Joseph J. O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids William Hegarty Daniel Ostapowicz
Docket: 92-1549
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; July 18, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Joseph J. O'Brien filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Grand Rapids, Police Chief William Hegarty, and Officer Daniel Ostapowicz, claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment rights due to a warrantless search of his home and excessive force during his arrest. The district court ruled in favor of O'Brien, finding that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the police's warrantless actions. The defendants appealed, challenging the district court's findings on three key issues: the legality of the warrantless search, the entitlement of Hegarty and Ostapowicz to qualified immunity, and the determination that the search resulted from an official city policy.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the warrantless search violated O'Brien's rights. However, the appellate court reversed the district court's conclusions regarding qualified immunity for Hegarty and Ostapowicz, as well as the finding that the search was a result of official policy or practice. The case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
The events leading to the lawsuit involved a court officer attempting to seize O'Brien's truck to satisfy a civil judgment. Police were called for assistance, and despite attempts to notify O'Brien at his home, he did not respond. Officers subsequently proceeded with the seizure based on the circumstances.
Johnson was stationed on O'Brien's lawn while a tow truck prepared to take O'Brien's vehicle. He observed O'Brien in his doorway with a rifle, prompting the tow truck driver and a neighbor to seek cover, while Johnson and Officer Baker drew their weapons. Johnson ordered O'Brien to drop the rifle, to which O'Brien responded by refusing and retreating into his house. O'Brien did not threaten anyone with the rifle or point it at them. Following this, Johnson called for backup, leading to the arrival of the Neighborhood Patrol Unit (NPU), trained in handling critical incidents involving barricaded individuals. Lieutenant Ostapowicz became the scene commander, overseeing the incident.
Police evacuated the neighborhood and secured the perimeter. Negotiators attempted to contact O'Brien via phone and loudspeaker for nearly six hours without response. Chief Hegarty arrived and left the scene twice during this period. During this time, police learned of O'Brien's history of mental health issues and violent behavior but did not inform him of any arrest. Hegarty expressed uncertainty about whether O'Brien had committed an arrestable offense.
As the situation progressed, Ostapowicz and Hegarty devised a plan to utilize three probes to gain insight into O'Brien's location and facilitate communication. They believed no search warrant was necessary under the circumstances. The first probe was authorized at 4:25 p.m., but initial attempts to see inside O'Brien's house were unsuccessful due to visibility issues. Eventually, at 5:25 p.m., Officer Ingalls broke part of the window to improve visibility and allow O'Brien to hear announcements, though he still could not see O'Brien.
A negotiator used a bullhorn to communicate with O'Brien, who expressed a desire to avoid jail by yelling, "I don't want to go to jail," at 5:51 p.m. Following an escalation, including Ingalls breaking a window, O'Brien fired around ten shots at the police at 5:55 p.m. Police Chief Hegarty noted that O'Brien posed no physical threat until he fired shots. At 6:27 p.m., Hegarty issued a shoot-to-kill order, and police attempted to communicate with O'Brien for two hours using tear gas and stun grenades, which were ineffective. At 8:43 p.m., Officer Stan Lis shot O'Brien in the neck, resulting in O'Brien becoming a quadriplegic. Although O'Brien was not charged for the initial confrontation, he was later convicted of assault for firing at police.
O'Brien filed a lawsuit against the City of Grand Rapids and several officers under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment rights due to illegal searches and excessive force. The trial court ruled against Hegarty and Ostapowicz on the search claim, stating they violated O'Brien's rights by authorizing probes without a warrant and that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also ruled against the City, attributing the Fourth Amendment violation to its policies. After a mistrial, a settlement conference led to an agreement on all claims except the Fourth Amendment search claim, which the defendants appealed after a final judgment was entered on April 9, 1992.
To succeed in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action, a plaintiff must demonstrate deprivation of a constitutional right by someone acting under state law without due process. The defendants disputed the court's finding of a Fourth Amendment violation regarding the unwarranted physical probes conducted by the police.
Hegarty and Ostapowicz claim qualified immunity under section 1983, while the city contends it cannot be liable because O'Brien did not prove the constitutional violation stemmed from an official city policy. The federal rule on judgment as a matter of law allows a court to grant such a motion if there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to rule for the party in question. This motion can be made anytime before the jury's submission, and the reviewing court must view evidence favorably for the non-moving party, without weighing it or assessing witness credibility. For the Fourth Amendment violation, the defendants argued that exigent circumstances justified their warrantless search of O'Brien's house. However, the district court determined that the defendants did not provide enough facts for a reasonable jury to find such circumstances existed. O'Brien maintained that even with probable cause, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches without exigent circumstances, which he contended were absent in this case. The Fourth Amendment safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring warrants based on probable cause, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment safeguards an individual’s privacy, particularly within the confines of their home, which is strongly protected against unreasonable government intrusion. The Amendment establishes a clear principle: the right to be secure in one's home prohibits warrantless searches and seizures, barring exigent circumstances that justify such actions. A warrant is essential for police to enter a residence, even with probable cause, unless immediate and serious consequences would arise from delaying action to obtain a warrant. These "exigent circumstances" typically involve the potential destruction of evidence or the need to protect life or prevent serious injury. Various Supreme Court cases illustrate exceptions to the warrant requirement, including scenarios of hot pursuit, searches incident to arrest, and searches conducted under the plain view doctrine, among others. The defendants acknowledge that their search of O'Brien's home was warrantless but claim it was justified by hot pursuit and other exigent circumstances.
The defendants argued that the police had probable cause to believe O'Brien committed an assault and that they were in "hot pursuit," justifying warrantless probes. However, the court found that the "hot pursuit" exception did not apply because Officer Johnson did not pursue O'Brien initially, opting instead to secure the area with backup, which did not indicate immediate danger. O'Brien was contained, posed no threat during the six hours before the probe, and had not acted violently or threatened anyone. The court emphasized that for exigent circumstances to apply, there must be an immediate threat, which was not established in this case.
The defendants further claimed that the situation posed a threat to officer and public safety, but again, the court noted that the perceived threat was not immediate and that no actions against the officers occurred during the relevant time. The court affirmed that the trial court correctly concluded that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers' failure to obtain a warrant before the probe.
The police also sought to categorize their situation with O'Brien as a "critical incident," arguing for a new per se rule for exigent circumstances. The court rejected this notion, stating that allowing officers to determine when to bypass a warrant requirement undermines the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches. It reiterated the importance of a disinterested judicial determination in warrant issuance and declined to create a blanket exception for critical incidents, emphasizing that not all such situations inherently justify warrantless searches.
O'Brien's interaction with Johnson began at approximately 11:50 a.m., and there was a significant delay before O'Brien fired shots at 5:55 p.m., during which police did not attempt to arrest him, indicating he had retreated from the confrontation. The four-and-a-half-hour wait by the officers before deploying the first probe undermines the defendants' assertion of exigent circumstances that would have justified a warrantless arrest. The district court ruled on this matter as a question of law, as the undisputed facts did not allow for differing interpretations by a rational jury.
Defendants Hegarty and Ostapowicz claimed qualified immunity, arguing that O'Brien failed to demonstrate that no reasonable officer could have perceived exigent circumstances. O'Brien countered that his right to be free from unreasonable searches was well established, asserting that no rational officer would have deemed exigent circumstances existed justifying a warrantless search. The determination of qualified immunity is a legal question for the district court, and no deference is owed to its conclusions.
Qualified immunity typically shields officers from liability for discretionary actions unless they were aware or should have been aware that their actions would violate constitutional rights or acted with malicious intent to deprive someone of those rights. The assessment of qualified immunity focuses on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the officer's actions in relation to clearly established law at the time. To evaluate whether Hegarty and Ostapowicz are immune, it must be determined if O'Brien identified a clearly established right that was allegedly violated and whether a reasonable officer in their position should have recognized that their conduct violated that right. The right in question pertains to protection against warrantless searches absent exigent circumstances, thus necessitating an evaluation of whether a reasonable officer would believe exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search given the circumstances and established law at the time.
Determining the objective legal reasonableness for qualified immunity requires a case-by-case analysis to ascertain if the plaintiff's constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Officials can claim immunity if reasonable officers could disagree on whether their actions violated those rights. The subjective beliefs of the officers, Hegarty and Ostapowicz, regarding the existence of exigent circumstances are deemed irrelevant; the assessment must be based on objective reasonableness. If it is determined that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to act without a warrant due to exigent circumstances, they would be protected by qualified immunity.
The argument that the officers were in hot pursuit of the suspect, O'Brien, is dismissed, as a four-and-a-half-hour delay contradicts that claim. However, the court acknowledges that reasonable officers could view the overall situation as an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless action. The officers faced a barricaded gunman with a violent history, and the circumstances included an evacuated neighborhood and the potential for immediate danger. While the law may not excuse the officers from obtaining a warrant, their assessment of the situation as exigent was not so objectively unreasonable as to impose personal liability for their actions while executing their official duties.
Officers Hegarty and Ostapowicz were found to be entitled to qualified immunity in relation to a warrantless search, as reasonable officers could have believed exigent circumstances justified their actions. The district court's judgment against them was deemed erroneous. Regarding municipal liability, while the court initially found the city liable for violating O'Brien's rights based on city policy, there was dissent on this issue. Municipalities can be held liable under Section 1983 if they are responsible for a constitutional violation, which requires proof of: 1) deprivation of a constitutional right; 2) existence of a municipal policy; and 3) that policy being the "moving force" behind the violation. A single decision by a municipal policymaker can constitute a policy, but liability arises only when that official has the final authority to set policy and has made a deliberate choice among alternatives. Mere discretionary authority does not equate to policymaking. The court must evaluate state and local laws to determine if an official has final policymaking authority. Since Hegarty and Ostapowicz authorized the probes that violated O'Brien's rights, the city could be liable if their decision not to seek a warrant represented the city's final policy, despite the city's claim that this decision was merely a discretionary choice.
The Grand Rapids City Charter grants the city manager authority over the police, allowing officers to exercise powers typical of metropolitan police. The police department's Manual of Procedures includes a 'Response to Critical Incidents' protocol, which Hegarty helped develop, but does not define 'critical incident' beyond suggesting scenarios like hostage situations. The manual specifies that tactical probes should only be conducted under the tactical commander's direction, without drawing attention, and requires at least two trained officers for these probes. However, the manual lacks guidelines for when officers should seek search warrants or explicitly permits searches during critical incidents.
Hegarty claimed he had the authority to decide on obtaining arrest and search warrants and how to respond to critical incidents; nevertheless, all officers also possess discretion regarding warrant requests. Ostapowicz noted the absence of a formal policy on seeking warrants during critical incidents, indicating that the department does not prohibit such requests. Both Hegarty and Ostapowicz would have sought a warrant if deemed necessary during a specific incident.
O'Brien failed to provide evidence that the city has delegated final policy decision-making authority regarding warrant acquisition to the chief of police. While Hegarty may be a policymaker in setting police department policies, his decisions on individual cases do not automatically reflect municipal policy. In this instance, he acted within the 'Response to Critical Incidents' policy, opting for probes without a search warrant. Since all officers, including the chief, share discretion on warrant requests, the decision to proceed without a warrant was based on individual discretion rather than a municipal policy. Thus, the court's judgment against the city was deemed erroneous.
The judgment against the City of Grand Rapids is affirmed, while the judgments concerning Hegarty and Ostapowicz are reversed, with directions to enter a judgment for them. Judge Joiner concurs in parts of Judge Ryan's opinion regarding the violation of Joseph O'Brien's Fourth Amendment rights, recognizing that although the officers are protected by qualified immunity, the City is liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for the constitutional violation.
In 1981, the City prioritized developing a critical incident procedure, enlisting retired Captain Frank Bolz, an expert in critical incident management. Bolz reviewed the procedures, which failed to address the need for warrants, and deemed them adequate. Training sessions conducted in 1982-1984, led by Bolz, instructed officers on the legality of breaking windows during critical incidents without warrants, asserting that the warrant requirement from *Payton v. New York* did not apply. Bolz argued that using a probe to locate a person in their home did not constitute a "search" or "seizure."
Police Chief Hegarty acknowledged in his testimony that no warrant was sought prior to using probes on O'Brien’s residence, citing departmental routine practice as the reason, not a lack of time or resources. His statements made it clear that the decision was not influenced by any immediate emergencies at O'Brien's location.
The routine practice during critical incidents was not to obtain a warrant, as explained by Chief Hegarty, who stated there was no intent to physically search the residence and deemed a warrant unnecessary in such emergency situations. This approach aligned with the police department's historical practice, where warrants were not sought in prior critical incidents. Lieutenant Ostrapowicz acknowledged Hegarty's testimony but disagreed with the notion that the department had a blanket policy against obtaining warrants, asserting that officers had discretion based on legal guidance.
Hegarty, as chief of police, held final decision-making authority regarding warrant acquisition and the execution of critical incident procedures, which were confirmed to represent the city's final decisions. The city's argument at trial that the county prosecutor held this authority was dismissed by the trial court as unsubstantiated, and the assertion that the city manager was the policymaker for warrant acquisition was not advanced on appeal.
The excerpt emphasizes the necessity of police training in terrorism response, indicating that officers must react swiftly and lawfully to volatile situations. The actions of Hegarty and Ostrapowicz were consistent with departmental teachings and practices, deemed objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Consequently, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as their responses were not unreasonable given their training and the challenges presented by the incident. Although the city’s policy or practice may have been problematic, liability was not imposed on the officers for following those established practices, as they were based on credible national guidelines for managing critical incidents.
Officers are entitled to qualified immunity as their actions aligned with established policy, practice, or custom. However, the City of Grand Rapids cannot create policies that violate the law and subsequently claim immunity based on the legality suggested by a national authority. Judge Ryan highlighted that the procedures taught by Captain Bolz infringed upon O'Brien's Fourth Amendment rights, which implicates the city if these were indeed its policies. Unlike individual officers, cities lack the protection of qualified immunity and must ensure their policies reflect lawful standards. Liability under Section 1983 arises when a government policy or custom, enacted by its officials or representatives, directly causes harm. To establish a claim under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, a plaintiff must identify a specific policy, link it to the city, and demonstrate that the injury resulted from its enforcement. A "custom" must be a longstanding practice that functions with the authority of law. The evidence presented at trial indicated that Grand Rapids' official policy stemmed from Captain Bolz's training, which improperly instructed officers that warrants were unnecessary during critical incidents. This policy was established through significant resources dedicated to training and manual development but was ultimately illegal.
The commitment of resources by the City of Grand Rapids over four years was not an act of renegades operating beyond their authority, as the response plan was aimed at protecting innocent citizens in challenging circumstances. This commitment established a city policy, and the plaintiff is not required to prove that unnamed individuals authorized it to qualify as the "official" policy. The city cannot negate the official nature of the policy by referencing an obscure charter provision related to the department's supervisor.
The city failed to provide evidence or legal argument that any authority had the power to influence or approve the response plan's development. The trial judge's inquiry did not yield evidence that previous response plans were deemed inaccurate by city officials. On appeal, the city argued that the police department's actions required the manager's approval; however, the court would not assume such approval without evidence.
The court evaluated whether the trial court correctly granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law, determining that the evidence did not present disputed facts. The record supported the trial court's decision to impose liability on the city, and the plaintiff successfully demonstrated injury resulting from the implementation of the response plan, which violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Consequently, the judgment against the City of Grand Rapids was affirmed.
Concurrence is expressed regarding Judge Ryan's finding that the warrantless use of probes violated O'Brien's Fourth Amendment rights and Judge Joiner's determination that the City of Grand Rapids is liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. However, there is dissent concerning the majority's qualified immunity analysis for the officers involved. It is asserted that reasonable officers would understand that a warrantless search, absent exigent circumstances, is unconstitutional, and in this case, no exigency was present. The actions of the officers, described as unreasonable and overzealous, are criticized for surrounding O'Brien's home, breaking windows, and acting without probable cause, highlighting that O'Brien posed no overt threat. The dissent condemns the officers' failure to seek a warrant, equating their behavior to that of a lynch mob, ultimately leading to O'Brien being paralyzed. The dissenters argue this situation is precisely what the Fourth Amendment aims to prevent, advocating for the affirmation of the district court's ruling denying qualified immunity to the officers. Additionally, the text notes that the district court recognized the probes as a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and that the issue of excessive force related to O'Brien's arrest is settled and not under review. The court has previously identified specific exigent circumstances that can justify warrantless arrests, none of which applied in this case. Bolz's testimony was also noted, indicating that a warrant was not sought in critical incidents he responded to during his police career.
