Ronald Mendoza v. Sherman Block, Los Angeles County
Docket: 19-15936
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; May 31, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Ronald Mendoza, the plaintiff-appellant, was severely bitten by a police canine during his arrest following a bank robbery on March 9, 1988, in Hacienda Heights, California. After fleeing from the robbery, Mendoza hid under bushes on private property. Los Angeles County Sheriff's deputies, informed that Mendoza might be armed due to his criminal history, located his abandoned vehicle and initiated a search. Despite multiple helicopter announcements advising him that he was surrounded and cautioning that a dog might be deployed, Mendoza claims he did not hear these warnings.
Upon encountering the police dog, Mendoza alleges that he was bitten without any prior communication from the deputies. He contends that after the dog bit his arm, he was handled aggressively by the deputies, leading to further injuries and pain during his transport to the hospital. In contrast, the deputies assert that they ordered Mendoza to crawl out from the bushes and that he resisted arrest, struggled with the dog, and failed to comply with commands to stop resisting.
Mendoza's civil rights lawsuit against the deputies was dismissed based on qualified immunity, which he is appealing. The Ninth Circuit Court, in an opinion authored by Judge Boochever, upheld the dismissal, affirming the deputies’ qualified immunity status in this incident.
A deputy testified that Mendoza was not struck on the head during his arrest. After being handcuffed, Mendoza was taken to the hospital; while he initially sat up in the vehicle, he later lay down. The deputy clarified that no comments were made about Mendoza's odor, and the vehicle's driver only slowed down when crossing intersections, without slamming on the brakes. There was no testimony from officers regarding events at the hospital.
Mendoza filed a lawsuit against the deputies, Los Angeles County, and Sheriff Sherman Block under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging excessive force during his arrest. Before the trial, Mendoza requested a judgment on the defendants' qualified immunity defense, referencing the case Act-Up!/Portland v. Bagley, asserting that qualified immunity is a legal question for the court to decide. The trial court determined it had the authority to resolve the qualified immunity issue through an evidentiary hearing due to disputed factual matters that required assessing the credibility of witnesses.
Following the hearing, where Mendoza and several deputies testified, the court ruled in favor of the deputies on most disputed factual questions, concluding that the dog handler acted reasonably and that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity. The court did not address Mendoza's claims regarding the treatment of his wounds or the alleged head strike.
Mendoza argued for a reversal based on the trial court improperly resolving factual disputes without a jury. However, he waived this objection by agreeing to the court's procedure, thus failing to preserve the issue for appeal. The trial court's use of the evidentiary procedure, even if potentially erroneous, was not objected to by Mendoza, preventing him from raising it on appeal.
Mendoza contests the district court's ruling that law enforcement deputies were entitled to qualified immunity. He participated in a bench trial on this issue and is bound by the trial court’s findings unless there are errors in law or clear factual mistakes. The court found no clear error in the factual findings and upheld the deputies' qualified immunity regarding the use of a police dog.
Qualified immunity protects officers in Section 1983 actions if they reasonably believed their conduct was lawful based on clearly established law at the time. This determination involves a two-step analysis: first, whether the relevant law was clearly established, and second, whether a reasonable officer could have believed their conduct was lawful under that established law.
The first question is a legal one for the court. In this instance, the trial court skipped directly to the second question without addressing whether the law was clearly established. It is within the appellate court's discretion to consider the first inquiry. The inquiry into whether the law was clearly established begins by examining if the right allegedly violated was well-defined. If the law is not clearly established, a reasonable officer cannot be expected to know how to avoid liability. Past cases illustrate that rights must be specifically defined rather than abstract to prevent transforming qualified immunity into a form of almost absolute liability.
For qualified immunity to apply, a right must be "clearly established" in a manner that a reasonable official would recognize their actions as violating that right at the time of the incident. This does not necessitate that the specific action in question has been previously deemed unlawful, but rather that the unlawfulness should be apparent in light of existing law. Officials may not require prior case law to demonstrate that a right is clearly established if their conduct is egregiously unconstitutional.
In the case at hand, the deputies contend that the legal framework regarding the use of police dogs was not clearly established when Mendoza was bitten, citing a lack of pertinent case law to guide their actions. While there are few relevant cases, some address the use of police dogs in various scenarios, including Robinette v. Barnes, which determined that using a police dog in a search was not considered deadly force, and Chew v. Gates, which indicated that using dogs to locate suspects is not clearly prohibited by law. Conversely, Marley v. City of Allentown found the use of a police dog unreasonable when the suspect posed no threat, while People v. Rivera upheld the reasonableness of using a police dog in a potentially armed situation. At the time of Mendoza's incident in 1988, the Sixth Circuit was the only appellate court to have ruled on the use of police dogs in such contexts, raising questions about whether the deputies had sufficient legal guidance for their actions.
The use of a police dog during an arrest may violate constitutional rights if it constitutes excessive force, as established in prior case law regarding the Fourth Amendment. Courts provide guidance on permissible force, indicating that excessive force in arrests violates an arrestee's rights. The reasonableness of force is evaluated based on factors such as officer safety, motivation for arrest, and the extent of injury inflicted. It is unnecessary to have specific case law to inform officers that using a police dog on a fully surrendered and restrained individual is excessive. Qualified immunity does not apply merely because a novel method of force is used. The deputies' use of the police dog is thus subject to an excessive force analysis, which is clearly established for assessing qualified immunity.
If the law is clear, qualified immunity can still be granted if a reasonable officer could believe their actions were lawful. The reasonableness of force is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, focusing on the objective circumstances rather than the officer's intent. The court considers the totality of circumstances, including the severity of the crime, immediate threats to safety, and whether the suspect is resisting or fleeing.
In this case, the trial court determined that the deputies provided adequate warnings to Mendoza about the potential for a dog bite, and that Mendoza's actions led to the dog biting him. The court found that while deputies used offensive language, it was not unreasonable or considered force. The trial judge's factual findings were supported by the deputies' consistent testimonies and are not deemed clearly erroneous, allowing the judge to assess credibility among witnesses.
The district court found that the deputies acted objectively reasonably in their pursuit of Mendoza, who was fleeing arrest for felony bank robbery and was believed to be armed. Mendoza's refusal to surrender, compounded by his hiding on private property, led the deputies to perceive a potential threat to themselves and the property owners. The use of a police dog to locate Mendoza and secure him until he ceased resisting was deemed reasonable, particularly since he struggled with the dog after emerging from the bushes.
Mendoza argued that the court incorrectly assessed the deputies' conduct and claimed that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find excessive force. However, he did not object to the court's determination of objective reasonableness or preserve this issue for appeal by requesting a ruling on qualified immunity.
Regarding Mendoza's claim of being struck on the head by sheriff's deputies, the court did not evaluate this issue, and Mendoza did not contest the lack of consideration on appeal. His failure to raise this point resulted in a waiver of the issue. Similarly, claims of mistreatment in the hospital were waived for not being distinctly argued in his appeal brief.
The district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were upheld, affirming the dismissal of Mendoza's claims regarding the use of the police dog and the alleged assault and mistreatment. The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.
Mendoza alleges that he was not given a chance to exit the bushes before a police dog bit him, claiming that he received no verbal communication prior to the attack. He asserts that after being bitten, he was struck on the head, fell face-first to the ground, and was subsequently handcuffed while the dog continued to bite him. Mendoza contends that he was in significant pain and was verbally abused by the deputies when he pleaded for the dog to be removed. He describes being placed in a patrol car under distress and subjected to rough driving, which exacerbated his injuries. At the hospital, he reports further mistreatment, including pressure on his wounds.
In contrast, the deputies' account states that Mendoza was ordered to crawl out of the bushes, where he allegedly struggled with the dog, which then bit him on both sides. They maintain that Mendoza resisted arrest and even attempted to strike a deputy. The deputies deny any physical assault on Mendoza and claim he was not improperly treated during transport to the hospital.
Mendoza subsequently filed a lawsuit against the deputies, Los Angeles County, and Sheriff Sherman Block under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for excessive force. He sought a pre-trial ruling on the defendants' qualified immunity defense, referencing a prior case to argue that the issue should be determined by the court. The trial court agreed to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes, emphasizing the need to assess the credibility of Mendoza and the deputies involved. Mendoza's attorney did not oppose this procedure. The court then proceeded to hear testimonies from Mendoza and several deputies, including the dog handler.
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant deputies after a hearing, concluding that the deputy who managed the dog acted reasonably and thus qualified for qualified immunity. The court did not address Mendoza's claims regarding the deputies' treatment of his wounds or allegations of being struck on the head. Mendoza argued for reversal, claiming the district court improperly resolved factual disputes without a jury. However, he waived any objections to this procedure by stating he had no issues with it prior to trial, thereby failing to preserve the objection for appeal.
Mendoza also contested the district court's qualified immunity ruling. He consented to a bench trial for this issue and is bound by its outcome unless the court erred in law or made clearly erroneous factual findings. The appellate court found no clear error in the trial court's fact-finding and upheld the qualified immunity decision regarding the dog's use.
Qualified immunity in a Sec. 1983 action requires determining if the officer's conduct was lawful based on clearly established law at the time. This involves a two-step analysis: first, whether the law governing the conduct was established, and second, whether a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct was lawful under that law.
The determination of whether a law was clearly established is a legal question for the court, as established in Romero v. Kitsap County and Gooden v. Howard County. When qualified immunity is invoked, the court must first evaluate if the law was clearly established before assessing the deputies' conduct under the circumstances. The court has discretion to make this determination. The inquiry begins by examining if the right violated by the official is clearly established; if not, a reasonable person would not be expected to know how to avoid liability. In the case of Romero, it was found that the right of Indians to harvest shellfish from non-reservation areas was not clearly established, granting the deputies immunity. A plaintiff cannot assert a violation of abstract rights to bypass qualified immunity; the right must be clearly defined and understood in a specific context. The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear at the time of the alleged unlawful action for a reasonable official to recognize the violation. While not every action requires prior ruling to be deemed unlawful, the unlawfulness must be apparent based on existing law. If officials act in ways that are evidently unconstitutional, prior analogous case law is not necessary to establish that the law was clearly established.
The deputies contend that the legal standards for employing police dogs during the incident involving Mendoza were not clearly established at the time of the bite. They highlight a scarcity of case law specifically addressing the use of dogs to apprehend fleeing suspects, arguing that they could not reasonably predict how to avoid liability. Among the limited relevant cases referenced are:
- **Robinette v. Barnes** (1988), which determined that using a police dog was not considered deadly force when searching for a felon.
- **Chew v. Gates** (1990), which affirmed that neither federal nor California law explicitly prohibits the use of police dogs to subdue suspects, even by biting.
- **Marley v. City of Allentown** (1991), where the court found the use of a police dog against a suspected misdemeanant who posed no threat was unreasonable.
- **People v. Rivera** (1992), which deemed the use of a police dog reasonable when the suspect, believed to be armed, fled a burglary scene.
At the time of Mendoza's incident in 1988, the only appellate court addressing police dog use was the Sixth Circuit. This raises questions about whether existing case law provided adequate guidance to the deputies during Mendoza’s arrest. However, Mendoza argues that the police dog’s deployment constituted excessive force, violating his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures. The law is well-established regarding the use of excessive force during arrests, with factors like officer safety and the degree of injury considered in assessing reasonableness. The court asserts that while specific case law on police dogs may be limited, law enforcement should recognize that certain uses of force could be unlawful. For instance, using a dog on a compliant, handcuffed suspect is clearly excessive. Thus, the court concludes that the deputies’ use of the police dog warrants an excessive force analysis, and this principle is sufficiently established to evaluate the officers' qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity is applicable when a reasonable official could believe their conduct was lawful under clearly established law. The assessment of the 'reasonableness' of a use of force must be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, considering the objective nature of the inquiry, which focuses on the circumstances faced by the officers rather than their intent. The court evaluates the totality of circumstances, including the severity of the crime, any immediate threat posed by the suspect, and the suspect's actions regarding arrest.
In this case, the trial court, based on agreements between parties, found that the sheriff's deputies had issued warnings to Mendoza before using a police dog to apprehend him. Testimony indicated Mendoza struggled with the dog, which resulted in him being bitten on his arm. Although the deputies used offensive language, the court deemed this not unreasonable nor equivalent to the use of force. The judge's factual findings were upheld as not clearly erroneous, as he assessed the credibility of witnesses.
The district court ruled the deputies' conduct was objectively reasonable given the context: Mendoza was fleeing from a bank robbery, possibly armed, and failed to comply with warnings. His actions posed a potential danger to both the officers and the property owners. Mendoza contended the court improperly evaluated the reasonableness of the deputies’ conduct in a way that overlapped with the merits of an excessive force claim, arguing there was enough evidence for a jury to find excessive force, which he claimed should not have been precluded by the court.
Mendoza did not object to the court's approach in assessing the reasonableness of the deputies' actions, nor did he preserve for appeal the issue of whether he was struck on the head. His complaint included allegations of being bitten by a police dog and hit by deputies, but the court did not specifically address the head injury. On appeal, Mendoza did not argue that the trial court erred in omitting this issue; instead, he contended that the court made erroneous factual and legal determinations. The failure to raise specific issues on appeal results in waiver, as established in precedent. Additionally, Mendoza's claim of mistreatment in the hospital was also waived for the same reasons. The district court's procedures and findings were upheld, affirming the dismissal of Mendoza's claims regarding excessive force and alleged mistreatment. The court's judgment is therefore affirmed.
