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Frame v. City of Arlington
Citations: 575 F.3d 432; 22 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 263; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 15136; 2009 WL 1930045Docket: 08-10630
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; July 7, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Plaintiffs Richard Frame, Wendell Decker, Scott Updike, J N (a minor represented by his mother Gabriela Castro), Mark Hamman, and Joey Salas, all individuals with disabilities relying on motorized wheelchairs, allege that the City of Arlington has violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act by failing to ensure that its curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots are ADA-compliant. The district court dismissed their complaint, ruling that the claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. The appeal presents two key issues: whether Title II of the ADA permits the plaintiffs' claims about the City’s infrastructure and the appropriate statute of limitations for those claims. The court determined that Title II does authorize the claims and set a two-year statute of limitations, which begins upon the City’s completion of any noncompliant construction or alteration. Additionally, the burden to demonstrate the claims’ accrual and expiration lies with the City, not the plaintiffs. The district court’s error in placing the burden on the plaintiffs necessitates a remand for further proceedings. The plaintiffs do not seek monetary damages but rather an injunction for the City to make its facilities ADA-compliant. The City contended that the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a legal claim, but these arguments were not the basis of the district court's dismissal. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims because their complaint failed to identify specific dates of noncompliance within two years before filing on July 22, 2005. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that their claims accrued when they individually encountered noncompliant barriers, rather than when the City completed such constructions. They also argue that statutes of limitation do not apply to claims for injunctive relief and assert that the noncompliant features constitute ongoing violations. The district court's dismissal referenced Alexander v. Sandoval, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked a private right of action under 28 C.F.R. 35.150, a ruling the plaintiffs do not challenge. The plaintiffs further argue that their ADA claims exempt them from procedural bars and that the City bears the burden of proving when the claims accrued. Before addressing the limitations and accrual questions, the court examines whether Title II of the ADA supports the plaintiffs’ claims. It finds that the City’s curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots qualify as services, programs, or activities under Title II, which prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Title II allows for private causes of action, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a qualifying disability, denial of benefits from public services, and that the discrimination is disability-related. While the City is recognized as a public entity and the plaintiffs have qualifying disabilities, the issue remains whether the specified structures fall under Title II's scope, which lacks a clear definition of 'services, programs, or activities.' Other circuit courts have interpreted this language broadly. Public sidewalks are recognized as a "service, program, or activity" under Title II, as established by the Ninth Circuit in Barden v. City of Sacramento. The court emphasized that the inquiry centers on whether the maintenance of sidewalks is a normal function of a government entity, ultimately concluding that it is. The Sixth Circuit similarly interprets "services, programs, or activities" broadly, asserting that it covers virtually all functions of public entities. While it has not explicitly classified sidewalks as such, it affirmed that plaintiffs have a private cause of action under Title II to enforce accessibility standards for curbs and sidewalks, as demonstrated in Ability Center of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky. The Second and Third Circuits also adopt a broad interpretation, with the Second Circuit labeling the phrase as a "catch-all" against discrimination. Both circuits agree that the term encompasses at least curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots. The ordinary meaning of "service" includes facilities that meet public demand, reinforcing that sidewalks and related infrastructure qualify as services under Title II. Congress intended for the ADA to mandate local and state governments to ensure disability-accessible sidewalks, as indicated in the legislative history. Specifically, the employment, transportation, and public accommodation sections of the ADA would be ineffective if wheelchair users could not navigate streets. This legislative intent, supported by other circuits' broad interpretations and the plain meaning of "services," leads to the conclusion that curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots qualify as "services, programs, or activities" under Title II, thereby validating the plaintiffs’ claims. Regarding the statute of limitations, neither Title II of the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act specifies a limitations period, and the general federal statute does not apply. The applicable limitations period for Title II claims in Texas is the two-year statute for personal injury claims. However, the plaintiffs contest the district court's determination that their claims accrued when the City completed noncompliant construction, arguing instead that it should be based on when they encountered the barriers. They also claim that their pursuit of injunctive relief exempts them from the statute of limitations, asserting that the noncompliant conditions represent ongoing violations. Title II incorporates the remedies and procedures of the Rehabilitation Act, which are governed by 42 U.S.C. 1988(a). Courts apply state statutes of limitations analogous to the federal claims, with prior cases establishing that statutes of limitations apply even for claims seeking only injunctive relief. The plaintiffs’ arguments against the application of the statute of limitations are ultimately rejected, as precedent shows that limitations are routinely enforced in ADA claims, including those seeking equitable relief. The case of Soignier v. American Board of Plastic Surgery addresses the application of Illinois's two-year statute of limitations to Title III claims for injunctive relief. The court affirms that the same statute applies to Title II claims and rejects the plaintiffs' argument that noncompliant infrastructure constitutes continuing violations that would extend the limitations period. The court emphasizes that the continuing violations doctrine, typically applicable in employment discrimination cases, does not apply here since the alleged violations (e.g., noncompliant curbs and parking lots) are unrelated. A key issue is the accrual date of the plaintiffs’ claims: whether it is the completion date of the noncompliant construction or the date the plaintiffs encountered the barriers. The district court determined that the claims accrued on the completion date of noncompliant constructions, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims as they did not allege any such constructions within the two years before filing. The appellate court agrees with the accrual date but also states the City must prove that the limitations period had expired for each claim. While the statute of limitations is borrowed from state law, the accrual of claims is governed by federal law, which typically states that a claim accrues when a plaintiff has a complete cause of action. The structure and text of Title II of the ADA suggest that claims accrue upon the completion of alterations to facilities, but no explicit or implied accrual date is provided in the statute. The plaintiffs propose applying the discovery rule, which allows for accrual when a plaintiff is aware of the injury, but this is not explicitly supported by the statute. Under the discovery rule, plaintiffs’ claims arise when they first encounter a noncompliant curb, sidewalk, or parking lot. The City argues for a rule that ties claim accrual to the completion of the noncompliant construction or alteration, emphasizing the importance of the discriminatory act rather than its effects. The City contends that applying the discovery rule would lead to perpetual liability for municipalities, as it would allow the limitations period to reset with each new discovery of noncompliance. The court finds the City’s position compelling, noting that there is no established federal discovery rule applicable here, and the Supreme Court has not endorsed a general federal discovery rule. While lower federal courts often utilize a discovery rule in silent statutes, this court has not adopted that practice. The discovery rule has been historically limited to cases involving latent injuries, such as fraud or medical malpractice, where the harm is not immediately apparent. In contrast, ADA violations, such as missing curb cuts, are not latent and can be readily identified, making the application of a discovery rule inappropriate. Although the discovery rule has been applied in ADA employment discrimination cases, the accrual date in those instances coincided with the discriminatory act, unlike the current case where claims could indefinitely extend the limitations period. Thus, applying the discovery rule here would prevent the City from establishing a clear limitations timeframe, conflicting with the underlying policies of statutes of limitations. Statutes of limitations protect defendants from stale claims, emphasizing the need for timely notice to defend against such claims. If the discovery rule were applied, it could allow new plaintiffs to constantly renew liability for noncompliant sidewalks, undermining the statute of limitations and leading to unlimited exposure for public entities. The court holds that liability for noncompliant construction or alteration under the ADA exists only within a defined limitations period, specifically from the date of the City’s completion of the noncompliant work. The court further analyzes the burden of proof regarding the expiration of the limitations period. The City is in a better position to demonstrate the accrual of claims, as plaintiffs may not have access to the necessary construction dates without discovery. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the party asserting an affirmative defense, like statute of limitations, carries the burden of proof. The court finds that the district court incorrectly placed the burden on the plaintiffs to prove accrual dates prior to their complaint's filing. Therefore, the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint was improper, leading to a vacating of the judgment and a remand for further proceedings. Finally, the court confirms that curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots fall under Title II of the ADA, affirming that the plaintiffs have valid claims. The district court's acknowledgment of a two-year statute of limitations and the accrual date was correct, but its burdening of the plaintiffs was not. The judgment of dismissal is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings aligned with this ruling. Prado, Circuit Judge, expresses partial concurrence and dissent regarding when a plaintiff’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accrues. The majority holds that the claim accrues upon the City’s completion of noncompliant construction, a position Prado critiques for neglecting the statute's text and traditional standing rules, potentially undermining the ADA's remedial intent. He contends that a claim should accrue when a plaintiff actually suffers an injury due to their disability, specifically when they encounter a noncompliant facility. Prado emphasizes that claim accrual is linked to the moment an injury occurs, aligning with established legal precedents. He argues that the district court mistakenly applied the discovery rule without first determining when the plaintiffs’ injuries happened, which are distinct inquiries. Prado insists that the focus should remain on the actual injury under the ADA, asserting that a cause of action is only complete and present for limitations purposes when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief, a principle reinforced by Supreme Court precedents. A plaintiff must demonstrate standing, which requires proof of an "injury in fact," to bring a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Specifically, an injury occurs when a qualified individual with a disability is subjected to exclusion or denial of benefits from a public entity's services, programs, or activities. The ADA's focus is on the individual's experience of discrimination; thus, generalized discriminatory acts do not constitute an injury until a specific individual encounters exclusion. A plaintiff's awareness of discriminatory conditions and subsequent avoidance of a public accommodation due to that awareness constitutes injury in fact. Consequently, standing to sue arises only when the plaintiff has encountered the noncompliant facility. Claims under the ADA do not accrue until the injury occurs, which can be influenced by congressional specifications regarding accrual timing. A recent Third Circuit case illustrated this principle. In that case, a nonprofit group sued the Philadelphia subway system over plans that excluded an elevator, but the suit was filed after the plans were known but before construction completion. The court determined that the claim accrued only upon completion of the construction, as the relevant statute's language indicated discrimination occurs if alterations render a public entity's facilities inaccessible. Thus, the court's interpretation of the statute's language defined the timing of the injury and, consequently, the claim's accrual. Plaintiffs allege a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 12132, which prohibits discrimination in public entity services, including accessible sidewalks. The ADA mandates that public entities must incorporate curb cuts in new sidewalk constructions or alterations, as per 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(e)(1). This requirement applies to constructions initiated after January 26, 1992. Importantly, the statute does not specify that injury occurs solely upon completion of construction; rather, it asserts that no qualified individual with a disability should be excluded from public services due to their disability. A key point of potential discrimination is the absence of a curb cut in newly constructed or altered sidewalks. The text of the ADA should guide the analysis of claims, and deviation from standard claims accrual should only occur for compelling reasons. In this context, a plaintiff's injury is recognized when they encounter a noncompliant sidewalk, not merely based on potential future injuries. For instance, a disabled individual unaware of a noncompliant sidewalk would lack standing since they have not experienced an actual injury. Standing under the ADA is predicated on real attempts to use or being deterred from using noncompliant facilities. The reopening of the Grove Street PATH Station does not constitute an injury until plaintiffs attempt to use it and find it inaccessible. Thus, actual denial of access is essential for establishing a plaintiff's injury under the ADA, which in turn starts the statute of limitations, particularly when seeking injunctive relief. To establish standing for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of future injury caused by the defendant, and that the requested relief will prevent this injury. The majority opinion erroneously concludes that a disabled individual experiences a complete cause of action once construction by the City is completed, suggesting that the City’s actions trigger the statute of limitations. However, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 emphasizes the focus on qualified individuals being excluded from or denied access to services, programs, or activities, rather than solely on the City's conduct. The requirement to show a present or future injury is highlighted by the use of the gerund "being," indicating that a plaintiff must prove actual or potential harm to seek injunctive relief. If a plaintiff does not encounter a noncompliant sidewalk or is not deterred from accessing it, they cannot claim to be excluded. Abstract claims of inaccessibility do not suffice for standing, as they constitute conjectural harm. The plaintiffs in the case acknowledge their injury as a continual denial of equal access to Arlington's pedestrian rights-of-way, detailing specific barriers they face daily and their intentions to visit inaccessible locations in the future. The majority fails to recognize that the City's wrongful act and the plaintiffs' injury occur at different times. Citing the Western District of Pennsylvania's decision in *Voices for Independence*, it is clarified that the timing of a defendant’s duty and breach is separate from when a plaintiff's injury occurs. The wrongful act and the resulting injury are distinct, and conflating them misrepresents the legal principles at play. The City unlawfully constructs a noncompliant sidewalk, but individual plaintiffs do not incur injury until they experience a barrier to access. A private right of action exists under Title II of the ADA, requiring actual exclusion from or denial of benefits from the sidewalks or facilities for a plaintiff to claim injury. The wrongful act (construction of the sidewalk) is distinct from the injury (actual denial of access). Thus, the statute of limitations for a claim does not begin until the plaintiffs encounter the noncompliant sidewalk. A plaintiff's cause of action accrues only when they have standing, which necessitates suffering an injury in fact. The principle that the wrongful act and resulting harm are not simultaneous is supported by case law, such as Ramey v. Guyton. The majority's focus on statute of limitations policies overlooks the ADA's intent to eradicate discrimination against individuals with disabilities and the significance of ensuring access to public accommodations, as emphasized by Congressional findings related to curb cuts. The legal commentary highlights concerns regarding a two-year statute of limitations imposed on plaintiffs seeking to address violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) related to sidewalks. This limitation effectively prevents many disabled individuals from pursuing legal action if they are unaware of noncompliant sidewalks until after the two-year period following the City’s construction or alteration of those sidewalks. As a result, the City could potentially evade liability for maintaining noncompliant conditions indefinitely, leaving newly disabled persons or those relocating to the City without recourse against ADA violations. The excerpt critiques the requirement for disabled individuals to actively seek out and identify noncompliant sidewalks shortly after construction, deeming this expectation overly burdensome and contrary to the ADA’s intent to remediate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. It emphasizes that the statute of limitations should not preclude legal action for new injuries arising from past wrongful conduct, arguing that the City’s rationale for imposing such a limitation undermines the protections intended by the ADA. Additionally, the commentary notes that while the City may face liability for ongoing violations, the proposed limitation could unjustly restrict access to justice for individuals who encounter violations after the two-year mark. The majority's rejection of the accrual argument presumes that plaintiffs are not experiencing injuries with each incident of denied access, a position unsupported by the ADA's language or standing principles. The court does not need to determine the applicability of the continuing violation doctrine, but it highlights a concern that if the City avoids litigation for two years, it could evade ADA compliance while disabled individuals continue to suffer injuries due to its wrongful actions. The City can limit its future liability by remedying the original construction issues, as its responsibility does not extend indefinitely. The ADA's intent emphasizes that a plaintiff suffers an injury upon encountering a denial of access to public services or programs. The analysis suggests that a city could be liable for damages long after the original unlawful construction, but the case at hand only seeks injunctive relief, thus sidestepping this question. Typically, monetary damages under the ADA require evidence of intentional discrimination, which is difficult to establish, particularly in cases like the absence of curb cuts on sidewalks. The purposes of monetary damages and injunctive relief differ: damages compensate for past intentional acts, while injunctive relief addresses ongoing injuries. The Supreme Court's ruling allows for damages related to ADA violations linked to constitutional breaches, yet it remains uncertain if damages apply for Title II violations without constitutional infringement. Therefore, the scenarios in which monetary damages are recoverable under the ADA seem limited, easing concerns about a city's financial liability. The court faces a dilemma: it can either uphold statutes of limitations, compromising the ADA's broader objectives, or allow the City to maintain its liability to enable disabled individuals to assert their rights. The author argues against the majority's interpretation regarding the timing of a plaintiff's ability to bring a lawsuit for injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). They contend that a plaintiff should be allowed to file suit within two years of experiencing an injury related to access, specifically when they are unable to access a noncompliant facility, rather than two years from the construction or alteration of that facility. The majority's approach risks allowing public entities to permanently evade accountability for ADA violations if no suits are filed within the two-year window post-construction. The author illustrates this issue with a hypothetical scenario where a city develops an area without curb cuts and no disabled individuals reside there initially. Once residents move in, a disabled person may suffer an injury due to the lack of access, but no legal recourse would be available as no plaintiff existed within the two-year period following construction. This outcome contradicts the ADA's definition of "injury" and the legislative intent behind the Act, which aims to ensure continued compliance with accessibility standards. The dissent emphasizes the necessity of allowing individuals to act as "private attorneys general" to enforce ADA compliance and argues that the city's liability should not be limited to a two-year period when no potential plaintiffs were present. The author concludes that the majority's reasoning is inconsistent with claim accrual principles, the ADA's text, and the overarching goals of the statute.