Angel Ortiz, a Member of the Philadelphia City Council, in His Individual Capacity Project Vote! Service Employees International Union v. City of Philadelphia Office of the City Commissioners Voter Registration Division Martha Johnson, in Her Official Capacity as Administrator of the Voter Registration Division of the City of Philadelphia. Angel Ortiz, Project Vote! And Service Employees International Union

Citation: 28 F.3d 306Docket: 93-1634

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; July 12, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Angel Ortiz, along with Project Vote and the Service Employees International Union, filed a lawsuit against the City of Philadelphia, challenging Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law, claiming it violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The district court denied Ortiz's request for a permanent injunction to stop the implementation of the purge law, which mandated the removal of registered voters who had not voted in the past two years after notification. In 1991, a significant number of Philadelphia voters (193,000, or 21%) were slated for purging. Ortiz contended that the law had a discriminatory impact on minority voters and violated various legal provisions, including Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and constitutional amendments. Initial requests for injunctive relief were denied, and subsequent appeals were dismissed for lack of prosecution. A trial held in November 1992 concluded with the district court ruling in favor of the City on June 1, 1993, despite acknowledging that minority voters faced disproportionate purging rates. Ortiz subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his Section 2 claim.

Ortiz contends that the district court incorrectly applied the standard in determining that the purge statute did not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. He claims the court erred in concluding that he failed to demonstrate the statute led to the disproportionate removal of minority voters from registration rolls. The assessment of whether an electoral practice has a discriminatory effect is a factual question reviewed for clear error, requiring a localized analysis of the electoral mechanisms' design and impact. However, the legal standard to be applied in evaluating discriminatory effects is subject to plenary review.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 enforces the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits voting discrimination based on race. The 1982 amendment to Section 2 clarified that practices causing voting denial or abridgment can be challenged based solely on discriminatory results, without needing to prove discriminatory intent. Section 2(a) prohibits any voting qualification or procedure that results in the denial of voting rights based on race, while Section 2(b) allows for a violation to be established by showing that protected class members have less opportunity to participate in the political process. The extent of elected representatives from a protected class is one factor considered, but it does not require proportional representation.

The case Thornburg v. Gingles involved a challenge to a redistricting plan that allegedly impaired black citizens' voting rights under Section 2, ultimately ruling that the plan diluted their votes in the affected districts.

The Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision regarding most disputed districts, except for one, emphasizing that assessing minority electoral opportunities requires evaluating the impact of contested practices based on objective factors. A Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the amendment of Section 2 provided a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors for such claims, including historical voting discrimination, racial polarization, electoral practices enhancing discrimination, exclusion from candidate slating, effects of discrimination in various societal aspects, racial appeals in campaigns, minority representation in office, responsiveness of elected officials to minority needs, and the legitimacy of voting qualifications. While the Court in Thornburg v. Gingles examined these factors, it acknowledged that they were not comprehensive and that proving a specific number or majority of them was not necessary; other relevant factors could also influence the assessment of discriminatory electoral procedures. The parties in the case agree that the district court's analysis must consider the totality of circumstances, including whether the purge statute was a significant factor in denying minorities equal access to the political process. Ortiz contends that the district court improperly dismissed the totality of the circumstances test by requiring proof that the purge statute was the primary cause of unequal access. In contrast, the City argues the court correctly required Ortiz to demonstrate that the statute resulted in lesser opportunities for minority voters. The key legal question is whether the district court erred by including the causal relationship between the purge statute and minority access in its totality of circumstances analysis, as the Supreme Court indicated that a causal connection between electoral practices and discrimination is essential for a Section 2 claim.

Three Courts of Appeal have established that plaintiffs under Section 2 must prove a causal link between alleged discrimination and the electoral process in question. In *Wesley v. Collins*, the Sixth Circuit rejected claims that a Tennessee law disenfranchising felons disproportionately impacted black voters, despite evidence of historical racial discrimination in the state. The court concluded that the law's impact did not arise from racial qualifications for voting and did not violate the Voting Rights Act. In *Irby v. Virginia State Board of Elections*, the Fourth Circuit upheld a finding that Virginia's appointive system for school board members did not violate Section 2, noting that the disparity in representation was due to lower black candidacy rather than the electoral system itself. In *Salas v. Southwest Texas Junior College District*, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that a lack of electoral success among Hispanic voters resulted from lower turnout rather than a violation of Section 2, emphasizing that protected classes are not entitled to relief solely based on turnout discrepancies. The district court correctly assessed whether Pennsylvania's non-voting purge statute caused discrimination, agreeing with the courts that a causal connection must be shown, as Ortiz failed to demonstrate that the purge law contributed to unequal access for minority voters. The determination of discriminatory effects in electoral procedures is a factual question subject to review for clear error.

The district court found evidence of racially polarized voting and a general pattern of racial appeals in Philadelphia's political campaigns, alongside substantial socioeconomic disparities affecting African-American and Latino residents, which hinder their political participation. However, the court determined there was no historical voting-related discrimination against these groups, and no evidence suggested discrimination in candidate slating or difficulties for minorities in electing representatives. The court upheld the city's voter purge policy as valid, aimed at preventing election fraud. Ultimately, it concluded that Ortiz failed to prove the purge law denied minority voters equal access to the political process, even though it disproportionately affected African-American and Latino voters. The court emphasized that despite these disparities and contributing factors to lower minority participation rates, the evidence did not establish that the purge law was the decisive factor in violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The district court's conclusion was affirmed, highlighting the importance of the right to vote in a democratic society while acknowledging historical challenges in extending this right to all citizens.

The State does not obstruct citizens' voting rights or participation in the political process; rather, lower voter turnout among minority citizens compared to white voters is attributed to historical factors, not discriminatory electoral practices. Ortiz's complaint claims that Pennsylvania's purge statute resulted in unequal purge rates between white and minority communities, but there is no evidence supporting this assertion. Purge statutes are validated as a means to combat voter fraud and apply uniformly, irrespective of race or demographics, targeting those who do not vote or seek reinstatement. The historical trend shows that minority voter turnout has been lower, but this does not establish that the purge law caused these disparities. According to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, minority claimants must prove they have less opportunity to participate in the electoral process and elect representatives of their choice. In the case of Chisom, the Supreme Court specified that an inability to elect preferred representatives does not alone indicate a violation if there is no evidence of reduced participation opportunities. The district court found that Philadelphia's minority population participates in the political process and has successfully elected minority representatives, including a two-term minority mayor and a significant minority presence in the City Council. No evidence suggests that the purge law restricts minorities' ability to influence election outcomes in Philadelphia.

The district court's findings are upheld as not clearly erroneous, concluding that Ortiz failed to prove causation and, consequently, did not meet the requirements for a Section 2 cause of action. The dissent argues that broader societal issues, such as discrimination in housing and education, contribute to the inequality created by the purge law. However, it overlooks that the individuals affected by the purge law had previously registered to vote, suggesting they overcame societal disadvantages. The law only targets those who have registered but failed to vote in subsequent elections, meaning it does not affect individuals who have never registered or voted.

The dissent's claim that the purge law dilutes participation is unsupported, as the record shows no connection between the societal factors cited and the challenged electoral practice. Furthermore, the dissent contends that the City must prove the necessity of the non-voting purge law, referencing a Senate Judiciary Committee report. However, no authority substantiates this burden on the City, and the court believes the purge statute serves a legitimate civic interest in preventing electoral fraud. Recent incidents, including a Senate election invalidated due to fraudulent absentee votes, illustrate the need for the purge law, which aims to address such electoral fraud, a long-standing issue in Philadelphia.

The dissent fails to connect the societal disadvantages it outlines with the purpose and effect of Philadelphia's non-voting purge act, which is aimed at preventing electoral fraud that undermines the voting power of all registered citizens, including minorities. Neither the plaintiffs nor the dissent have proven that the purge act infringes on rights protected by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The dissent's claims of discrimination against minorities lack supporting evidence, and merely expressing concern over societal disadvantages does not constitute a legal challenge to the purge act. The dissent's focus on societal issues may be relevant to Philadelphia's voter registration procedures but is misplaced in a challenge to the specific non-voting purge act, which only applies after individuals have navigated existing societal barriers. The court maintains that until evidence is presented showing that the purge law discriminates against a specific class, it will not invalidate the statute. Consequently, the district court's decision to deny Ortiz's request for relief is upheld, and costs are assessed against him.

Fraudulent elections significantly undermine democratic governance by devaluing the votes of citizens, including minority voters. In Pennsylvania, particularly in Philadelphia, concerns about voter fraud, such as voting by deceased or non-resident individuals, have prompted legislative action. In 1937, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a non-voting purge law to combat this issue, which was deemed constitutional by a federal court in 1972, recognizing the state's interest in maintaining electoral integrity. In a recent challenge, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that this law violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires proof that minority citizens have less opportunity to participate in elections. The ongoing issues of voter fraud in Philadelphia were reiterated, highlighting the continuing relevance of the law.

Congress has sought to improve voter turnout through the National Voter Registration Act, aiming to enhance registration while preventing fraudulent voting. However, this may complicate states' efforts to remove ineligible voters from electoral rolls. The Pennsylvania law and the new federal act reflect different policy choices; state legislatures have the authority to balance voter registration and fraud prevention, barring other legal violations.

In dissent, Judge Lewis acknowledges the progress made since the Voting Rights Act but argues that discrimination in voting persists, affecting minority participation. He contends that the majority erred in upholding Pennsylvania's purge statute, which he believes perpetuates discrimination and undermines the integrity of democratic processes. He emphasizes the need to recognize ongoing discrimination to effectively address it and prevent future electoral inequities.

Deep concerns are raised regarding the effects of a recent decision on Philadelphia residents' voting rights and the application of the Voting Rights Act. Each January, the Voter Registration Division in Philadelphia enforces a non-voting purge law, identifying registered voters who have not voted in the past two years for potential removal. Those identified receive "intent to purge" notices, which are only printed in English and inform them of their impending registration cancellation unless they vote or submit a written request for reinstatement within a specified timeframe. However, these notices lack detailed instructions on how to file such requests.

If voters do not act, they are purged from the rolls and must re-register to vote in the future. Evidence presented shows that the purge disproportionately affects black and Latino voters, with higher rates of purging compared to white voters, and lower rates of reinstatement for minorities. Expert testimony indicates a systematic pattern of discrimination in the purging process, highlighting that the impact on black and Latino voters is both significant and consistent across electoral cycles. Dr. Alan Lichtman's analysis of the data supports these claims, demonstrating that the non-voting purge creates substantial disparities in voter retention among racial groups.

The district court determined that expert evidence indicates African-American and Latino voters in Philadelphia face higher rates of registration purging compared to white voters. This conclusion persists despite annual fluctuations in purge rates. The court highlighted significant socioeconomic disadvantages experienced by Latino and Black Philadelphians, including lower education levels, poorer health, reduced access to medical care, fewer home ownership rates, higher unemployment, and lower incomes, which collectively hinder their political participation and ability to elect preferred candidates. Statistical evidence further supports that minority voters in Philadelphia do not vote as frequently as white voters, a disparity attributed partly to discrimination and socioeconomic challenges. The court argued that these socioeconomic disparities, linked to historical and ongoing discrimination, diminish the likelihood of minority groups participating in the electoral process. 

Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, courts must assess whether voting practices result in a denial or abridgment of voting rights for protected classes rather than requiring proof of discriminatory intent. Amendments to Section 2 clarify that states and political subdivisions cannot impose qualifications or practices that lead to such denial or abridgment of voting rights. The legal standard for evaluating these results is outlined in Section 2(b), drawing from precedents established in prior Supreme Court rulings.

A violation of subsection (a) occurs when it is demonstrated, based on the totality of circumstances, that political processes in a state or political subdivision are not equally accessible to protected classes of citizens, resulting in reduced opportunities for these groups to participate in elections and elect representatives of their choice. The Supreme Court's interpretation in Gingles emphasizes that a Section 2 claim revolves around how electoral laws, practices, or structures interact with social and historical conditions to create disparities in voting opportunities between racial groups. Following the 1982 amendments, Congress mandated a thorough practical evaluation of both past and present realities when assessing whether political processes are equally open to protected groups. This evaluation must adopt a functional perspective rather than a formalistic one, reflecting Congress's intent to understand the real effects of challenged voting practices. The majority's view, which asserts that plaintiffs must show a causal link between the electoral practice and alleged discrimination, is critiqued for not fully embracing the necessary functional and practical evaluation required by the Voting Rights Act.

The primary legal issue under consideration is the necessity for plaintiffs challenging a voting practice under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to demonstrate a causal connection between that practice and the alleged deprivation of equal political opportunity. The text asserts that this causal link is undisputed and supported by the Act's language, legislative history, and relevant judicial precedent. However, it critiques the majority's requirement for plaintiffs to prove that the voting practice is the "dispositive force" behind the deprivation of rights, arguing that Section 2 does not impose such a stringent standard. The plaintiffs need only show that the challenged law contributes to unequal political opportunities, without needing to prove it as the sole or primary cause. The excerpt emphasizes the importance of considering the totality of circumstances, including social and historical factors, which shape the impact of the voting practice. It notes that while the district court made erroneous statements regarding the "dispositive force," there are indications it understood the proper legal standard. The majority's stance, however, fails to recognize that the plaintiffs are not required to demonstrate that the non-voting purge law operates independently of external conditions to establish a violation of Section 2.

The majority opinion concludes that despite lower voter turnout among black and Latino populations, the purge law is not responsible for this disparity. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the purge law itself has hindered minority voters' ability to participate, as required under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court asserts that a challenged law is allowable unless it is the sole cause of diminished political opportunities; the presence of other contributing factors absolves the law of liability unless those factors are direct results of the law itself. Consequently, the social disadvantages experienced by the plaintiffs in areas such as education and employment are deemed irrelevant to their legal claim, as no causal link has been established between these factors and the purge law.

The majority emphasizes that the purge law affects only those who have previously registered, implying that these individuals have already surmounted barriers to voting. Thus, if a law merely necessitates re-registration, it does not violate Section 2. The majority's interpretation suggests that unless a law prevents individuals from ever registering, it is permissible under the Voting Rights Act. This view diverges from the Supreme Court's understanding that a Section 2 claim hinges on how an electoral law interacts with other circumstances to create unequal political opportunity. The majority provides a rationale for the disproportionate purging of minority voters: they are purged more frequently because their turnout is lower. Ultimately, the majority's position indicates that as long as the purge law itself is not directly responsible for lower voter turnout, there is no Section 2 violation.

The majority's rationale for the impact of the purge law, attributing lower turnout to minority voters' infrequency in voting, fails to address deeper issues faced by these groups in the political arena. The district court emphasized the necessity of a thorough examination of the underlying factors contributing to the reduced voting rates among Latinos and blacks. It highlighted that lower participation may stem from discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantages prevalent in Philadelphia. According to the Senate Report, historical disadvantages in education, employment, and living conditions have been shown to depress minority political engagement, negating the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate further causation between socioeconomic status and political participation.

Historical context is provided through references to W.E.B. Du Bois, who noted the barriers to political participation faced by black Philadelphians due to poverty and lack of education, and Gunnar Myrdal, who linked nonvoting with poverty. The excerpt underscores Congress's directive to evaluate both past and present realities when assessing the effects of voting laws on individuals' political participation. Testimony from Councilman Ortiz illustrates the challenges within the Latino community, where survival concerns overshadow voting, leading to skepticism about the political system's efficacy. Consequently, the compounded effects of discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage diminish the resources available for registration and voting, fostering apathy and further diminishing the political power of minority groups.

Judge Wisdom articulated a cycle of discrimination impacting voter registration and participation among black and Latino communities in *United States v. Marengo County Comm'n*. He explained that historical discrimination leads to lower registration and voting rates among these groups, resulting in socioeconomic disadvantages that further diminish political engagement. The law permitting the purging of registrants who do not vote exacerbates this cycle, reinforcing beliefs that participation in the political process is futile due to the higher costs and lower benefits.

The excerpt asserts that under current legal standards, plaintiffs demonstrating socioeconomic disparities and discrimination do not need to establish a direct causal link to low political participation rates. The majority's position, which requires proof that the purge law directly caused the disproportionate removal of minority voters from registration rolls, overlooks the broader societal factors contributing to lower turnout rates. The judge contends that while the purge law may discourage participation, it is largely societal discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantages that are principally responsible for reduced voting among these populations.

It is argued that if the majority's interpretation of the law were correct, it would effectively shield non-voting purge laws from Section 2 challenges, as these laws could not be held accountable for their disparate impacts when discrimination and disadvantage are seen as the primary causes. The excerpt references *Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain*, which correctly applied Section 2 to reject the majority's stance, highlighting that similar legal principles should apply in the current case.

Citizens must register with a county registrar for federal, state, and county elections and with a municipal clerk for municipal elections. A state prohibition on "satellite registration" further restricts registration opportunities outside of the registrar's office. The district court found these procedures significantly disadvantaged black registration rates, violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Although Mississippi's registration laws were not the sole cause of lower black registration, socioeconomic factors—such as limited transportation access and inflexible job hours—interacted with these laws to create the disparity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, supporting the finding of significantly lower black registration numbers and emphasizing the importance of considering how laws affect social conditions. This perspective contrasted with a majority view that focused solely on registration frequency and causation. In a related case, United States v. Marengo County Commission, the Eleventh Circuit overturned a district court dismissal of a Section 2 claim, highlighting that discriminatory practices, such as limited registrar hours and lack of black deputy registrars, hindered black voter registration. The appellate court found these policies discriminatory, as they disproportionately affected black voters.

County officials' lack of black poll officials and rejection of a black citizen's offer to serve as a registrar limited black citizens' access to and confidence in the political system. The Eleventh Circuit, similar to Operation PUSH courts, did not require plaintiffs to prove a direct link between challenged measures and their voter registration or participation failures. It rejected the district court's view that apathy explained lower black voter turnout, citing various social and historical factors that contributed to the disparity. These factors, coupled with the contested voting practices, resulted in a discriminatory impact, leading the court to determine that the county's at-large election system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

The majority relied on Salas v. Southwest Texas Junior College District to argue that a protected class does not automatically qualify for Section 2 relief based on lower voter turnout. However, the context of Salas—where Hispanic voters failed to prove that white bloc voting impeded their electoral success despite being a registered majority—does not support the majority’s position. The Salas court highlighted that even a majority class could face obstacles that undermine their voting power, emphasizing that their failure to demonstrate such impediments precluded their claim. In contrast, the plaintiffs in the present case are not part of a majority class facing similar challenges, and thus the Salas decision does not align with the majority's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act.

The Fifth Circuit indicated that the plaintiffs in Salas could succeed if they demonstrated "practical impediments to voting" or low turnout due to prior discrimination, which could interact with the state's districting plan, limiting the class members' political engagement. However, the court's interpretation of Section 2 necessitated that plaintiffs prove the challenged voting measure, an at-large district, directly caused these impediments or turnout issues, a requirement deemed impossible as district lines alone cannot create the "totality of the circumstances" for Section 2 analysis. The majority ruling contrasted with Salas, which did not impose such a burden. Furthermore, while the amendment to Section 2 primarily addressed vote dilution, it also maintained provisions against all forms of voting rights discrimination, including "episodic" practices not involving permanent barriers. The Senate Report clarified that events affecting electoral administration could result in discriminatory outcomes, with different proof factors applicable than those used for vote dilution cases. The Report specifically identified voter purging as an example of episodic discrimination that could lead to discriminatory results if not conducted fairly or if re-registration opportunities were insufficient.

The statement from the Senate Report does not justify affirming the legality of Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law for two main reasons. First, the City failed to demonstrate "the need" for the law, as the district court's finding that it prevented fraud does not equate to necessity. Second, Congress identified purging as a form of "episodic discrimination" under Section 2, noting that the examples provided were not exhaustive and did not imply that purging could not yield discriminatory outcomes. The majority's interpretation suggests that a fairly administered purge statute would not violate the law, but this implication is unsupported by the text. The excerpt references a case that indicates the list from the Senate Report is merely illustrative of potential violations, not a comprehensive guide for establishing claims. Furthermore, Congress clarified that a racially neutral practice does not exempt it from scrutiny if other factors indicate discrimination. The majority's view could incorrectly narrow the scope of Section 2 in evaluating voter purging challenges. The Senate Report also acknowledges that the factors relevant to assessing violations outside vote dilution claims may differ, yet it does not specify what those factors might be in the current context.

The majority fails to analyze the considerations relevant to evaluating the legality and impact of a non-voting purge law, likely due to its causation theory. In contrast, the district court addressed this issue and identified that the Supreme Court's threshold test for vote dilution claims, established in Thornburg v. Gingles, is largely irrelevant to a Section 2 challenge against a purge law. The court noted that factors like polarized voting are peripheral to such claims and can be supplanted by more pertinent considerations. Key factors influencing the discriminatory effect of a purge law include discrimination, socioeconomic disadvantage, historical discrimination in voting, attempts to limit minority political power, and the challenges faced by minority voters in electing preferred candidates. Each of these factors can exacerbate the adverse effects of a non-voting purge statute on minority voter participation. The majority's flawed interpretation of Section 2 diminishes the importance of identifying and weighing these relevant factors. Ultimately, the evaluation of a law's effect and legality should consider its interaction with the overall circumstances, irrespective of the law's direct causation of those circumstances. The plaintiffs contend that to prove Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law violates Section 2, they must demonstrate both its disparate impact on Black and Latino voters and that the state could achieve its goal of preventing election fraud through less discriminatory means, supported by a Senate Report indicating that a lack of justification for a purge could amount to prohibited discrimination.

Plaintiffs argue against Pennsylvania's purge law, asserting it disproportionately disenfranchises Latino and Black voters. The court acknowledges the plaintiffs' concerns but emphasizes that Congress did not intend for the Voting Rights Act to undermine state efforts to prevent voting fraud. It outlines that any voting practice compromising equality must be justified as necessary for achieving legitimate public interests. Drawing a parallel to Title VII disparate-impact law, the court suggests that just as employers must demonstrate the necessity of practices adversely affecting protected classes, states must also justify practices that disadvantage minority voters. The court concludes that while plaintiffs should not bear the burden of proving the unnecessary nature of the purge law, defendants must demonstrate its necessity once a disparate impact is established.

Plaintiffs assert that their trial evidence clearly demonstrates reasonable, less discriminatory alternatives to Philadelphia's non-voting purge law. However, the court disagrees, stating that unchallenged evidence does not equate to indisputable evidence; some evidence can fail independently of any opposition. The district court did not evaluate the necessity of the non-voting purge law to prevent electoral fraud, as its adopted legal standard did not address this aspect. Although the court acknowledged that the law serves a purpose in fraud prevention, it noted that the plaintiffs' evidence suggested the existence of practical, less discriminatory alternatives, but did not establish this as indisputable. The appellate court cannot resolve this matter and suggests a remand for further consideration.

The majority opinion claims the purge law is "needed" to prevent fraud based on a record review, a conclusion the dissent finds unfounded. The dissent emphasizes that usefulness does not imply necessity and argues that a court must assess the existence of equally effective but less discriminatory alternatives, which neither the district court nor the majority has done. Expert testimony from Emmett Fremaux, Jr. indicates that the objectives of the purge law could be met more effectively through less discriminatory methods, such as a mail canvass system implemented in Washington, D.C. and other large cities. The dissent points out that the City has not provided evidence that the cessation of non-voting purges, mandated by the National Voter Registration Act effective January 1995, would lead to significant electoral integrity issues in Philadelphia.

The City of Philadelphia expressed its intention to comply with a new law and indicated a belief that it could function without the purge statute deemed necessary by the majority for the current year. The district court appeared unconvinced by evidence suggesting viable, less discriminatory alternatives to the purge law, which the City did not present during the trial, possibly due to its belief in the legal irrelevance of the issue. While the plaintiffs have not definitively proven the existence of effective alternatives, they have substantial evidence supporting their position. The majority's assertion that Philadelphia needs the non-voting purge law to prevent electoral fraud lacks strong justification, and the decision on the necessity of the purge law should be remanded to the district court.

The district court found that historical and social conditions contribute to lower voting rates among black and Latino Philadelphians, resulting in these groups being disproportionately affected by the purge law. The majority's view that the purge law is not the primary cause of these voting disparities fails to recognize that plaintiffs are not required to prove such a direct link under Section 2. Given the demonstrated disparate impact of the law on protected classes, the City should be obligated to justify the law’s necessity to prevent voting fraud. 

Both the district court and the majority noted the ability of purged black and Latino voters to reinstate themselves or re-register, but did not clarify the legal implications of this possibility. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs did not show that the purge law interacts with social and historical conditions to deny minority voters equal political access, asserting that purged voters could preserve their voting rights by voting or requesting reinstatement. The majority echoed this sentiment, suggesting that the disproportionate purging of Latinos and blacks results from their lack of voting or failure to seek reinstatement.

The district court's conclusion that Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law does not negatively impact blacks and Latinos' access to the political process contradicts its factual findings, rendering the conclusion erroneous. The ability of plaintiffs to re-register after being purged does not eliminate the inequality stemming from the law's interaction with broader social conditions. A comprehensive evaluation reveals that reinstatement and re-registration pose significant barriers for racial and language minority groups, contrary to the majority's formalistic perspective on political participation. The majority's comparison of the purge law to race-neutral literacy tests lacks justification, as both can result in disparate impacts on minority voters. The argument fails to recognize that while literacy tests may appear neutral, they disproportionately affect those who may struggle with literacy, similar to the barriers posed by the purge law. Moreover, statistics indicate that of over 190,000 individuals purged in 1991, 81% did not reinstate, with lower rates of reinstatement among black and Latino voters compared to white voters, highlighting the law's discriminatory impact.

The district court and majority opinions suggest that the approximately 156,000 voters purged from the rolls did not express interest in political participation, implying that their failure to file a Request for Reinstatement indicates apathy. It is argued that those wishing to retain their voting rights could have easily taken the necessary steps to do so, as noted by the district court, which stated that registrants simply needed to vote or request reinstatement. However, the notion of mass apathy, particularly among Black and Latino voters, is challenged by evidence that suggests barriers exist in the re-registration process. The excerpt highlights that both Congress and the courts have dismissed the idea that reduced participation among Black voters is merely due to apathy. 

Statistical data regarding the percentage of voters who re-register after purging, specifically among minority groups, is lacking. Testimony indicates that minority individuals often make errors on registration forms, with significant challenges faced by Latino voters due to language barriers. In a cited example, the City’s Voter Registration Division rejected about 8,800 registration forms, indicating a substantial portion of applicants were unable to successfully register. 

The discussion also references the recent passage of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, which acknowledges that discriminatory registration practices adversely affect voter participation, particularly among racial minorities. This legislation underscores the obstacles faced by these groups in the registration process.

Congress enacted a law aimed at enhancing voter registration rates by minimizing the need for citizens to independently register to vote, directly addressing obstacles to participation in the electoral process. The law, codified as 42 U.S.C.S. Sec. 1973gg-3, allows for simultaneous applications for a driver's license and voter registration. This initiative is intended to expand the voter rolls significantly, providing more citizens with the opportunity to participate in federal elections. During legislative discussions, it was highlighted that approximately 70 million eligible voters, or 40% of the voting-age population, remained unregistered primarily due to burdensome registration processes rather than a lack of interest. Supporters of the bill emphasized the necessity of removing these practical obstacles to increase voter registration, a view acknowledged even by some opponents. The effectiveness of similar state programs, like Washington's motor voter initiative, demonstrated the potential success of such measures. The excerpt critiques viewpoints that underestimate the challenges of voter registration, arguing that if the process were truly easy, there would be no need for the National Voter Registration Act. Thus, Congress aimed to make democracy more accessible, acknowledging that for many Americans, registering to vote is a significant challenge. Courts evaluating voting laws are urged to adopt a practical perspective, similar to the intent behind the legislation.

The excerpt critiques the majority's interpretation of the district court's findings regarding the impact of Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law on minority voters, specifically Latinos and blacks. It argues that the majority incorrectly claims the district court found no difficulty for minorities in electing representatives, mischaracterizing the district court's actual considerations. The district court examined the extent of minority representation in public office but did not address the challenges faced by minority voters in electing candidates. The distinction between the difficulties experienced by minority candidates versus those faced by minority voters is emphasized as a critical legal and factual difference. Furthermore, if this were a case of vote dilution, the plaintiffs would need to meet the Gingles threshold factors, particularly demonstrating that the white majority votes as a bloc to defeat the minority's preferred candidates.

This legal analysis clarifies that the case at hand is not about vote dilution, and the factors relevant to such cases are largely inapplicable. The plaintiffs should not be required to demonstrate difficulty in electing their preferred representatives based solely on the win-loss records of minority candidates. It is noted that Latino and black voters may support white candidates even when minority candidates are running, challenging the assumption that minority candidates are always the preferred choice of minority voters. The district court did not find that minority voters faced no challenges in electing minority candidates; rather, it concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove such difficulties based on the evidence presented.

Furthermore, the legal discussion emphasizes that even if plaintiffs were required to demonstrate challenges in electing preferred candidates, the district court's findings would not negate the plaintiffs' claims under Section 2. The court failed to consider "special circumstances" that could explain the success of minority candidates, such as incumbency or lack of opposition, which are critical per Gingles standards. Evidence presented at trial indicated that most minority representatives on the Philadelphia City Council were elected from minority districts, underscoring that the electoral success of these candidates does not necessarily reflect the broader voting preferences of minority constituents.

The record lacks information on whether minority state legislators were elected from districts with a black or Latino voting majority and does not address other factors, such as incumbency or candidate opposition, that could explain the success of minority candidates. Courts must consider the existence of majority-minority districts when determining if minority voters face difficulties in electing their preferred candidates. In vote dilution cases, this consideration is irrelevant since such claims challenge districting schemes that fail to provide an effective voting majority for minority voters. However, the demographic makeup of a district is crucial outside this context when assessing the impact of voting practices. If a discriminatory law disenfranchises a significant number of minority voters but an effective majority remains, the election of a minority candidate from that district does not indicate that minority voters can elect their representatives. Special circumstances, such as majority-minority districts, can explain and diminish the significance of minority candidates' political success. The district court did not consider these special circumstances, despite evidence suggesting their existence. This oversight could lead to a reversible legal error if it were relevant to the plaintiffs' claims about their electoral influence. The district court's limited findings did not constitute such an error, but the majority's conclusion, based solely on minority electoral success, fails to adequately address the potential impairment of minority voters' electoral influence.

The majority overlooks the existence of special circumstances that could explain the outcomes relied upon in its decision, despite unrefuted evidence of these circumstances. Appellate courts are not equipped to resolve such questions independently, yet the majority's approach necessitates doing so to avoid error. Even if the majority's interpretation of the district court's findings is accepted, there is disagreement regarding the significance attributed to those findings. The majority appears to suggest that the plaintiffs’ inability to demonstrate difficulties in electing representatives alone negates their claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This interpretation implies that any voting practice hindering protected class participation could be permissible if those groups still achieve a fair share of election victories, a notion contrary to the Voting Rights Act's intent.

The majority's legal argument, particularly in Part III.C, suffers from two main errors: a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court's ruling in Chisom v. Roemer and a misunderstanding of Section 2. The majority asserts that plaintiffs must show diminished opportunities to both participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice. It focuses on the latter, arguing that electoral successes among Latino and Black candidates indicate no impairment in the plaintiffs' ability to influence elections, thus concluding the plaintiffs have not satisfied both elements of a Section 2 claim. However, the Supreme Court in Chisom articulated that Section 2 provides dual protections for minority voters: the opportunity to participate in the political process and the opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. This distinction was also noted in the prior case of League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, where the court determined that the term "representatives" does not encompass judges, a crucial aspect that the majority fails to acknowledge.

Plaintiffs cannot challenge a districting scheme that limits their ability to elect preferred judicial candidates. However, voting practices that hinder minority voters' participation in judicial elections can still be contested. The Fifth Circuit, as explained in Chisom, allows challenges to practices with a disparate impact on minority voting opportunities, such as polling hours, even if they do not affect the election of representatives. The majority interprets Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as requiring plaintiffs to prove two elements—both the opportunity to participate and the opportunity to elect—unlike the Fifth Circuit's approach, which recognized them as alternative protections.

The Supreme Court, in Chisom, rejected both interpretations, stating that Section 2 does not create separate rights for participation and election. Any infringement on a protected class's opportunity to participate in the political process also diminishes their ability to influence elections. This linkage reinforces that a voting law is impermissible if it denies equal opportunities for participation, regardless of the group's ability to elect representatives of their choice. Thus, a voting practice that undermines participation is inherently problematic under Section 2, aligning with the unitary claim established by Congress.

The majority opinion concludes that the plaintiffs cannot succeed in their claim because there is insufficient evidence that the purge law has denied them fair access to the political process or impaired their electoral influence. This stance may overlook established legal principles, particularly the Supreme Court's language in Chisom, which emphasizes the inherent connection between participation in the political process and the ability to elect representatives. The majority appears to require the plaintiffs to demonstrate a specific causal link that, according to Chisom, should be presumed. Alternatively, the majority may believe that purging individuals from voter rolls does not reduce their political participation, which contradicts the basic understanding that if individuals are purged, they cannot vote, thereby diminishing their participation and impairing their ability to elect preferred representatives.

Furthermore, the majority seems to assert that to prove a violation of Section 2, plaintiffs must show that the purge law directly prevents Latinos and blacks from voting, implying that the law is solely responsible for its discriminatory effects. This view misinterprets both Chisom and Section 2, which acknowledges that the success of black and Latino candidates is just one factor in assessing discrimination, rather than a decisive one. Congress has explicitly rejected the notion that failing to prove any single factor undermines a Section 2 claim. Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated that Section 2 evaluations should be based on a comprehensive consideration of the political landscape, rather than a narrow focus on specific factors. Moreover, Congress has enacted legislation to prevent discriminatory purges in federal elections, reinforcing its commitment to ensuring equal access for racial and language minorities in the democratic process, addressing the concerns raised by the plaintiffs in this case.

Under the National Voter Registration Act, Pennsylvania will be prohibited from removing individuals from voter registration rolls based solely on their failure to vote. The dissent expresses concern that the decision made will negatively impact future applications of the Voting Rights Act, suggesting that despite progress, discrimination in voting persists. The majority's assertion that voting rights have been extended to all American citizens lacks significance if discriminatory laws hinder the exercise of that right. The dissent emphasizes the need for continued efforts to achieve equality as mandated by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, highlighting that there remains "unfinished work" to be done. 

Additionally, the excerpt details the process by which the state commission examines district registers annually. If a registered elector has not voted in the preceding two years, they will receive a notice indicating potential cancellation of their registration unless they vote in the next election or request reinstatement within ten days. A list of notified individuals is to be sent to the relevant political party. Failure to vote during this period can lead to registration cancellation, but it does not bar individuals from re-registering in the future. 

The petition for rehearing in this case was denied, with two judges expressing a desire to grant it.

Electors whose registrations have been erroneously cancelled can petition for reinstatement up to ten days before an election, and if they prove an error by the commission during a hearing, their registration must be reinstated. Ortiz's expert provided data showing disparities in voter purging rates among white and minority voters in Philadelphia from 1989 to 1992, with minority voters experiencing higher estimated purge rates. Ortiz has dropped his claims under the U.S. Constitution and state law, although his complaint regarding the 1991 election remains relevant as it is deemed "capable of repetition yet evading review." The district court's interpretation suggests that a plaintiff challenging a specific election practice must demonstrate that the practice causes discrimination. The dissenting opinion's distinction of Salas is criticized for failing to recognize that the court must assess whether the electoral practice leads to an inability to elect preferred representatives. Additionally, the legislative history of the 1982 amendment to Section 2 supports the requirement that any alleged denial of equal political participation must be a result of the challenged practice. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report asserts that if a practice prevents equal opportunity to participate politically, it constitutes a violation of Section 2.

The Senate Judiciary Committee emphasized that courts should assess whether a challenged electoral procedure denies minority plaintiffs equal opportunities in the political process. It noted that if voter purging lacks fair procedures or demonstrates undue limitations on re-registration, it could lead to discriminatory effects, potentially violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Committee acknowledged that a well-administered purge statute would not infringe upon the law.

In the case at hand, Ortiz contested several factual findings by the district court, particularly concerning the lack of bilingual "intent to purge" notifications for Latino voters, the alleged disproportionate re-registration burden on minority voters, and the placement of voting machines in minority areas. However, the district court ultimately determined that Ortiz did not prove that the purge statute disproportionately affected minority voters. The court recognized existing disparities in socioeconomic status and voter participation between minority groups and the general population in Philadelphia, attributing lower voter turnout among minorities to these factors. The district court's analysis included voter registration and turnout statistics by ethnicity, revealing significant differences in participation rates between white and minority voters in recent elections.

Statistics from the years 1989 to 1992 reveal varying numbers of registered voters, with specific figures for different categories. A Fourth Circuit ruling upheld Maryland's voter purge statute aimed at preventing vote fraud by removing ineligible voters from the registration list, including those who moved without notification, died unreported, or became disqualified due to felony convictions. The court emphasized the importance of maintaining accurate voter lists to prevent impersonation and fraud, acknowledging that while re-registration may be inconvenient, it is a necessary measure to uphold electoral integrity. The dissenting opinion references that even neutral practices can be challenged if they disproportionately impact minorities, yet Ortiz failed to demonstrate that the purge statute denied minorities fair access to voting. Additionally, statistics highlighted the representation of minorities in the Pennsylvania legislature from 1979 to 1992, demonstrating varied percentages of minority representatives over the years. The dissent's comparison to a Mississippi case involving dual registration requirements was deemed inappropriate, as the current purge statute does not hinder minority voter registration or participation. Finally, it was noted that improper purging could lead to discrimination if not conducted fairly.

Ortiz has not demonstrated the need for a purge or shown that re-registration opportunities were excessively restricted. In Title VII disparate impact cases, plaintiffs can present evidence of less discriminatory alternatives to counter an employer's business justifications, which need not be essential for legality. In this instance, there is no evidence to suggest that the City of Philadelphia's purge statute was enacted or executed for discriminatory purposes. Title VII cases place the burden of proof regarding discrimination on the plaintiff, which Ortiz has failed to meet. The Sixth Circuit case Wesley v. Collins affirmed that the state was not required to prove its statute disenfranchising convicted felons was necessary, as legitimate state interests supported the statute's enactment. Recent actions by the Board of Elections included purging voting rolls of individuals who no longer reside at their registered addresses, including deceased individuals and those living outside the area. The focus of the statute is to prevent fraudulent voting, as noted by Judge Max Rosenn.

Voter rolls that include individuals who no longer reside in a precinct or do not vote can facilitate electoral fraud. Pennsylvania identified that political operatives exploited the system by casting votes in the names of these non-voters. The state implemented a two-year period for removing such names to limit opportunities for manipulation, revising the previous four-year period due to public concern over voting fraud. This change, enacted in 1941, followed a lawsuit by the Committee of Seventy in 1940 regarding fraudulent "phantom voters." A 1941 federal grand jury found 50,000 ineligible voters on Philadelphia's registration lists, highlighting ongoing issues with voting fraud.

The National Voter Registration Act, effective in Pennsylvania on January 1, 1995, aims to enhance voter registration and participation while maintaining electoral integrity. It prohibits states from removing individuals from voter rolls solely for failing to vote. Additionally, the Act mandates that state initiatives to prevent fraud do not result in disenfranchisement due to non-voting.

Testimony from Robert Lee, Director of the Voter Registration Division, confirmed that notices of intent to purge included his office's contact information, indicating the office received inquiries from voters about these notices. Dr. Lichtman's analysis revealed a disparate impact of the non-voting purge, indicating that if the black purge rate had matched that of white registrants in 1991, significantly fewer black individuals would have been targeted for removal, while a higher purge rate for whites would have resulted in more white registrants facing purging.

The 1991 voter purge in Pennsylvania was significant, impacting 21% of registrants, primarily those who had not voted since the 1988 presidential election, with over 80% ultimately purged. Reinstatement rates for whites were notably higher than for blacks and Latinos, highlighting a racially differential impact as emphasized by Dr. Lichtman. Although subsequent years saw fewer purged registrants and a reduced magnitude of disparate impact, the 1991 figures remain crucial for assessment. In 1992, even a minor difference in purge rates between whites and blacks persisted, despite fewer black registrants being eligible for purging. The district court noted the City’s liability for discrimination in housing and employment. The Gingles ruling, initially focused on blacks, also applies to Latinos under the Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court refers to the Senate Judiciary Committee's report for legislative intent regarding the 1982 amendments. The majority opinion inaccurately portrayed the plaintiffs' stance on causation, as plaintiffs maintained that the discriminatory outcome was partly attributable to the purge. The majority's interpretation of causation suggests a requirement for a single legally definitive cause for discrimination, neglecting other contributing factors related to the voting law itself.

The plaintiffs' complaint appears to inadvertently support the majority's interpretation of Section 2, despite not pleading or acknowledging the necessity of proving causation as outlined by the majority. Plaintiffs argue that the law does not require them to demonstrate that the practice itself results in discriminatory outcomes; instead, they maintain that historical and socioeconomic discrimination interacts with the non-voting purge to disproportionately affect Latino and African-American voters. The plaintiffs assert that to succeed, they must demonstrate that the discriminatory effects they allege are partly attributable to the law they challenge.

The majority's interpretation of the Senate Report suggests that courts should focus solely on the challenged law and its direct consequences, excluding other contributing factors. This interpretation contradicts the broader expectation established by the Senate Report, which indicates that plaintiffs must establish a causal link between the law and the identified discriminatory result while considering the totality of circumstances influencing voting practices. The majority's conclusion seems to abandon its causation argument, making a surprising statement about hypothetical cases involving registration procedures, which contradicts its earlier legal reasoning. In both scenarios, the laws would not be deemed responsible for the adverse effects experienced by members of protected classes, raising questions about the consistency of the majority's legal stance.

Under the majority's interpretation of Section 2 causation, the adverse outcomes associated with certain registration laws are viewed as inherent "voting ills" that cannot be contested under the Voting Rights Act. The author expresses confusion as to why the majority focuses on Philadelphia's registration processes, which have not been challenged by plaintiffs, rather than addressing the discriminatory impact of non-voting purge laws. The author argues that there is no distinction between the majority's hypothetical scenario and the current case, emphasizing that the majority's conclusion does not clarify or modify its previous analysis of Section 2 causation.

The author references the case of White, which served as a foundational source for the language of Section 2 and illustrated that the Court did not require a direct link between the reapportionment plan and the factors leading to its discriminatory effects. It highlighted Texas's history of racial discrimination affecting Negroes' voting rights and the ongoing struggles of Mexican-Americans, noting that these social and historical conditions contributed to poor voter registration, independent of the 1971 reapportionment plan. The Supreme Court affirmed that the district court correctly assessed the lawfulness of the multimember district in light of the cultural and economic realities facing the plaintiff class, realities that predated the reapportionment.

The author contends that Congress, in amending the Voting Rights Act and relying on White, did not align with the majority's interpretation of Section 2 causation. The evaluation of election procedure challenges under Section 2 should account for socio-economic factors influencing minority voter turnout, as held by the district court. However, the majority's view suggests that courts need not consider these underlying causes, which undermines the recognition of the disparate impact that registration laws have on black citizens in Mississippi due to their socio-economic status.

The court examined three key socioeconomic disadvantages affecting black voters in Mississippi: 

1. Predominance in blue-collar and service jobs, which typically offer hourly wages, making it difficult for workers to take time off during business hours to register to vote.
2. Limited access to transportation, as black households are significantly less likely to own a vehicle, hindering their ability to travel to voter registration sites.
3. A high percentage of black households lacking telephone access, complicating their ability to acquire information about voter registration procedures.

These factors led the district court to determine that black citizens faced greater challenges in overcoming the administrative barriers imposed by Mississippi's voting laws. 

The majority opinion's distinction between laws that initially complicate registration and those that affect ongoing registration was criticized as unreasonable. The court noted that previous cases, such as Harris v. Graddick and Brown v. Dean, demonstrated that social and historical contexts, in conjunction with voting laws, can create discriminatory effects, supporting claims under Section 2. 

The majority's reference to Operation PUSH was deemed unconvincing, as the plaintiffs were not required to prove a direct causal link between registration procedures and disparities in registration rates; rather, the interaction of existing socioeconomic conditions with such procedures resulted in a discriminatory outcome. The reliance on Irby v. Virginia State Board of Elections was also contested, highlighting significant differences between that case and the current situation.

The Fourth Circuit expressed doubt regarding the comparison of legal and factual variables in cases lacking any voting or election history, as highlighted in Irby, where plaintiffs did not establish a causal link between the challenged selection system and the underrepresentation of African Americans on school boards. Specifically, in one county with a significant disparity, all black residents who sought appointments since 1971 were selected, leading the court to conclude that the appointive system did not create a disparate impact. Consequently, the court did not consider any causation requirement since the practice in question did not contribute to the underrepresentation.

In contrast, the situation involving purge laws is distinct, as these laws can directly disenfranchise significant numbers of minority citizens from voter registration rolls. While Irby suggests that Section 2 plaintiffs must demonstrate some causal connection between a voting practice and the disparity, this notion is not controversial. The author contends that Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law should not be classified as "episodic" due to its annual and consistent discriminatory effects.

The author critiques the majority's argument that purging laws affecting only registered voters must be permissible, noting the Senate Report's acknowledgment that purging can violate Section 2. While the majority argues that only the statute itself produces discriminatory results, the author identifies this as a flaw in their reasoning. The district court emphasized the importance of a flexible approach in evaluating Section 2 challenges rather than a rigid point-counting method.

The author clarifies that factors such as societal discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage are key elements in assessing the legality of non-voting purge statutes but do not constitute the entirety of the circumstances considered. Furthermore, the presence of racial appeals could enhance minority voter turnout, potentially counteracting any adverse effects stemming from non-voting purges.

The excerpt highlights concerns regarding fraudulent voting practices in Philadelphia, referencing a historical context of electoral dishonesty and a recent case, Marks v. Stinson, which underscores the ongoing issue. It critiques the majority's position on the legitimacy of non-voting purge statutes as a means to prevent voter fraud, arguing that such statutes have not been adequately tested under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. It points out that existing cases cited by the majority primarily address constitutional rather than statutory challenges, with Hoffman v. Maryland being an exception where a non-voting purge law was upheld under the First Amendment, but not under Section 2. The excerpt argues that the lack of Section 2 challenges does not imply their futility; rather, it indicates that the legitimacy of these laws remains unestablished. The author invokes Judge Cardozo's perspective on judicial precedent, suggesting that untested claims warrant serious consideration, reinforcing the notion that the legal discourse surrounding purge laws is complex and requires further scrutiny.

Section 4(a) requires a state or subdivision to demonstrate that a reinstated voting practice has not been used to deny or abridge voting rights based on race or color. The majority references Wesley v. Collins, where the court upheld a law disenfranchising convicted felons, noting the state's compelling rationale for such a statute. This rationale, grounded in the civil rights limitations for felons, does not apply here since the plaintiffs have not lost their rights due to criminal conduct. 

The text emphasizes that the impending enforcement of the National Voter Registration Act does not negate the necessity of the purge statute, as the City may face resource challenges in complying. The urgency of the situation is highlighted by upcoming elections and the ongoing purging process, which disenfranchises voters without automatic reinstatement when the practice becomes unlawful. 

Concerns are raised regarding the district court's assumptions about the plaintiffs’ re-registration opportunities, as there was no factual assessment of how many purged voters, particularly among black or Latino populations, actually re-registered. The court's lack of clarity on the significance of re-registration necessitates a remand, as thorough and precise findings are essential in these complex cases, similar to the standards set in Jenkins regarding vote dilution claims.

The district court that ruled on Ortiz prior to the issuance of Jenkins should be allowed to adhere to the guidelines provided. The court acknowledged the importance of dedicating special efforts to such decisions, even in the absence of explicit direction. The majority agrees with the district court's legal reasoning, treating its conclusion of no Section 2 violation as factual, subject to review for clear error. However, there is a significant legal aspect to Section 2 determinations, necessitating a more rigorous review standard than suggested by the majority. Judge Becker's explanation in Jenkins emphasizes that while factual findings receive deference under Rule 52(a), appellate courts retain the authority to correct legal errors that may arise from mixed findings or misunderstandings of the law. This dual approach ensures that the trial court's familiarity with local political contexts is respected without compromising legal standards.

While the majority's view aligns with the complex standard of review articulated in Jenkins, it does not adequately capture the legal implications of Section 2 decisions. The author agrees with the district court's factual findings but contends that these do not support its conclusion of no violation, indicating a primarily legal disagreement. Additionally, Section 201 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits literacy tests, though such prerequisites could also be contested under Section 2. The Supreme Court's ruling in Gaston County highlights that even fairly administered literacy tests are impermissible if they contribute to disenfranchisement, particularly in the context of racial inequalities.

The excerpt critiques the use of a literacy test in Gaston County, asserting that it does not account for the historical and social inequalities that disproportionately affect black residents' reading skills. The Court found no direct correlation between the literacy test and the plaintiffs' reading abilities, yet deemed the test discriminatory under the Voting Rights Act due to the context in which it was applied. The author counters the majority's argument that re-registering to vote is no more challenging than the initial registration. They emphasize that, generally, re-registering is more difficult, particularly for those unaware of their purged status. They reference Rep. Collins’ remarks about the distractions of daily life that could prevent individuals from realizing they’ve lost their voting rights. Additionally, purging qualified voters can lead to feelings of frustration and alienation, deterring future participation in elections. The author disputes the majority’s interpretation of the district court's finding, suggesting a miscommunication regarding the challenges faced by minority voters in electing representatives. The excerpt concludes that the majority's view fails to recognize the statute's discriminatory impact.

The district court's analysis focused on the challenges faced by minority candidates in elections, rather than the difficulties encountered by minority voters in electing their preferred candidates. The court's reliance on the Senate Report and its discussions highlighted that it only referenced elected candidates, neglecting voter preferences. Notably, the court found that while white voters can and do support minority candidates, the burden of proof lies with Section 2 plaintiffs to show which candidates were preferred by minority voters. The court did not gather sufficient evidence regarding whether black and Latino voters were able to elect representatives of their choice, and the mere defeat of minority candidates does not inherently signify minority voting frustration. The majority's interpretation that the election outcomes indicated minority voter success was flawed and unsupported. The district court acknowledged the existence of racial polarization in Philadelphia’s voting but did not find that this translated into a preference for specific minority candidates. Furthermore, the majority mischaracterized the district court's findings, stating it concluded that no political hardships were experienced, whereas the court only noted a lack of proof of such hardships. Finally, the majority's use of Wilson Goode's mayoral victories to argue that minority voters successfully elected minority candidates misinterpreted the findings, as Goode's election was an outlier in a broader context of limited minority representation.

Goode's mayoral victories are presented by the majority as evidence of minority electoral success in Philadelphia, overlooking the broader historical context that suggests these victories do not negate the argument of ongoing challenges faced by minority candidates. The majority references a district court's finding on minority political participation but fails to substantiate this conclusion adequately, as it merely restates the conclusion of no violation under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This interpretation has been criticized, notably by Justice Scalia, who pointed out that a minority group could suffer an abridged opportunity to participate without being able to control election outcomes. The Chisom decision highlighted that no member of the Court supported a view that would allow for abridgment of participation without a direct impact on electing representatives.

The excerpt also emphasizes that while the success of minority candidates is a relevant consideration in evaluating laws that may disenfranchise voters, it is not the primary factor. The extent of political success can influence participation rates, but it does not serve as a threshold requirement for plaintiffs challenging non-voting purge laws under Section 2. The relevant statute mandates that voter removal due to non-voting cannot occur in efforts to maintain accurate voter rolls for federal elections. States could theoretically circumvent this requirement, but the City indicated it would not pursue impractical methods to uphold the non-voting purge law. The excerpt concludes with a reference to Abraham Lincoln's ideals regarding political participation, underscoring the ongoing importance of democratic engagement.