Robert Simmons v. Ronald Pryor and City of Evanston

Citation: 26 F.3d 650Docket: 92-2462

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; June 8, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Robert Simmons filed a Section 1983 action claiming violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to his arrest without probable cause. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that probable cause existed based on a state judicial officer's determination. The incident began on October 14, 1989, when Evanston police officers responded to a domestic disturbance involving Simmons and his wife, Patricia. Both parties accused each other of battery, and Patricia revealed she had an expired order of protection against Simmons and wished to file a complaint. 

Sergeant Wernick, after assessing the situation, contacted Lieutenant Ronald Pryor, the on-duty Watch Commander, and suggested they take both parties to the station to resolve the matter. Upon arriving, an Assistant State's Attorney advised against criminal charges, recommending civil court intervention instead. Simmons was informed he could leave, and no charges would be filed. However, Patricia later insisted on pressing charges, prompting Pryor to gather additional statements from family members about the altercation. Following protocol, Pryor sought guidance from Deputy Chief Edwards, who instructed him to sign a complaint if probable cause existed, in line with departmental policy regarding domestic violence. This policy encourages police involvement in domestic disputes to facilitate victim support.

Edwards was informed by Pryor and Sergeant Wharton at the police station that a complaint and emergency order of protection were being prepared. Patricia was taken to Judge Loverde, who signed the emergency order after finding probable cause for the complaint. Subsequently, Simmons was arrested but acquitted of battery charges. A year later, Simmons filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment rights due to lack of probable cause (Count I), deprivation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count II), and malicious prosecution, adding the City of Evanston as a defendant (Count III).

The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the state judge's finding of probable cause negated the false arrest claim, that the substantive due process claim lacked a valid property or liberty interest, and that the malicious prosecution claim was without merit or jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the finding of probable cause precluded claims of inappropriate actions by the defendants.

On reconsideration, the district court noted that Simmons did not challenge the integrity of the evidence presented at the probable cause hearing but only the judge's finding, which could not be second-guessed. Simmons appealed the decision.

The appellate review of the summary judgment is de novo, requiring that the record, viewed favorably to Simmons, shows no genuine issue of material fact. The court found that the district court erred in affording preclusive effect to the state judge's probable cause finding. Citing Malley v. Briggs, the court emphasized that a judicial officer's finding of probable cause does not bar a claim against the police officer if it can be shown that a reasonably trained officer would have known the action lacked probable cause. Thus, the finding of probable cause is not necessarily dispositive in subsequent civil actions against police officers.

The defendant contends that the case of Malley is not applicable because, unlike that case where the police officer initiated proceedings leading to a false arrest, here, Patricia initiated the criminal complaint. This distinction may affect causation but does not alter the significance of Judge Loverde's finding of probable cause. The plaintiff asserts that Pryor played a crucial role in advancing the complaint, claiming evidence that Pryor ordered its drafting on Patricia's behalf. Consequently, the district court incorrectly granted preclusive effect to the judge's finding of probable cause, although the summary judgment can still be affirmed on other grounds.

The defendants argue that the evidence demonstrates probable cause for the complaint, while the plaintiff maintains that a remand for trial is necessary since the defendants did not address probable cause in their summary judgment motion. The plaintiff believes he only needed to disprove the preclusive effect of the judge's finding. However, once a police officer claims that their actions were supported by probable cause and provides evidence of a judicial officer's finding, the issue of probable cause becomes relevant, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a factual dispute regarding it.

Despite the plaintiff's claim of being unaware that probable cause was at issue, he initially argued against Pryor's actions being based on probable cause in his opposition to summary judgment. His filings indicate he was aware of the need to contest the defendants' probable cause claim. To succeed in an unlawful arrest claim, the plaintiff must prove the absence of probable cause, as its existence acts as a complete defense against claims of unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, regardless of any alleged malicious intent.

Probable cause existed to believe that Simmons committed battery, preventing the plaintiff from meeting a critical element of their claim. Battery, as defined under Illinois law (720 ILCS 5/12-3), occurs when a person intentionally causes bodily harm or makes insulting physical contact. Legal justification is not a required element but serves as an affirmative defense for the defendant. Victim testimony alone can support a conviction, and visible evidence of bodily harm is not necessary.

Pryor, aware of events leading to the complaint, noted that officers saw Simmons and Patricia in an altercation involving slaps. Patricia informed Pryor that Simmons had struck her and allegedly threatened her with a gun, expressing fear for her safety. Additionally, Patricia had previously secured an order of protection against Simmons, indicating potential risk. Their son, Robert, Jr., reported witnessing Simmons retrieve a weapon and forcibly entering the house.

Pryor acknowledged the Domestic Violence Act's mandates, which require law enforcement to ensure victim safety and inform them of their rights to seek emergency protective orders. The law obligates officers to provide transportation for victims to file petitions for protection and inform them of their rights to initiate criminal proceedings if no arrest occurs.

The plaintiff argues against the existence of probable cause, citing Sergeant Wernick's conclusion, after consulting an assistant state's attorney, that probable cause did not exist for arresting either Patricia or Robert. However, this does not negate the possibility that a reasonable officer, like Pryor, could have believed Simmons committed a crime. There is no evidence that Wernick or the state's attorney determined there was insufficient probable cause to proceed against Simmons; rather, they opted for civil resolution based on the existing protection order.

No genuine issue of fact regarding probable cause exists, leading to the conclusion that Officer Pryor's actions were objectively reasonable. A reasonable officer would have believed there was sufficient basis to think that Simmons committed battery, justifying the filing of a complaint. The plaintiff failed to prove a critical element of his unlawful arrest claim, making summary judgment appropriate. The court lacks jurisdiction to address the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim after rejecting the federal claims. The district court's judgment is affirmed.

Regarding the petition for rehearing, no active judges requested a vote, and the original panel denied the rehearing. The court amended its opinion to clarify that a plaintiff must demonstrate a lack of probable cause to prevail in an unlawful arrest action. Probable cause serves as an absolute bar to claims under Section 1983 for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, regardless of any malicious motives. 

Additionally, a typographical error in a previous order resulted in the incorrect omission of a paragraph, which has now been restored. Deputy Chief Edwards noted in his deposition that the general order was not followed when Patricia was not allowed to file a complaint and that contacting the state's attorney for minor injuries was unusual. Despite claims of visible injuries on Patricia, evidence suggests there were no signs of bodily harm, and for summary judgment purposes, it is assumed that she had no visible injuries.