Bobby Johnson v. Pepperidge Farm, Incorporated

Citations: 23 F.3d 401; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 18484; 1994 WL 118100Docket: 93-1386

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; April 4, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Bobby Johnson, the plaintiff-appellant, was terminated by Pepperidge Farm, Inc., following an on-the-job injury that caused him to miss work for over a year. Pepperidge Farm enforced its attendance policy, which stipulates that employees cannot be absent for more than twelve months. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's summary judgment in favor of Pepperidge Farm, dismissing Johnson's claims for retaliatory discharge, bad faith discharge, violation of public policy, and emotional distress. Johnson, who was employed since 1978 and reassigned in 1989, sustained a back injury in February 1990, leading to a prolonged absence. His workers' compensation claim was initially denied, but later affirmed by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, which recognized his injury as work-related. Throughout his absence, Johnson was informed about the company's policy limit on leaves of absence. Despite maintaining communication with human resources, he failed to return to work by the mandated deadline. Consequently, his employment was terminated effective March 26, 1991. Johnson's condition was deemed permanent, with a reported twenty-five percent total loss of mobility. The appellate court found no merit in Johnson's appeal, affirming the lower court's decision.

Johnson testified to experiencing double vision, high blood pressure, an inability to lift over 15 pounds, and an inability to drive. His therapist expressed optimism for his return to work in 4-6 months. The account specialist position required driving 25,000 to 35,000 miles annually and lifting up to 25 pounds. After Johnson's termination, his supervisor, Bruton, and area sales manager Dennis Smith visited his home to retrieve a company car, during which Johnson alleged they verbally abused him and that Bruton doubted the legitimacy of his injury, leading to Johnson experiencing an anxiety attack. Bruton denied making disparaging remarks, and Johnson later acknowledged that the confrontation was minimal. 

The district court's summary judgment was reviewed de novo, affirming that summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as stated in Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56. Johnson contended that the court overlooked inferences related to his retaliatory discharge claim against Pepperidge Farm. North Carolina law prohibits employers from discharging or demoting employees for participating in workers' compensation proceedings (N.C. Gen.Stat. Sec. 97-6-1). The employer bears the burden of proof for certain defenses, including willful absenteeism or violating company policy.

The district court determined that Pepperidge Farm had valid statutory defenses under subsections (c) and (e) of the statute, particularly under Sec. 97-6-1(e), which allows employers to terminate employees who have a permanent disability that interferes with job performance. The court referenced Johnson v. Builders Transport, Inc., supporting summary judgment for an employer in a similar context.

The court of appeals determined that the employer's reasons for terminating Bobby Johnson were irrelevant due to the unchallenged evidence of a legitimate defense under Sec. 97-6-1(e). Johnson had a permanent partial disability that hindered his work performance. The district court also found that Pepperidge Farm successfully demonstrated the affirmative defense of willful or habitual absence under Sec. 97-6-1(c), which applies when an employee violates a known company policy. Johnson violated the absence control policy and acknowledged prior notification of this rule, justifying Pepperidge Farm's entitlement to summary judgment.

Johnson's claims for bad faith discharge and discharge in violation of public policy were dismissed. North Carolina does not recognize a claim for bad faith discharge, as established by case law, including English v. General Electric Co. and confirmed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co. Johnson's public policy claim asserted that retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim violated state public policy. However, the court found that this case did not meet the specific contexts where public policy violations are actionable, as established in past rulings. Additionally, since there was no violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. Sec. 97-6.1, there could be no corresponding violation of public policy related to that statute.

Appellant's claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress were dismissed, with the court affirming the district court's ruling. For intentional infliction, the legal criteria require extreme and outrageous conduct meant to cause severe emotional distress, which must exceed societal tolerances. The court determined that the appellant's allegations of verbal abuse did not meet this threshold under North Carolina law. Additionally, the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress was invalidated as North Carolina's workers' compensation act bars common law negligence claims related to workplace injuries. The court upheld the dismissal of all of the appellant's claims, affirming the district court's summary judgment favoring Pepperidge Farm, Inc., which had terminated the appellant after he missed over a year of work due to a back injury. The company’s attendance policy, which limits absences to one year, was cited in the decision. The appellant’s injury, initially deemed not work-related by the workers' compensation carrier, was later recognized as compensable by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, but this did not impact the validity of the dismissal.

On January 23, 1991, Johnson was notified that if he did not return to work by March 26, 1991, his employment would be terminated under the company's absence control policy. By mid-March, Johnson had not returned, leading to his termination effective March 26, 1991. Johnson's disability was permanent, with a 25% total loss of mobility as determined by the Industrial Commission. He reported experiencing double vision, high blood pressure, and limitations on lifting and driving. The role of account specialist required extensive driving and the ability to lift up to 25 pounds.

After his termination, Johnson alleged verbal abuse from his supervisor Bruton and area sales manager Smith during a visit to collect a company car, claiming Bruton doubted the legitimacy of his injury, which caused him anxiety. Bruton denied making any disparaging comments, and Johnson later acknowledged that the confrontation was minimal.

The excerpt discusses the standard for summary judgment, stating it is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Johnson contended that the district court overlooked inferences regarding his retaliatory discharge claim against Pepperidge Farm. Under North Carolina law, specifically N.C. Gen.Stat. Sec. 97-6-1, it is unlawful for an employer to discharge or demote an employee for participating in workers' compensation proceedings. The burden of proof for such claims lies with the employee.

Employers can assert an affirmative defense against claims of retaliatory discharge if the employee demonstrates willful or habitual tardiness or absence, or if the employee violates a specific written company policy after being warned, with the consequence outlined. The district court ruled that Pepperidge Farm was entitled to these defenses based on the statutory provisions. In the case of Johnson v. Builders Transport, the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a summary judgment favoring the employer where the employee's permanent partial disability hindered work performance, indicating that the employer's reasons for termination were irrelevant when a bona fide defense existed. In Johnson's case, his permanent partial disability similarly affected his ability to work. Furthermore, Johnson's violation of Pepperidge Farm's absence control policy, along with his acknowledgment of prior notice regarding this policy, supported the employer's entitlement to summary judgment. 

Regarding Johnson's claims for bad faith discharge and discharge in violation of public policy, the district court dismissed the bad faith discharge claim since North Carolina does not recognize such a cause of action, as established in recent case law. The claim for discharge in violation of public policy, however, is an accepted exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in North Carolina.

Johnson contends that his termination for filing a workers' compensation claim violates North Carolina's retaliatory discharge statute, which reflects public policy against such retaliatory actions. The public policy exception has been narrowly applied in North Carolina, primarily in situations where an employer's actions harm the public good or force employees into illegal choices, as established in case law such as *Coman* and *Sides*. These exceptions include cases where employees were dismissed for refusing to engage in illegal activities or where terminations contradicted express policies in state law.

However, the court agrees with the district court that Johnson's case does not fit within these limited contexts, especially since there was no violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-6.1, negating any public policy violation under this statute. Additionally, Johnson's claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress were also dismissed. For intentional infliction, the court noted that the alleged conduct did not rise to the extreme level required under North Carolina law. Furthermore, the claim for negligent infliction was barred by the state's workers' compensation act, which limits common law negligence claims. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Johnson's claims, deeming his assignments of error without merit.