United States v. Leslie R. Barth

Citations: 28 F.3d 253; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 15243; 1994 WL 270466Docket: 94-1020

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; June 20, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves an appeal by Leslie R. Barth regarding a December 23, 1993, order from the District Court for the District of Connecticut, which committed him for a preliminary psychiatric evaluation. The appeal centers on whether this order is subject to review under the collateral order doctrine. The court ultimately concluded that the order is not appealable and dismissed the appeal.

The statutory framework relevant to this case includes provisions from Title 18 concerning defendants' mental competency. Two main procedures are established: 

1. **Competency Determination (Section 4241)**: 
   - A defendant can request a hearing to assess their mental competency any time before sentencing. 
   - The court may order a psychiatric examination and commit the defendant for up to 30 days for this evaluation, extendable by 15 days.
   - If found incompetent, the defendant may be committed for up to four months to determine the likelihood of regaining competency, with possible extensions if there is a substantial probability of recovery.

2. **Hospitalization in Lieu of Imprisonment (Section 4244)**: 
   - A defendant convicted of an offense may request a hearing regarding their mental condition within ten days post-conviction.
   - The court can also initiate a hearing if there is reasonable cause to believe the defendant needs care for a mental condition.
   - Similar to the competency procedure, a psychiatric examination can be ordered, with a commitment period of 30 days, extendable to 45 days.

If, after the hearing, the court determines the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect, it may commit them to an appropriate facility instead of imposing a prison sentence.

Following Barth's conviction, he requested a psychiatric evaluation and funding for it before sentencing, which was granted. A psychiatrist diagnosed him with a chronic psychiatric disorder that existed at the time of his offense and trial. Barth then sought a new trial based on this diagnosis. On December 23, 1993, the District Court ordered his commitment to the Attorney General for a psychiatric evaluation at a facility in Butner, North Carolina, and the request to stay this order was denied.

Barth's motion was filed after the ten-day period post-conviction, so the court's authority to assess mental competency stemmed from section 4244, allowing for evaluation of a defendant's mental condition before sentencing. The Government noted that the court may have also referenced section 4241, which pertains to competency evaluations at any time before sentencing. Ultimately, the court determined that a commitment was necessary based on the psychiatrist's report, authorized under section 4247(b).

The commitment order cited both sections 4241 and 4244, indicating reasonable cause to suspect Barth was suffering from a mental disease affecting his competency to stand trial and necessitating hospitalization. At the time of the appeal, the District Court had not received the evaluation report from Butner, thus delaying determinations regarding Barth's competency or the need for hospitalization.

The appeal focused on the interlocutory order of commitment related to assessing competency and potential hospitalization. The court referenced a precedent in United States v. Gold, where a similar commitment order was deemed appealable under the collateral order doctrine. However, it suggested that a preliminary commitment order for examination purposes would not be subject to appeal.

The commitment order being appealed, based on sections 4241 and 4244, is deemed a 'first-step' order, which is not appealable. This order, authorized by section 4247(b), serves as a preliminary measure that will be returned to the District Court for a final determination. Although significant for the defendant, it does not resolve a key issue distinct from the case's merits, as outlined in Coopers, Lybrand v. Livesay, and thus does not meet the criteria for the collateral order doctrine. The term 'merits' refers to the defendant's mental competency and need for hospitalization rather than guilt of the charged offense. The ruling also clarifies that while 'second-step' commitment orders are not appealable until after mental competency inquiries, alternative remedies exist, such as petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or mandamus, to challenge unlawful confinement or jurisdictional excess. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed, with the case presided over by Judge Levin H. Campbell of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.