Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; June 13, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the case of Kent Neal, who appealed his sentencing as a career offender under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. Secs. 4B1.1 and 4B1.2(2)). The trial court had determined that Neal's two felony drug possession convictions under New York Penal Code Sec. 220.06 qualified him as a career offender, increasing his offense level significantly. Neal, who pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine, had a presentence report indicating 21 adult convictions, including nine for drug possession.
The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's interpretation of New York law de novo and ultimately reversed the decision, concluding that Neal's prior convictions did not meet the criteria for qualifying as "controlled substance offenses" under the guidelines. While Neal met the age and instant offense requirements, the critical issue was whether his prior convictions constituted the requisite two felony offenses. The court noted that the definitions of "controlled substance offense" under the guidelines pertained specifically to the distribution or possession with intent to distribute, which was not established for Neal’s prior convictions as interpreted by the appellate court. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
The definition of "controlled substance offense" excludes simple possession of drugs, as indicated by the commentary, which specifies that it encompasses aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit the offense. The critical issue in this case is whether Neal's prior convictions under New York law were for simple possession or possession with intent to distribute. If either conviction was for simple possession, Neal does not qualify for the career offender enhancement and must be resentenced.
The New York statute defines criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree by outlining various conditions, with intent to sell explicitly required only in subsection 1. The government contends that the amounts specified in the other subsections imply an intent to distribute. However, Neal argues that, based on statutory interpretation, the remaining subsections pertain solely to simple possession. The court agrees with Neal’s interpretation, drawing a parallel to the categorical approach taken for determining "crimes of violence" under the career offender enhancement.
According to this approach, the court must focus on the elements of the offense rather than the specifics of the conduct. The statutory language supports the conclusion that the intent to distribute requirement is confined to subsection 1, as the other subsections lack such a stipulation. Thus, the presumption is that the legislature intended for the plain meaning of the law to apply, reinforcing the conclusion that the intent to distribute applies only to subsection 1. If external sources were considered, they would further substantiate this interpretation.
The New York Attorney General characterizes the state's drug laws as a structured framework that distinctly separates possession and sale offenses, with specific statutes outlined in New York Penal Law Sections 220.03–220.21 for possession and 220.31–220.43 for sales. Possession offenses are categorized into six degrees, with the lowest degree (seventh) representing the basic offense. Aggravating factors, primarily the weight of the controlled substance, determine the degree of the offense. Additionally, possession with intent to sell is treated more severely than simple possession, with certain requirements for non-narcotic drugs that include prior convictions for enhanced penalties.
New York's highest court has recognized the complexity of these laws. Key distinctions among offense grades involve the type and weight of the substance, and whether there is intent to sell. The legislature has determined that possession with intent to sell warrants harsher penalties than simple possession, leading to a lower amount being necessary for the former offense. The trial court's interpretation of the intent to distribute requirement in Section 220.06(1) was deemed incorrect, as it undermined the legislative intent.
The case of Neal, whose previous convictions were not clearly detailed in terms of the specific subsections of the law, was reversed and remanded for resentencing. The trial court must establish which subsection(s) of New York Penal Law Section 220.06 apply to Neal's convictions; if they do not fall under subsection 1, he cannot be resentenced as a career offender. The presentence report indicates Neal faced charges for possession on two occasions in 1989, pled guilty to attempted possession, and received one-year sentences, but lacked clarity on specific statutory subsections. Relevant documents, including Neal's "rap sheets," were available at the hearing but were not included in the appeal record.
