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Swope v. State
Citations: 490 N.E.2d 736; 1986 Ind. LEXIS 1079Docket: No. 784 S 269
Court: Indiana Supreme Court; March 26, 1986; Indiana; State Supreme Court
Eric V. Swope was convicted of rape (class A felony) and confinement (class B felony) after a jury trial, receiving concurrent sentences of twenty-five years and ten years, respectively. Swope appealed on two grounds: the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and alleged abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing two State witnesses to testify despite a witness separation order. The court affirmed the convictions, highlighting that on October 16, 1981, the victim recognized Swope, who, along with another man, threatened her with a gun and forced her into sexual acts. The victim's consistent testimony was deemed sufficient to establish the elements of rape and confinement beyond a reasonable doubt, aligning with precedents that support the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim. The court noted that it does not evaluate evidence credibility in sufficiency challenges, deferring to the jury's role in weighing evidence and determining witness credibility. The appellant contends that the trial court improperly allowed two State witnesses to testify despite their breach of a witness separation order. The order was initially requested by the State and agreed to by the defense. Although Officer Michelle Myles was permitted to remain in the courtroom as the investigating officer, defense counsel observed her conversing with Officer Farias during a recess. A subsequent hearing revealed that Farias discussed an offense report prepared by another officer but did not talk about courtroom testimony. The prosecutor claimed ignorance of the conversation. The trial court permitted both witnesses to testify, restricting Farias from discussing the offense report. The defense's request to admonish the jury regarding the violation was denied, but during cross-examination, Farias acknowledged the separation order and their discussion about the report. The trial court has broad discretion to allow testimony despite such violations unless there is evidence of State involvement in the breach. Precedent supports the trial court's discretion, particularly as the appellant could not demonstrate collusion by the State. Given that neither officer's testimony would significantly influence the other’s, the court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment was affirmed.