Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; April 29, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Robert Walker, the plaintiff-appellant, appeals a judgment from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, which dismissed his complaint against L. Bates, a Tier III Hearing Officer at Southport Correctional Facility. Walker claimed that his constitutional procedural due process rights were violated during a disciplinary hearing that led to his confinement to the Special Housing Unit (SHU). The district court ruled that any procedural deficiencies were rectified by an administrative appeal that reversed Bates' decision, thus dismissing the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
On December 5, 1990, Walker received an Inmate Misbehavior Report from Officer P. Youmans, charging him with possessing contraband (a metal rod) and excess state bedding (an extra pillow and sheets). Walker denied these charges, asserting the items belonged to a previous occupant of his cell. A Tier III hearing was held on December 10, 1990, where Walker pleaded not guilty and requested to call three witnesses, all of which Bates denied. Bates found Walker guilty and sentenced him to 120 days in SHU.
Walker appealed Bates’ decision to Donald Selsky, who reversed it on February 11, 1991, expunged Walker’s record, and mandated a rehearing within seven days. However, a rehearing did not occur within that timeframe, and Walker remained in SHU until February 22, 1991. Subsequently, Walker filed a pro se complaint for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, initially naming Bates, Superintendent Robert McClellan, and Commissioner Thomas Coughlin as defendants, but later amended the complaint to dismiss Coughlin and McClellan.
Walker claims he was wrongfully denied the opportunity to call witnesses during his hearing, asserting that their testimonies could have supported his defense and potentially changed the hearing's outcome. He seeks damages for his entire duration in the Special Housing Unit (SHU). On September 21, 1992, Bates filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), contending that an administrative appeal rectified any procedural issues from the hearing. However, in a Report and Recommendation dated October 9, 1992, Magistrate Judge Fisher advised the district court to deny the motion, determining that Walker's inability to call witnesses and his subsequent SHU confinement constituted a valid claim under section 1983 and that the administrative reversal did not remedy the hearing's deficiencies. The District Judge, in a Decision and Order on January 5, 1992, rejected the Magistrate's recommendation, stating that an administrative reversal sufficed to correct any constitutional violations, thus dismissing Walker's complaint with prejudice. Walker filed a timely appeal.
The excerpt further outlines the regulations governing SHUs in New York correctional facilities, which require single-occupancy cells for inmates separated from the general population, aimed at maintaining safety and security. SHU confinement entails restrictions on personal belongings, shower, and exercise privileges. Admissions to the SHU can occur for disciplinary reasons or other approved purposes as outlined in the regulations, which also specify the procedural requirements for disciplinary hearings, including timely service of the Misbehavior Report, the inmate's right to assistance, presence at the hearing, and the ability to present evidence.
Inmate regulations allow inmates to call witnesses whose testimony is material, non-redundant, and does not threaten institutional safety or correctional goals. If a witness request is denied, the hearing officer must provide a written explanation detailing the safety concerns. If a witness is excluded, their statement may be recorded and made available to the inmate. Inmates can request witnesses before or during the hearing, and these procedures align with due process rights established in *Wolff v. McDonnell*. Restrictive confinement as a disciplinary sanction invokes a protected liberty interest, necessitating due process protections, including the right to call witnesses. A denial of this right constitutes a compensable due process violation.
The case focuses on whether New York's administrative appeals process remedied the violation. The inmate, Walker, appealed, leading to a reversal of his hearing disposition and an order for a new hearing, which was never conducted. Walker was ultimately discharged after prolonged confinement. A similar case (*Cleavinger v. Saxner*) determined that members of a federal prison discipline committee are entitled to qualified, not absolute, immunity for constitutional violations, affirming that due process rights were violated when inmates were denied the ability to call witnesses or cross-examine accusers. The appellate court upheld a jury's finding of due process violations, resulting in damages awarded to the inmates.
The Supreme Court in *Cleavinger* rejected the government's claim of absolute immunity for prison disciplinary committee members, concluding that qualified immunity sufficiently protects them in their adjudications. The Court emphasized that committee members should adhere to the constitutional standards set forth in *Wolff v. McDonnell* to avoid liability. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued for absolute immunity based on the existence of an administrative appeals process, suggesting that such a system could vindicate prisoners' claims, thereby justifying absolute immunity under *Butz v. Economou*. However, the majority differentiated between those eligible for absolute immunity and the prison committee members, noting that these members are not professional judges but rather Bureau of Prisons employees, whose credibility assessments often involve conflicts between staff and inmates. The Court did not directly address whether a successful administrative appeal would bar recovery under Section 1983 but allowed the damages judgment to stand, indicating that qualified immunity was adequate protection for the committee members regardless of the appeal's outcome.
Additionally, a prior ruling in *Patterson* established that New York prison officials could be liable for damages due to constitutional violations when they failed to adhere to state law or *Wolff*'s due process requirements, even when administrative remedies were available. In that case, although an administrative appeal was unsuccessful, a subsequent state court order mandated the inmate's release and the expungement of his disciplinary record. The *Patterson* ruling clarified that a pre-punishment hearing is necessary for due process, and a post-deprivation hearing cannot rectify constitutional violations. Importantly, the court noted that once a constitutional violation occurs, subsequent state actions cannot extinguish the Section 1983 claim.
In Young v. Hoffman, 970 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1992), the court reversed a District Judge's summary judgment that awarded nominal damages to a New York prison inmate who was denied the right to call witnesses, be present, and have an impartial hearing officer during his disciplinary hearing. The reversal was based on the fact that the Department of Correctional Services vacated the hearing's penalty and expunged records before the inmate served any confinement, leading to the conclusion that he did not suffer any interference with a liberty interest.
In Russell v. Scully, 15 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 1994), the court addressed due process rights in disciplinary contexts but did not resolve whether punishment during an appeal violates due process. The inmate alleged inadequate examination of informant credibility by the Hearing Officer; however, the court found no established constitutional inadequacy in the officer's procedures, granting qualified immunity and summary judgment.
The Russell case established that the inmate would not have been released from the Special Housing Unit (SHU) regardless of the appeal outcome, thus he did not experience constitutional harm from confinement during the appeal. In contrast, in the current case, Walker's confinement was solely for punishment, with no other justifiable reasons for his SHU placement. He began serving his disciplinary sentence immediately post-hearing and remained there until his release, highlighting a distinct situation from Russell regarding the nature of confinement and due process claims. The document notes that federal criminal appellants often serve sentences while their convictions are reversed, lacking due process damage claims, implying that disparities in immunity types affect the outcomes in these cases.
Judicial officials performing purely judicial functions are granted absolute immunity, as established in cases like Stump v. Sparkman and Butz v. Economou. Conversely, officials adjudicating prison disciplinary hearings receive only qualified immunity, as highlighted in Cleavinger v. Saxner. This qualified immunity does not extend to claims arising from procedural rights violations during disciplinary hearings, meaning that prison officials may be liable for damages if they deprive inmates of these rights without just cause. In the current case, a Hearing Officer denied an inmate's request for witness testimony without justification, suggesting a procedural violation. The court ruled that the inmate's success in the administrative appeal does not preclude his section 1983 claim, which is valid for further consideration. The district court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. A dissenting opinion argues that the majority misapplies precedents like Cleavinger and Patterson, asserting that these cases do not address the absolute immunity of prison officials in this context and that the conclusion drawn by the majority lacks solid precedent. The dissent emphasizes that a due process violation gives rise to a claim regardless of subsequent state actions.
Patterson does not address whether a constitutional violation occurs when a disciplinary ruling is reversed through a prison's internal process. The majority opinion distinguishes this case from Russell v. Scully and Young v. Hoffman based on the differing circumstances in those cases, particularly regarding qualified immunity and the initiation of disciplinary sentences. The ruling in Young primarily hinged on the administrative correction of the disciplinary determination. The author asserts that there is no controlling precedent from the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit on this matter, advocating that no procedural due process violation arises under Section 1983 when a disciplinary breach is corrected through a timely internal appeal.
The author cites statistics from the New York prison system to argue against treating every disciplinary action as a potential Section 1983 violation if it is later rectified. The author emphasizes that inmates' constitutional rights are limited due to their convictions, and that allowing internal appeals promotes careful oversight of disciplinary actions, reducing the need for judicial intervention. A Section 1983 remedy would only be appropriate if there is no available or timely appellate process following a disciplinary decision. The author concludes by expressing agreement with the district court's judgment while noting the potential for a delayed disciplinary sentence to raise issues of due process.
