Rosemary Bradway, Earl J. Bradway Earl J. Bradway, Jr., a Minor Who Sues by His Natural Parents, Guardians, and Next Friends, Rosemary Bradway and Earl J. Bradway Justin E. Bradway, a Minor Who Sues by His Natural Parents, Guardians, and Next Friends, Rosemary Bradway and Earl J. Bradway v. William P. Gonzales, New York State Trooper Susan C. McDonough New York State Trooper Brian T. White, New York State Trooper, Gerald Spencer

Citations: 26 F.3d 313; 29 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 997; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14475Docket: 1131

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; June 10, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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On February 20, 1988, New York State Troopers entered Rosemary Bradway's home under the pretense of executing an arrest warrant for her ex-husband, motivated by a tip suggesting stolen property was present. They aimed to locate a stolen wood stove and milk cans reported missing from a hunting camp. Upon finding the items, the Troopers arrested Bradway for possession of stolen property and making a false statement. After the criminal charges were dismissed, Bradway filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming her constitutional rights were violated due to an unlawful search and arrest without probable cause. A jury awarded her $100,000 in compensatory damages for false arrest but did not reach a conclusion on the legality of the search. The district court denied her request to have the jury reconsider the search issue and granted the Troopers qualified immunity, which was subsequently affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The background included a prior theft report and the Troopers' attempts to secure a search warrant, which failed due to the absence of a supporting affidavit from a key informant.

Upon arriving at 38 Tarborton Road, Troopers White and McDonough informed the plaintiff of their dual purpose: to search for stolen property and to execute an arrest warrant for Earl Bradway. The plaintiff signed a consent form for the search, which led the Troopers to the basement, where they discovered a wood stove and two steel milk cans matching descriptions of stolen property identified by Spencer. During questioning, the plaintiff claimed her ex-husband purchased the stove and that she had owned the milk cans for many years. Based on her statements, the Troopers arrested her, leading to charges of possessing stolen property and making a false written statement. These charges were dismissed in October 1989.

On February 8, 1991, the plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action in the Northern District of New York, alleging violations of her constitutional rights, specifically an unlawful search and false arrest. Testimony during the trial diverged significantly: while McDonough maintained the plaintiff voluntarily consented to the search, the plaintiff claimed she did so under threat of losing her children. Discrepancies also emerged regarding the search's scope and when Spencer was brought in to identify the stolen items. 

Before the trial concluded, the Troopers claimed qualified immunity and sought judgment as a matter of law, with the court deferring its decision. The jury ultimately found that the plaintiff did not voluntarily consent to the search, though they believed the Troopers had a reasonable belief that Bradway was present. Conversely, the jury concluded the Troopers lacked probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest, awarding her $100,000 in compensatory damages.

After the jury answered the interrogatories but before reconvening to consider punitive damages, the plaintiff's counsel objected to the verdict form, arguing it failed to address whether the Troopers exceeded the scope of the search authorized by Earl Bradway's arrest warrant. The district court denied this request, stating that any objections had been waived. Following the jury's verdict, the court reviewed the Troopers' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, ultimately determining, based on findings of fact, that the execution of the arrest warrant was a pretext for a search and that qualified immunity applied to both the search and arrest. The complaint was dismissed on May 4, 1993. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal. 

The plaintiff contends that the district court erred by not resubmitting the verdict form to the jury regarding the search's scope and by dismissing her unlawful search and false arrest claims based on qualified immunity. The conclusion reached is that the objection to the verdict form was waived, and the Troopers were entitled to qualified immunity on both claims. The waiver analysis hinges on whether the verdict form sought special verdicts under Rule 49(a) or a general verdict with written answers under Rule 49(b), with Rule 49(a) providing that any omitted issues are waived unless raised before jury deliberation.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49 outlines two types of verdict forms: Rule 49(a) allows for special verdicts where the jury provides written findings on factual issues, with the court applying the law to those findings. Rule 49(b) permits the submission of written interrogatories alongside a general verdict, wherein the jury answers specific questions and renders an overall verdict. In this case, the unlawful search component of the verdict form was analyzed under Rule 49(a) because it did not solicit a general verdict, unlike the false arrest portion, which did provide for a clear liability determination. The court noted that the district court's belief that the verdict form corresponded to Rule 49(b) was unconvincing, as the form only sought special verdicts on the unlawful search claim.

Additionally, if an issue is omitted from a Rule 49(a) verdict form and not challenged before jury deliberation, it constitutes a waiver of the right to a jury trial on that issue. The court noted that the lack of a finding regarding the scope of the search implied a lawful search, favoring the defendants (Troopers). Subsequently, the district court ruled that the plaintiff's Section 1983 action was barred by qualified immunity, granting judgment in favor of the Troopers. On appeal, the plaintiff contested the qualified immunity ruling concerning both the unlawful search and false arrest claims. The standard for reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law requires courts to view the evidence favorably for the non-moving party and grant the motion only if no reasonable juror could find differently.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from civil liability when their actions do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would recognize. This protection balances the need to shield officials from excessive liability and interference with their duties against the necessity of deterring unlawful conduct and compensating victims. The determination of whether an official can be held personally liable hinges on the "objective legal reasonableness" of their actions based on the legal standards in existence at the time of the conduct. Courts evaluate if a right was clearly established by considering the specificity of the right, relevant Supreme Court and circuit court decisions, and whether a reasonable official would have recognized their actions as unlawful.

In the context of an unlawful search claim, the district court concluded that it was reasonable for law enforcement to rely on an arrest warrant and that the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment justified seizing certain items. The plaintiff contests this, arguing that the plain view doctrine requires inadvertent discovery, referencing prior case law that supports this interpretation. Since the district court found that the items were deliberately sought under the pretext of executing the arrest warrant, the plaintiff claims it was unreasonable for the officers to believe the seizure was justified. The initial analysis must determine if the conduct in question violates any constitutional right, as actions that do not breach any constitutional rights cannot violate rights that are deemed "clearly established."

Current constitutional law does not impose an "inadvertent discovery" requirement on the plain view doctrine. In **Horton v. California**, the Supreme Court clarified that while inadvertence is common in legitimate plain view seizures, it is not essential. If an officer has a lawful search warrant or a valid exception, their expectation of finding specific evidence does not invalidate its seizure. Therefore, in the case of the Troopers discovering the wood stove and milk cans, the purposeful nature of their finding does not constitute a constitutional violation.

The district court's determination that the search was a pretext for an unlawful search does not change the analysis. The Fourth Amendment's evaluation focuses on objective circumstances rather than the subjective intentions of officers. As long as law enforcement acts within the limits of authority and legality, their motives are irrelevant. The objective circumstances justified the seizure of the wood stove and milk cans, given that the arrest warrant for Earl Bradway provided a lawful basis for searching 38 Tarborton Road. A properly confined search scope allows for the seizure of contraband in plain view without violating the Fourth Amendment. Pretextual arrests do not invalidate lawful searches, and subjective intent does not undermine claims of qualified immunity. However, there are exceptions, such as in **Winters v. Bd. of County Comm'rs**, where reliance on a pretextual search was deemed inappropriate for seizing evidence in a pawnshop context.

Plaintiff argues that the Troopers' plain view seizure was unconstitutional under the law as it existed in February 1988, citing the Supreme Court's decision in *Coolidge*, which stated that inadvertent discovery is necessary for the plain view doctrine. However, this requirement was only supported by a minority of justices in *Coolidge*, with Justice Harlan and four other justices disagreeing. Following *Coolidge*, the Supreme Court in *Arizona v. Hicks* questioned the necessity of inadvertence for the doctrine, indicating that the requirement had not been established by a majority ruling. Therefore, inadvertence was not a clearly established element of the plain view doctrine at the time of the Troopers’ seizure of the items in question.

Additionally, the plaintiff contends that the Troopers are not protected by the plain view doctrine because (i) the search under the arrest warrant for Earl Bradway was not confined in area and duration, and (ii) the incriminating nature of the stove was not immediately apparent. These claims lack support in the record. To justify a warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine, an officer must be lawfully in a position to see the object clearly. The jury did not determine whether the search's scope exceeded the arrest warrant's bounds, and the district court did not make a finding to that effect, implying that the search was lawful in scope. Consequently, the district court's decision granting the Troopers qualified immunity is based on this implicit finding.

A lawful plain view seizure requires the incriminating nature of the item to be immediately apparent. The plaintiff contends this criterion was unmet because the officers inspected the ashpan of a stove before seizing it. According to the Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Hicks, moving an item to ascertain its identity without probable cause is not allowed. However, descriptions provided by witnesses about the stove's distinctive features were sufficient to establish its incriminating character. The officers’ ability to identify the stove negated the need for prior certainty regarding its involvement in a crime, allowing them to examine the ashpan further without violating the plain view doctrine. 

Consequently, the district court did not err in concluding that a reasonable officer could believe the seizure was justified. Regarding the false arrest claim, despite a jury finding that the Troopers lacked probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest, the district court affirmed that qualified immunity is a separate issue. The court deemed it objectively reasonable for the officers to believe probable cause existed based on the presence of the stove and inconsistent statements from the plaintiff about their ownership. The plaintiff’s argument that the seizure of the stove did not comply with the plain view doctrine is countered by the fact that the unlawful search claim is invalid under current law. However, she maintains her constitutional right against arrest without probable cause, emphasizing that an improper search cannot legitimize an arrest.

Plaintiff's false arrest claim is intricately linked to her unlawful search claim, stemming from an alleged arrest without probable cause. The plaintiff argues that the actions leading to probable cause, including the seizure of a stove and milk cans, should be evaluated under established legal standards. The court notes that while an officer may have qualified immunity for a seizure, they could still be liable for an arrest stemming from that seizure. However, this reasoning undermines the objectives of qualified immunity, which is designed to protect public officials from excessive liability and ensure they can perform their duties without fear of legal repercussions. The court emphasizes that holding officers liable for an objectively unreasonable arrest based on a seizure that could later be deemed constitutional would not effectively deter unlawful conduct. Furthermore, if the seizure is not deemed unlawful, then the plaintiff cannot claim to be a victim of an unlawful action. The court concludes that since the Troopers are entitled to qualified immunity for the seizure, this immunity precludes the false arrest claim under Section 1983, regardless of prior legal standards. Even considering the law as it stood in 1988, the Troopers would still be granted qualified immunity because the requirement of inadvertence for lawful plain view seizures was not clearly established at that time. A reasonable officer could have interpreted the circumstances as providing probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest based on the evidence observed. The district court's decision granting judgment in favor of the appellees due to qualified immunity is affirmed.