Linda Lounsbury and William R. Donaldson, Jr. v. Jack Jeffries, Lisa Charton, Richard Baez, Fran Budwitz and James Cameron, Lt.
Docket: 1561
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; May 27, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Plaintiffs Linda Lounsbury and William R. Donaldson, Jr. appealed a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which dismissed their consolidated action for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing Connecticut's two-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs argued that the applicable statute should have been the three-year statute, asserting their suits were timely filed. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversing the lower court's decision and remanding for further proceedings.
On November 14, 1988, Lounsbury and Donaldson were assaulted in their business by Deidre Adams. During the assault, they contacted the Madison Police Department, but upon arrival, the police arrested all three parties involved. After their criminal charges were dismissed, Lounsbury and Donaldson filed their lawsuits in August 1991, approximately two years and nine months post-arrest.
The defendants sought summary judgment, asserting that the statute of limitations for their claims was two years under Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-584. The plaintiffs contended that the correct statute was Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-577, which has a three-year limitation. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants, interpreting § 1983 as primarily addressing failures in duty rather than intentional harm, and thus applied the two-year statute. This led to the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims as time-barred, prompting the appeal.
Plaintiffs assert that Connecticut's statute of limitations for Sec. 1983 claims should be Sec. 52-577, a three-year limit, instead of the two-year limit from Sec. 52-584 applied by the district court. The court agrees, referencing the principle that, in the absence of a federal statute of limitations for Sec. 1983 actions, state statutes must be borrowed. The Supreme Court has clarified that when a state has multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury, the general or residual statute should be used.
In Connecticut, Sec. 52-577 allows three years for tort actions, while Sec. 52-584 limits actions based on negligence or malpractice to two years. The existence of multiple statutes indicates that Connecticut's general or residual statute for personal injury should apply to Sec. 1983 claims. The district court's reliance on Sec. 52-584 is deemed incorrect, as it does not qualify as a residual statute because it does not cover all personal injury actions. Thus, Sec. 52-577 is determined to be the appropriate statute of limitations for these claims.
Section 23 clarifies that the specific provisions it references apply only to certain enumerated negligence actions, not to all personal injury claims. Section 52-577 is identified as a general statute that sets the limitations period for all tort claims, encompassing both negligent and intentional injuries, unless explicitly covered by other statutes. Sections like 52-584 and 52-577c establish specific two-year limitations for certain types of personal injury actions, which serve as exceptions to the general three-year limitation outlined in Section 52-577. Therefore, unless a statute explicitly states otherwise, tort claims in Connecticut are governed by the three-year period of Section 52-577. The critical issue for the Owens analysis is determining the applicable statute of limitations for unenumerated personal injury claims, which in Connecticut is Section 52-577. Consequently, this section should apply to plaintiffs' claims under Section 1983, meaning those claims are not time-barred. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
