John Frederick DORMAN, Appellant, v. EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY, Appellee

Citations: 23 F.3d 1354; 1994 WL 164698Docket: 93-2222

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; June 7, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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John Frederick Dorman, a Canadian citizen, filed a diversity action against Emerson Electric Company in the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, following personal injuries he sustained while operating a saw designed by Emerson. Dorman's claims included strict products liability, breach of warranty, negligence, and res ipsa loquitur. Emerson moved to strike the claims based on strict liability, breach of warranty, and res ipsa loquitur, arguing that Canadian law, which they contended was applicable under Missouri's choice-of-law rules, rendered these claims deficient. The District Court granted Emerson's motion to strike and dismissed the entire complaint, including the negligence claim, which Dorman appealed.

Dorman had purchased a Craftsman miter saw from a Canadian retailer, which he modified before it malfunctioned, causing severe injury. Emerson admitted to designing the saw but highlighted that it was manufactured in Taiwan and sold through its Canadian subsidiary. The District Court's ruling was based on the application of the most-significant-relationship test from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, concluding that Canadian law was applicable and that the claims in question were insufficient under that law. The appeal resulted in an affirmation of the District Court's decisions in part, but a reversal and remand in part, specifically regarding the negligence claim.

Dorman contends that the District Court incorrectly applied Canadian law instead of Missouri law to his case. He also argues that if Canadian law is applicable, the court misjudged his claims as materially deficient under that law. Lastly, he asserts that the court abused its discretion by dismissing his negligence claim. The appellate court affirms the District Court’s application of Canadian law and its finding that Dorman's claims for strict products liability, breach of warranty, and res ipsa loquitur are materially deficient. However, it reverses the dismissal of Dorman’s negligence claim and remands for further proceedings.

The District Court's choice of law was guided by Missouri's choice-of-law rules, which necessitate using the most-significant-relationship test from the Restatement. This test assesses the state with the most significant relationship based on the nature of the cause of action and the specific legal issues involved. The court's application of these rules is subject to de novo review. 

According to Section 145 of the Restatement, tort rights and liabilities are determined by the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the accident and the parties. Section 146 specifies that for personal injury actions, the law of the state where the injury occurred typically governs, unless another state has a more significant relationship based on the Restatement's principles. This creates a presumption favoring the law of the injury's occurrence, unless another state demonstrates overriding interests based on Section 6 factors, which include the location of the injury, where the conduct causing the injury occurred, and the parties' residences or business locations.

In Kennedy v. Dixon, the Missouri court applies the Restatement principles regarding choice of law in personal injury cases, particularly when injuries and the conduct causing them occur in different states. The general rule favors the application of the law from the state where the injury occurred, which in this case is Canada, unless another state demonstrates a more significant relationship to the incident and the parties involved. Missouri law emphasizes the quality of contacts rather than their quantity. 

A detailed analysis of the factors outlined in the Restatement is deemed unnecessary, as certain factors are minimally relevant to personal injury claims. Specifically, concerns about justified expectations and uniformity of results are less significant when dealing with unintended injuries. Moreover, the ease of applying either jurisdiction's law does not favor Missouri over Canada in this scenario.

Dorman attempts to challenge the presumption favoring Canadian law by arguing that Missouri's interest is superior because the design of the saw, which is central to the negligence claim, occurred in St. Louis. He posits that this connection indicates a stronger relationship to the case than that of Canada.

The argument presented by Dorman, asserting that the design location of the saw in St. Louis should influence the choice-of-law analysis, is deemed unpersuasive. The court emphasizes that while the design location is relevant, it does not outweigh the presumption under section 146 favoring the law of the place where the injury occurred. Accepting Dorman's perspective would undermine this presumption in most products liability cases, which section 146 does not intend to exclude. The court will evaluate the relevant factors in sections 6 and 145 without overemphasizing the significance of St. Louis.

Dorman also argues for Missouri law based on its interest in deterring corporate wrongdoing. However, Missouri's law is more focused on compensating victims rather than simply deterring conduct. The court references precedents, notably Dunaway v. Fellous, where Missouri law was applied due to a compelling public policy regarding local dram shop liability. In contrast, this case involves a Canadian citizen suing for an injury in Canada, where Missouri's interest in compliance with design standards is less significant than Canada’s interest in protecting its citizens and regulating domestic product safety.

Dorman contends that Canada lacks a significant interest in the litigation since the accident's occurrence in Canada was merely coincidental, asserting that Missouri's interests should take precedence in the choice-of-law analysis. He cites the Restatement commentary and the case Kozoway v. Massey-Ferguson Inc., which posits that the location of an injury is irrelevant if it is fortuitous and disconnected from the parties involved. The commentary offers the "flyover" scenario as an example, where the injury's location is inconsequential. However, the current case differs significantly; Dorman's injury is closely tied to the location as it is where he purchased and used the saw, as well as his residence. 

Additionally, Dorman's reliance on Kozoway, which involved a Canadian citizen suing for injuries in Canada stemming from a product made in Iowa, is found unpersuasive. The court in that instance ruled that the accident's occurrence in Canada was fortuitous, but the Missouri courts are not indicated to follow that reasoning. The court ultimately concludes that Canada's contacts and interests in the case are as substantial as Missouri's, thereby affirming that the presumption for applying the law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred—Canada—has not been surpassed.

Furthermore, Dorman argues that even if Canadian law is applicable, the District Court erred in stating that Canada does not recognize strict products liability or that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to his case. The interpretation of Canadian law by the District Court will be reviewed de novo.

Canadian law does not recognize a theory of strict products liability for plaintiffs, as established by the courts in cases such as Meisel v. Tolko Indus. Ltd. and Phillips v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada. Despite arguments suggesting that Canadian courts impose a form of strict liability on manufacturers, the primary legal sources affirm that such a theory is not valid under Canadian law. The courts have clearly ruled that a cause of action for strict products liability is not permissible.

In terms of res ipsa loquitur, Canadian courts interpret it similarly to the American version, using circumstantial evidence to infer negligence. For res ipsa loquitur to apply, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the object causing injury was under the sole control of the defendant and that the cause of the accident is unknown, allowing negligence to be reasonably inferred. Dorman, however, failed to meet these criteria, as he had control of the saw when the accident occurred, and the cause was known—his injury resulted from removing guards from the saw. Therefore, his claims do not align with the requirements for res ipsa loquitur, which is reserved for incidents where the cause is inexplicable and negligence can be inferred.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the District Court correctly dismissed Dorman's claims based on strict liability and res ipsa loquitur.

Dorman contends that even if Canadian law applies and other claims fail, the District Court improperly dismissed his complaint entirely. During oral arguments, Emerson's counsel conceded that Dorman's negligence claim was not challenged in their motion to strike, which recognized it as valid under Canadian law. The District Court only addressed claims contested by Emerson, leading to the conclusion that the dismissal of Dorman's negligence claim was an inadvertent error, resulting in its reinstatement. The Court affirmed the dismissal of Dorman's claims related to strict liability, breach of warranty, and res ipsa loquitur but reversed the dismissal of the negligence claim. The case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. Emerson's motion to strike portions of Dorman's supplemental appendix, which included a deposition taken after the dismissal, was granted, and Dorman's request to file an amended statement of facts was accepted. The motion to strike was deemed more appropriate as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which the Court noted but did not emphasize. Factors for determining the proper choice of law were referenced, highlighting the need for consistency and predictability. Dorman's allegations included negligence in the design, manufacture, and sale of the saw, which was made in Taiwan and sold in Canada, indicating the irrelevance of the injury occurring in St. Louis. Dorman did not contest the dismissal of his breach of warranty claim under Canadian law, which was based solely on Missouri's Uniform Commercial Code.