Rowland W. Dory v. Burton T. Ryan, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Nassau County Robert Anderson

Citations: 25 F.3d 81; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11792Docket: 1503

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; May 19, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Burton T. Ryan, Jr., an assistant district attorney, petitions for rehearing after the Second Circuit reversed the U.S. District Court's dismissal of Rowland W. Dory's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Dory alleged that Ryan coerced a witness to commit perjury and withheld exculpatory evidence, violating his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the case on statute of limitations grounds and cited absolute immunity for Ryan and Robert Anderson, a police officer involved in Dory's trial. The Second Circuit found Dory's claim timely and determined that Ryan and Anderson were not entitled to absolute immunity due to their involvement in an alleged conspiracy to deprive Dory of his rights. The court referenced San Filippo v. United States Trust Co., which stated that absolute immunity does not apply to conspiratorial actions involving false testimony. Following a Supreme Court ruling in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, which clarified the analysis for determining prosecutorial immunity, Ryan argues that the Second Circuit’s decision conflicts with Buckley and misapplies San Filippo. He seeks affirmation of the dismissal of his case based on these grounds.

Absolute immunity applies to a prosecutor's actions that are closely linked to the judicial process, excluding investigative or administrative functions. The Court clarified in Buckley that immunity covers not only courtroom duties but also actions taken in preparation for trials, including the evaluation of evidence and witness testimony management. Consequently, prosecutors are protected from Section 1983 liability for actions related to their advocacy role, even if those actions involve alleged conspiracies to present false evidence in court. The distinction between presenting perjured testimony and conspiring to do so is significant for witnesses, who lack immunity for extra-judicial actions, but it is not applicable to prosecutors, who are immune for all actions related to their prosecutorial functions. The previous interpretation extending liability for conspiracies to present false testimony to prosecutors has been modified, affirming that prosecutors retain immunity in such cases. The petition to dismiss the case against Prosecutor Ryan is granted, while the status of allegations against Officer Anderson remains unaffected. The San Filippo case, which addressed immunity for grand jury witnesses involved in conspiracies, does not extend to police officers and has not been applied in that context.

Police officers are not to be distinguished from other witnesses concerning the "extra-judicial conspiracy exception" to absolute liability. The case Briscoe v. LaHue established absolute immunity for witnesses, specifically limited to judicial testimony, aimed at encouraging witnesses to provide complete information. This rationale does not extend to cover conspiracies involving false testimony outside judicial proceedings. The San Filippo case clarified that the extra-judicial conspiracy exception applies to police officers as witnesses, establishing this as the law of the Court.

Contrasting cases, such as Malachowski v. City of Keene, assert that immunity from Briscoe does not extend to conspiracies for false testimony, while Miller v. Glanz disagrees with this by applying immunity to perjured testimony conspiracies. The Court finds no reason to exempt Anderson from the San Filippo ruling, unlike prosecutor Ryan. Thus, the previous decision regarding Anderson is upheld, reversing the district court's judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court emphasizes that the case is on sua sponte dismissal with insufficient evidence at this stage to substantiate Dory's claims, which will require further evaluation in future proceedings. 

In conclusion, the petition for rehearing by defendant-appellee Ryan is granted, affirming the district court's judgment, while modifications to the earlier opinion regarding Ryan are made. The judgment concerning Anderson is reversed, and the case is remanded for further action consistent with this opinion.