Rudolph Schlosser v. Culligan International Corporation
Docket: 93-3014
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; May 10, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) prohibits citing unpublished orders as precedent, except for specific legal doctrines. Rudolph Schlosser appealed the district court's summary judgment favoring Culligan International regarding his age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The court confirmed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, noting a timely appeal from a final decision involving a federal question. Schlosser argued that the district court improperly made credibility assessments and failed to favor him in drawing reasonable inferences per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
The court found Schlosser did not establish a genuine issue of fact warranting a trial. To prove age discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate: being over 40, meeting job expectations, qualification for the position, experiencing a materially adverse employment action, and being replaced by someone younger. The district court acknowledged Schlosser's age and employment history but concluded he had not sufficiently countered Culligan's non-discriminatory reasons for his discharge.
Culligan's evidence included Schlosser's consistent tardiness in report submissions, public challenges to superiors, neglect of account follow-ups, and other performance issues. While Schlosser did not dispute these deficiencies, he attributed them to understaffing and misassignment. Ultimately, the court determined that Schlosser failed to show Culligan's reasons for termination were a pretext for discrimination.
Schlosser, on appeal, acknowledges the deficiencies in his work performance but offers explanations rather than disputing them. He cites inadequate time and secretarial support for failing to complete assignments on time and claims he was relieved of responsibility for a specific task, arguing that he was unaware his new supervisor expected him to handle the UCC-1 financing statement. He further contends that he did not perform certain assignments because he found them impractical or could not adopt a positive attitude towards them. Schlosser did not submit required activity letters, believing his department was not progressing properly, and he defends his approval of a note with an incorrect credit rate by asserting it caused no real harm since it was not binding.
Despite his explanations, Schlosser fails to demonstrate that the employer's assessment of his performance as inadequate or noncompliant with authority was erroneous. He misunderstands the burden of proof in alleging discrimination, which requires showing that the employer's rationale for his treatment is a pretext rather than a valid reason. To establish this, he could have provided evidence that his claimed deficiencies were untrue, that the employer's demands were fabricated, that younger employees received more lenient treatment, or that the expectations imposed on him were unreasonable. However, he has not done so, relying solely on personal testimony without any objective evidence to substantiate his claims. This lack of comparative or statistical data undermines his position, as he fails to demonstrate that the demands he faced were so excessive as to imply discrimination.
To establish pretext in discrimination claims, a plaintiff must provide more than self-serving assertions that challenge their employer's judgment. In Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., it was emphasized that self-serving statements do not prove employer dishonesty or that the reasons given for adverse employment actions are pretextual. The evidence presented by Schlosser indicated that his superior had consulted legal counsel following performance-related dissatisfaction, which did not imply age discrimination. At oral arguments, Schlosser's counsel failed to identify any specific disputes regarding evidence relevant to pretext, merely arguing that age discrimination itself was in dispute, which is insufficient. Courts must evaluate evidence at the summary judgment stage to avoid unnecessary trials. Schlosser contested that the district court improperly favored his employer's credibility, but the court's judgment was based on documented performance deficiencies that Schlosser did not refute. Although Schlosser referenced prior excellent evaluations, they indicated significant shortcomings in key areas, supporting the conclusion that he did not meet the company's legitimate expectations. Schlosser's argument regarding the application of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks was dismissed, as the Supreme Court clarified that proving pretext does not automatically favor the plaintiff. Schlosser failed to demonstrate any material facts indicating that his employer's reasons for adverse actions were fabricated. Consequently, the summary judgment for Culligan International, Inc. was affirmed by the court.
