Court: Supreme Court of the United States; February 15, 1805; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Expatriation does not render an individual a complete alien incapable of inheriting land by descent. John Redman Coxe's title is valid unless his father, Daniel Coxe, was an alien or attainted of treason. Since no evidence of attainder exists, the main argument is whether Daniel was an alien. It is asserted that every inhabitant of a state became a citizen upon the Declaration of Independence, thus retaining the right to hold real estate and owing allegiance to the state. Allegiance cannot be unilaterally renounced; it requires mutual consent to dissolve. Prior to independence, individuals were British subjects with the capacity to hold lands, and this right persisted despite the governmental change. The revolution was a collective act that established all inhabitants as members of the new society, preventing any unjust seizure of property from the minority. The independence movement was recognized as a national act, dissolving political ties with Britain and affirming the rights of the new states. The majority's assent to independence implied the consent of all, as no state opposed the formation of the new government. New Jersey was the first to adopt its independent government on July 2, 1776.
The excerpt outlines the legal status of inhabitants within New Jersey during a specific historical period. It asserts that the division of people and their disfranchisement was not a necessary outcome of the state's assent to governance, as all inhabitants remained members of society and retained their property rights. Each state was required to establish its own government and rules, which are encapsulated in the New Jersey Constitution. Key articles detail the organization of the legislature and the process for selecting officers, emphasizing that all inhabitants with a year of residency and certain property qualifications are considered citizens.
Daniel Coxe, as an inhabitant of New Jersey at the time, was affirmed to be a member of society entitled to hold land. The New Jersey legislature, convening in August 1776, enacted a law stating that all individuals residing within the state owe allegiance to it and are thus members of it. The excerpt further discusses two acts of assembly that clarify the legal implications for individuals who had pledged allegiance to the state but had previously joined the enemy.
The act of June 5, 1777, offered pardons to those who returned to allegiance, detailing the consequences for personal estate, which would be forfeited if they did not comply. However, real estate was not forfeited under this law. It required oaths of allegiance to the state rather than allegiance to the British Crown, restoring individuals' rights as subjects of the state. Subsequent acts, including those from April 1778 and December 1778, highlight the state’s authority to take possession of the estates of those who failed to return to allegiance, ultimately leading to their forfeiture.
The document outlines legal provisions regarding allegiance and treason in relation to land ownership in the state of New Jersey. It states that any inhabitant who supported the enemy between April 19, 1775, and October 4, 1776, and has not returned to allegiance to the current government is guilty of high treason, with forfeiture of real and personal estate resulting from an inquisition. This does not apply to Daniel Coxe, who joined the British army in 1777. Additionally, non-inhabitants aiding the enemy during the specified period are also guilty of high treason, subject to the same forfeiture rules.
The document emphasizes that only those who owe allegiance to New Jersey face forfeiture of their land, and no actions can be taken against aliens regarding real estate. It argues that Daniel Coxe, as a recognized inhabitant, has the right to hold land. The common law principle that aliens cannot hold land is noted, but Coxe is not classified as an alien.
The collateral impact of the Treaty of 1783 supports the position that individuals, even those previously involved with the British cause, are entitled to hold land. The treaty's provisions prevent future confiscations and allow restitution of estates, thereby affirming the rights to retain and acquire land. The 6th article of the treaty reinforces the right to hold new acquisitions, while the 9th article of the treaty of 1794 further clarifies that heirs or assigns of such individuals will not be considered aliens. This extends the rights of land ownership across generations, including both ante-nati and post-nati.
The third position consists of two divisions: Allegiance and Capacity to hold and transmit lands. Daniel Coxe maintained his allegiance to New Jersey despite attempts to renounce it, and he could not be deprived of his capacity to hold land except in cases of criminal punishment. Even if Coxe had sought to divest himself of this capacity, his heirs, as U.S. citizens, could still claim inheritance. The opposition he faces is from private individuals, not the state, who aim to eliminate his legal existence to claim a larger portion of the inheritance. Common law, as recognized by New Jersey's constitution, holds that allegiance cannot be renounced. Coxe's allegiance was rooted in his long-term inhabitancy of New Jersey, which predates the establishment of its statehood, distinguishing it from temporary allegiance based on residence. This allegiance was likened to a natural and permanent condition. The argument that he was never a citizen or that he expatriated himself is countered by the fact that he remained in New Jersey during critical periods, unlike Chapman, who left Pennsylvania before a significant date when allegiance was formalized. Coxe's residency in New Jersey from October 4, 1776, rendered any attempt to change allegiance too late.
Daniel Coxe was deemed a subject of New Jersey and liable for treason, which implies he was entitled to the benefits of this civil relationship. W. Tilghman acknowledged that New Jersey could lawfully consider Coxe a subject by force and argued that individuals could not exercise their right to choose citizenship until after the peace treaty of 1783. He challenged the notion that individuals of the minority could retrospectively alter their status based on past conflict.
Coxe’s purported expatriation, described as a renunciation of allegiance and capacity to inherit, was disputed. The argument against this included that expatriation must be established as a fact, and the evidence presented was insufficient to support such a claim. Specifically, Coxe's engagement in commerce as a British subject was cited as a key point, but it was noted that U.S. citizens could operate under dual status in British courts without forfeiting their rights as American citizens.
The distinction between expatriation and emigration was emphasized, with expatriation requiring public consent and dissolving original citizenship obligations, while emigration merely suspends those obligations without affecting an individual's capacity to inherit or be recognized as a citizen. The conclusion drawn was that Coxe's status as a British subject did not negate his rights as a New Jersey citizen, and thus he retained the ability to hold land in New Jersey.
Expatriation is characterized as a rigid and inconvenient deprivation of rights, contrasting with emigration, which enhances individual commerce and development. Emigration is not impeded in most states, whereas expatriation is legally recognized only in Virginia among the seventeen United States. Other states protect the right to emigrate but do not mention expatriation, a concept absent in British law. When a person expatriates, they lose all rights of citizenship, including property rights, although there are no recorded instances of land escheating due to expatriation. The nature of expatriation does not allow individuals to leave their community with intentions harmful to it, and one cannot expatriate to commit treason without such expatriation occurring first. Legal definitions and government assent should regulate the process of expatriation.
In a case involving Daniel Coxe, it is argued that he retained his rights and responsibilities as a citizen at the time of his departure, even if subsequent events might suggest otherwise. The court must assess whether Coxe intended to expatriate. The case is divided into three periods, with the first period (from the revolution to 1783) indicating that New Jersey had the right to compel individuals to be part of the new state. Evidence suggests Coxe resided in New Jersey until 1777, and his departure was not influenced by laws enacted in 1778 that could not retroactively change his citizenship status. The penalties for disaffection did not include the loss of property rights, as the laws declared him a citizen while imposing other penalties. Moreover, the argument that New Jersey laws targeted non-residents is countered by a precedent case affirming that offenses are against all states, not just the specific one.
The second period under consideration spans from the peace treaty to the descent cast in 1802. It is argued that Daniel Coxe had the right to choose his citizenship in 1783; however, this claim is based on a misinterpretation of the treaty, which does not explicitly grant such a right. Articles 5 and 6 of the treaty indicate an understanding that loyalists could return and seek restitution of their estates, implying that successful restitution would allow them to hold property. The treaty's provision against future confiscations confirms that any ability to acquire property is current rather than prospective. It is established that selling previously confiscated property post-treaty does not violate the treaty, suggesting that future confiscations would only arise from future acquisitions, and those who can acquire property are not considered aliens.
Coxe asserts through his counsel that he never intended to forfeit his right to acquire and hold land, stating that if he had such an intention, it would not be legally feasible. Opponents must prove both his intent and ability to relinquish these rights. The argument against denying the right of expatriation is acknowledged, but it is clarified that this only pertains to emigration. The text critiques the notion that a person who opposes their country can later return without being treated as an alien. It highlights inconsistencies in the plaintiff's arguments, particularly their reliance on feudal doctrines that restrict land ownership to citizens while ignoring the principle that one cannot renounce their homeland.
Cited authorities do not support the plaintiff's claims, as American constitutions primarily reference emigration, with Virginia being the only state to legislate expatriation, which does not influence land laws in New Jersey. The opinions of Vattel and Judge Wilson are noted to focus on emigration rather than the legal status of land ownership post-exile. Previous cases, such as Apthorp v. Backus and Talbot v. Jansen, are referenced to illustrate that land claims by individuals who were British subjects before the revolution persist, but rights cannot be exercised without legislative action. The ongoing question is whether becoming a subject of a new sovereign renders one an alien for all legal purposes. The only challenge to the plaintiff's title is the assertion that Coxe was an alien at the time of the descent and conveyance, thus incapable of holding or transferring land.
Daniel Coxe's claim to subject status in New Jersey is supported by three key arguments. First, he was born under the same allegiance as other New Jersey subjects. Second, after New Jersey established its independent government, the legislature recognized him as a subject, requiring his allegiance and punishing any breach, while allowing him the capacity to inherit real estate. Third, once designated as a subject by New Jersey law, he could not unilaterally declare himself an alien, nor did he attempt to do so.
According to legal definitions, an alien is someone born outside the allegiance of the sovereign, and the burden of proof lies with the defendant to demonstrate that the plaintiff was born outside the sovereign's allegiance. Historical legal definitions, including those by Littleton and supported by legal scholars like Vaughan, Hale, Foster, and Blackstone, confirm that birthplace determines subject status, establishing a natural and reasonable duty of allegiance to the land of one’s birth. The common law asserts that no one born a subject can be an alien.
The argument against Coxe's status posits that he was not a subject at birth. However, it is contended that at his birth, the King of England was the common sovereign, thus ensuring that he could never be an alien, regardless of subsequent changes in governance. The principle of natural allegiance, acquired at birth, persists throughout life, safeguarding his rights, including land ownership, unless forfeited by crime. The case references Calvin's Case, which illustrates that individuals born subjects retain their status, irrespective of the sovereign at the time of their birth.
Lord Coke articulates that the obedience and allegiance of subjects to their sovereign is rooted in natural law, which is integral to English law and immutable. This establishes that Calvin, as a plaintiff born under the allegiance of one king, cannot be considered an alien. The argument is not merely an extrajudicial opinion but a logical conclusion supported by historical and legal precedent, including the treatment of Frenchmen born during England's claims on French territories, who were not deemed aliens post-possession. Critics have dismissed Calvin's Case and Lord Coke's reasoning, labeling them as outdated or absurd; however, Lord Coke's reputation as a respected lawyer and the absence of any legal challenge to Calvin's Case lend credibility to his position. This case is further supported by historical jurists such as Fleta and Bracton, as well as modern legal authorities like Lord Kenyon. The doctrine asserts that individuals born before a change in sovereignty should retain their rights to inherit, reflecting a principle of justice that protects vested rights unless forfeited for crime. Judge Tucker also supports this doctrine, applying it to ante-nati Americans' rights to hold land. While opponents argue that this common law principle conflicts with the ideals of freedom and current political institutions, it is contended that the doctrine does not restrict emigration rights but rather ensures that emigrants retain their natural allegiance and privileges. This perspective frames the doctrine as a beneficial restraint rather than a limitation on freedom.
The text emphasizes the importance of allegiance to one's native land, urging citizens to seek prosperity without engaging in actions against their country. It describes the political structure as a union of distinct, independent states rather than a confederated republic. A potential dissolution of this union is foreseen, raising concerns about land security across state lines, which could be protected only by adherence to the common law principle of citizenship based on birth. If a revolution severed ties with a parent nation, the new principle of citizenship would derive from residence at the time of the revolution, implying that individuals living in the territory would inherently become subjects of the new government based on tacit consent or majority action.
The text references the founding of New Jersey's government post-revolution, noting that its constitution and legislative acts recognized residents as subjects of the new state. Specifically, the New Jersey legislature claimed allegiance from individuals residing in its territory, declaring those who remained loyal to the British crown as treasonous. This legal framework preserved the rights of individuals while establishing their status as subjects of the new government.
Daniel Coxe was born in New Jersey and lived there while aligning with the British by joining their army over a year later. The New Jersey legislature actively defined who were considered subjects of the state, leading to the confiscation of estates from those who retreated within British lines, as they could not be tried under common law. An act providing a general pardon was established, offering conditional clemency to those who returned to allegiance and forfeiting the personal estates of those who did not. Subsequent acts reaffirmed this classification of subjects and included punishments for continued rebellion, culminating in the total confiscation of the estates of offenders.
These legislative measures were primarily fiscal, aimed at state revenue rather than merely enforcing duties or punishing crimes. The intention behind the acts was to legitimize the revolution and affirm the establishment of a new republican government, defining community membership and enforcing duties through property forfeiture rather than personal attainder, which would violate principles of due process. Notably, the second section of the latest act addressed treasonous acts committed between the onset of civil unrest in April 1775 and the formal treason act in October 1776. It clarified that governance persisted through self-organized committees and a provincial congress, which had already enacted a treason ordinance mirroring the later treason act, thereby providing legislative validation to the earlier provisions.
The ordinance and act establish that all individuals within the territory of the new government are considered subjects, reinforcing the principle that Americans could not act against their country during the war. In light of this, the government created a new authority, declaring all inhabitants as subjects and enforcing laws regarding allegiance and treason. Daniel Coxe, being within that territory, was claimed as a subject and punished for non-compliance. The government cannot simultaneously recognize him as a subject for punitive purposes while labeling him an alien to deny him rights or property acquisition. It is contended that the legislature did not intend to enact contradictory policies concerning citizenship and property rights; they only sought to affirm the majority's authority over the minority, without stripping individuals of their birthrights.
The argument further challenges the validity of claims that individuals could choose allegiance during civil strife, noting that New Jersey's treason laws denied such options. The opposition claims Coxe could have remained a British subject post-war, thus becoming an alien; however, it is asserted that he was a subject of New Jersey from the war's start until the 1783 treaty, and he could not unilaterally renounce that status without a legislative act from New Jersey. Citing common law, which prohibits expatriation and establishes perpetual allegiance, the argument concludes that Coxe's status as a subject is secured, and he did not exercise any right to abandon it.
Bracton, Coke, Hale, Foster, and Blackstone establish a fundamental legal principle regarding allegiance in common law, which Mr. Swift notes is also applicable in the U.S. states that have adopted common law. The 22nd section of New Jersey's constitution embraces English common law, barring any inconsistent provisions with the state's rights and privileges. The key question is whether the common law principle of perpetual allegiance conflicts with these rights. The argument presented suggests that allegiance to the New Jersey government, established by the people's authority, cannot be inconsistent with the rights bestowed by that constitution, which includes a republican government, legislative council, annual elections, freedom of conscience, and trial by jury.
It is asserted that while the common law reflects a notion of allegiance to a monarch, it can logically transfer this duty of allegiance from the king to the people during significant political changes, as evidenced by England's 1688 revolution. Thus, the doctrine of perpetual allegiance remains intact, merely shifting from one sovereign to another. The New Jersey legislature has codified the common law's allegiance doctrine, explicitly stating that all individuals within the state owe allegiance to its government, distinguishing between permanent and temporary allegiance. This legal framework aligns with the common law principles and the historical statute of Edward III concerning treason, indicating that New Jersey's constitution and laws have effectively adopted and adapted common law regarding allegiance and treason.
The interpretation of the term "allegiance" in legal contexts must align with its common-law meaning, which advocates for expatriation have sought to redefine. Historical arguments against the terms "allegiance" and "subject" suggest they imply subjugation and are inappropriate in a republican context. Proponents of these arguments proposed replacing them with "obedience" and "citizenship," terms they deemed more fitting for free individuals. However, the framers of New Jersey’s constitution recognized that allegiance could be owed to the people rather than a monarch, thus retaining the established legal terminology.
Even if expatriation were recognized under New Jersey law, Daniel Coxe did not exercise this right clearly or intentionally. His continued connections to New Jersey, despite residing in England and trading as a British merchant, do not constitute expatriation, as legal precedent affirms that a naturalized British subject in America retains American merchant status. Furthermore, receiving compensation from the British government during the war does not equate to expatriation, nor does self-identification as a British subject alter his legal status in New Jersey. The law recognizes him as a subject of New Jersey, resulting in a form of dual allegiance, a situation common with naturalized citizens.
The argument posits that the right of expatriation, if recognized, hinges on mutual consent from both the individual and the state, necessitating legal frameworks for its exercise. It critiques the notion that common law prohibits expatriation, highlighting that New Jersey has not legislated this right, rendering it ineffective. The author asserts that historical reasons for barring land ownership by aliens are outdated and that modern policies should encourage foreign settlement. Furthermore, it contends that treaties between the United States and Great Britain support Mr. Coxe’s position, as the treaties imply restoration of rights to royalists and recognition of landholding rights for heirs, thereby protecting Mr. Coxe’s inheritance claim.
The excerpt argues against the judgment that would disadvantage an individual due to their status as a subject, emphasizing that the decision should be affirmed. Ingersoll expresses concern over the legal principles being discussed, finding them both novel and alarming. He critiques the exclusion of post-nati individuals, who have no complaints against them, in favor of ante-nati individuals who were harmful. He also highlights the inconsistency in treating French allies as aliens while allowing British loyalists to hold land as citizens. The case centers on Daniel Coxe, who, after supporting British claims during the revolution and settling in England, claims descent rights as an American citizen following a relative's death in New Jersey. The key legal questions are whether Coxe expatriated himself and if this expatriation resulted in alienage, preventing him from inheriting land in the U.S. The argument posits that upon rejecting British authority, former colonists were in a state of nature with the freedom to choose their allegiance. This period of choice lasted until new governments were established, implying that residence thereafter indicated consent to the new governance. The commentary references historical cases and legal principles to support the notion that government should be established with individual consent, contrasting with the claim of usurpation as tyranny. New Jersey's constitution is cited as allowing suffrage rights while not mandating their exercise, aligning with the argument that treason could not be committed until after a specific date, indicating a structured transition of governance.
The act of June 5, 1777, extends the period for individuals to restore their rights as freemen by returning and fulfilling specific conditions by August 1. Daniel Coxe, who became a fugitive and joined the enemy, faced an inquisition in August of the same year due to alleged treason committed in April, resulting in a judgment of forfeiture of his real estate in February 1779. Opposing counsel argues that Coxe is recognized as a citizen and thus entitled to hold land, citing legal authorities to support this position. The argument acknowledges that while Coxe could take lands, he could not hold them as an alien or a citizen due to the nature of high treason, where forfeiture occurs from the date of the offense, not conviction.
The distinction between expatriation and emigration is addressed, asserting that emigration is a natural right and does not sever allegiance, whereas expatriation, which requires government consent, does dissolve allegiance and prevents land ownership. The speaker criticizes opposing arguments as lacking authority and contends that historical conventions indicate a right to emigrate without losing political connections. References to legal texts demonstrate the speaker's view that emigration and expatriation are synonymous and that the concept of expatriation is rooted in historical practices, as illustrated by biblical examples of individuals leaving their native lands. The speaker disputes the common-law principle that allegiance cannot be discharged, arguing it is not supported by divine law or natural law, and cites historical instances from the Bible to reinforce the legitimacy of expatriation.
The law of nature recognizes no hierarchy between rulers and subjects, indicating that common law principles do not arise from this source. Historical practices show that nations have restricted migration, but these prohibitions are not universally accepted. Ancient Athenian law allowed individuals to leave the state if they disagreed with its laws, and Roman citizenship laws permitted individuals to choose their preferred state of allegiance. The right of expatriation has deep historical roots, with modern practices varying by nation; for example, Russia prohibits it while Switzerland permits it. Legal scholars, including Grotius and Locke, argue that individuals possess a natural right to migrate, which can only be restricted under specific and limited circumstances. Locke criticized English law's restrictions on emigration, referencing historical precedents for migration. The New Jersey Constitution supports the right of expatriation and rejects the notion of perpetual allegiance. During a civil war, individuals have the right to choose sides, exemplified by Daniel Coxe, who declared himself a British subject and was treated as a refugee by New Jersey. Following the war, New Jersey's legislature enacted a law disenfranchising those like Coxe, but this act remained in effect even after peace was restored, allowing him the choice to return or relocate to another state.
The principles of the constitution support the claim that Daniel Coxe expatriated himself and became a British subject, as demonstrated by clear evidence. Mr. Rawle identifies eight key actions indicating this expatriation: 1) Joining the British army in 1777; 2) Residing voluntarily in Philadelphia and New York; 3) Holding civil offices under the British crown; 4) Engaging in trade as a British merchant; 5) Holding land as a trustee; 6) Receiving British pensions and rewards; 7) Self-identifying as a British subject; and 8) Not taking an oath of allegiance to New Jersey.
A precedent (Marryat v. Wilson) illustrates that trading as a citizen of one nation does not inherently negate allegiance to another; however, Coxe was not born under New Jersey's allegiance and never accepted its obligations. The evidence shows he is bound by oaths of allegiance to the British crown, which, per Wyckefort's reasoning, effectively terminates his connection to the United States.
The naturalization law indicates that allegiance to one nation equates to expatriation from another, suggesting that once Coxe became a British subject, he lost his American citizenship. Furthermore, the naturalization act of April 14, 1802 states that individuals convicted of treason or who joined the British army during the war cannot be naturalized without state consent, which Coxe lacks from New Jersey and Pennsylvania due to his proscription.
Consequently, it is concluded that Coxe legally expatriated himself and is not an American citizen, raising the question of whether this expatriation renders him incapacitated from inheriting land in the U.S. The assertion of inconsistency in applying common law to expatriation and alienage is countered by referenced authority.
An alien's acquisition of permanent property in land necessitates a permanent allegiance to the King of England, which conflicts with prior allegiance and creates various complications. Under civil law, contracts for land by aliens are void. The forfeiture to the prince is specific to England and similar feudal systems. Concerns were raised about the Treaty of London facilitating British influence by allowing aliens to hold land in the U.S. Expatriation, or the relinquishment of natural allegiance, must also induce alienage, as seen in Virginia's recognition of this right. The argument posits that individuals can shake off allegiance, contrasting Mr. Rawle's view that they cannot. The document asserts expatriation as a right, evidenced by the case of Talbot v. Jansen, which supports the notion that its fair exercise results in alienage. The case of The Charming Betsy further affirms that expatriation extinguishes prior citizenship. The conclusion drawn is that Daniel Coxe, through legitimate expatriation, lost his American citizenship and became an alien, thus unable to hold land unless an exception applies. The onus is on opponents to demonstrate the adoption of any such exceptions in American law, particularly regarding the common law of England.
The royal prerogative and the concept of personal allegiance to the king, as opposed to a duty to the state, are examined. Judges Tucker and Wilson assert that the common law of England was selectively adopted in the American colonies based on its relevance to local conditions, differing among colonies. In New Jersey, the adoption of English law is explicitly conditional upon it not conflicting with the rights in the charter. Two critical questions arise: whether the practices claimed by the opposing counsel were established in New Jersey prior to the constitution, and whether such practices contradict the charter's privileges. The counsel argues that demonstrating prior practice is impossible, as it could not have been anticipated by the constitutional convention.
Moreover, the opposing counsel's claim of perpetual allegiance by birth is seen as inconsistent with the charter's rights. They argue that allegiance and protection are reciprocal, allowing a citizen to withdraw allegiance when protection is absent. Reference is made to three states affirming emigration as an unrestricted right, a principle rooted in the revolution's ideology, which must be upheld to avoid labeling the revolution itself as treasonous.
The argument also touches on the capacity of British subjects to hold land in the U.S., referencing treaties from 1783 and 1794, which imply that it was not intended to enable escheatment. Judge Tucker's distinction between aliens by birth and by election is noted, though countered by the Virginia assembly's declaration that non-citizens are aliens. Tucker’s reliance on historical common-law principles is challenged, particularly regarding the assumption of perpetual allegiance by birth, especially after the Declaration of Independence, which severed ties with Great Britain, thus rendering British subjects as aliens. The New Jersey convention's view is that English law was suspended and only reinstated as previously practiced.
The argument presented asserts that the inference regarding the inheritance rights of American natives in England and vice versa is flawed, particularly if it relies on the notion of perpetual allegiance by birth. It critiques interpretations of the treaties of 1783 and 1794, suggesting they misinterpret historical context. On November 27, 1777, Congress urged states to confiscate the estates of individuals who had forfeited their rights, which included ante-nati. Various states enacted different measures regarding the confiscation and possession of loyalists' properties, leading to a situation where some lands remained unconfiscated. The sixth article of the 1783 treaty is argued to protect only those properties not actually confiscated before the war, emphasizing that the treaty's intent was to safeguard existing estates and outline the consequences of actions taken during the conflict. This interpretation is supported by case law from Connecticut and legal principles articulated by the English lawyer Wooddeson. The discussion also highlights the impracticality of allowing significant foreign land purchases by wealthy aliens at a time when the American population was comparatively small and poor. Ultimately, the clause aims to protect property rights alongside personal liberties, extending protections even to those who may have committed crimes against the U.S., and preventing criminal actions related to wartime conduct. The implications of alienage were left for policy considerations, suggesting a careful navigation of these legal complexities by American commissioners.
The article emphasizes that its purpose is to prevent punishment rather than to grant rewards. It states that loyalists, when treated similarly to allies, should have no grievances, and asserts that there should be no future losses or damages due to actions taken during the war. It illustrates this point by referencing Daniel Coxe, noting that had he fought under General Washington and later become a British subject, the same rules would apply. Many individuals returned and were naturalized, retaining their land, as seen with Mr. Gordon in Pennsylvania.
The opposing interpretation of the treaty relies on the common-law principle that British natives were considered born in America. The 5th article of the treaty aids in interpreting the 6th and is suggestive regarding confiscation laws. The 9th article of the treaty from November 19, 1794, aligns with the arguments presented to the court. Variations in state policies regarding alien land ownership are acknowledged, with Pennsylvania allowing purchases and inheritance.
Judge Tucker is noted for his non-committal stance, suggesting that the treaty seems to revive the principle of natural-born status for ante-nati but clarifies that British subjects born post-separation are considered aliens, although those born before the definitive peace treaty might benefit from it regarding land interests.
The text critiques the implications of the ante-nati doctrine, particularly the unfairness it creates in inheritance scenarios, such as lands escheating when a loyalist dies leaving an innocent infant versus a combatant descendant inheriting. It posits that under the treaty's equitable principles, vested rights of British subjects are protected, and those not yet citizens had their lifetime to naturalize, failing which their lands would escheat. This raises questions about reconciling the ante-nati doctrine with the ideas of perpetual allegiance and the criticisms of Judge Ellsworth's conclusions in Williams’s Case.
Following October 28, 1795, British subjects are prohibited from purchasing lands in the United States under the treaty's protection. Acceptance of the ante-natus doctrine could lead to numerous complications, such as allowing an attainted loyalist to regain citizenship and eligibility for political office despite restrictions on naturalization. In the case of Daniel Coxe, his expatriation precludes him from claiming land by descent in the U.S.
A case from the Supreme Court of Connecticut addressed whether an alien could hold real estate. The court ruled that states have the authority to prevent aliens from acquiring property as deemed necessary for safety or policy, similar to England’s laws. However, it was determined that property acquired by a citizen before alien status is not forfeited due to state division or war. The plaintiff, an heir to a mortgaged estate, was recognized as a citizen at the time of property acquisition, and her title was protected by the treaty, which forbids post-war forfeitures.
Furthermore, a state statute declaring aliens incapable of holding land does not retroactively negate the plaintiff's title, which is implicitly supported by the law allowing actions for possession. The court ultimately affirmed that Coxe had the right to inherit land in New Jersey.
