for probable cause hearings are not justified by the need to gather additional evidence.

The original arrest and subsequent two-week detention of Tilson occurred without a probable cause hearing, allegedly linked to an unsubstantiated murder charge. This lack of a preliminary hearing contravenes the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically Rule 5(c), which mandates a preliminary examination within ten days for detained individuals if no indictment is filed beforehand. Had Arkansas followed a similar rule, Tilson could have been released by April 29, 1989, instead of waiting until June 10, 1990, for a determination of his detention's validity. The suggestion is made that Arkansas legislative action may be necessary to prevent future occurrences of prolonged detentions without timely judicial review. Chief Goff, despite knowing of Tilson's incarceration, failed to investigate the circumstances of his detention. Given the size of Forrest City, it is reasonable to infer that the Chief, as the police department supervisor, was aware of Tilson's status. Jurisprudence supports that law enforcement has a duty to release detainees who are not brought before a magistrate in a timely manner. The Supreme Court's ruling in County of Riverside indicates that if a probable cause determination is not made within 48 hours, the government must justify the delay. Additionally, it was improper for the jury to receive qualified immunity instructions regarding the arresting officers, as this is a legal question for the court. However, the issue of qualified immunity was not raised on appeal due to lack of objection from Tilson's counsel. If a jury finds that Tilson did not suffer a constitutional injury from the officers, then the City cannot be held liable, even if there was a policy breach.

No finding of constitutional violation was made as the jury was instructed that individual officers could be exonerated if they acted in good faith, unlike in Heller. There is an argument that following Tilson's bindover order, no constitutional violation occurred since his second arrest was authorized by a warrant based on probable cause, which would negate Gerstein as the basis for his claim. Baker v. McCollan supports this notion, stating there was no violation where detention was conducted under a valid warrant per the Fourth Amendment. However, it is also posited that Tilson's due process rights might have been violated due to the absence of a probable cause hearing, arraignment, or preliminary hearing. Baker indicates that prolonged detention without due process can lead to constitutional issues, supported by cases such as Coleman v. Frantz, which held that an eighteen-day detention before a first appearance violated due process, and Garcia v. City of Chicago, discussing the implications of wrongful detention. Although constitutional questions arise if authorities ignore protests of innocence, these claims cannot be directed against the City and Chief, as others, including the prosecution's failure to charge Tilson or his attorney's inaction in pursuing a habeas corpus petition, contributed to the denial of due process. Jury instructions clarified that malicious acts are prompted by ill will, wanton acts show reckless disregard for rights, and oppressive actions involve unnecessary severity or abuse of authority.